# Open source `kaal:entity:open-source` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 32 claims that carry the concept tag `open-source`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 32 claims across 11 works, 2017 to 2022. **2017** - [3067615-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because token offerings are built on open source code, the utility of an issued token can at any time be recreated in another token with essentially identical features at marginal cost, so investors cannot rely on the implicit promise that promoters and developers will increase the value of the acquired token rather than launch a duplicate. > Investors cannot rely on the implicit promise that the token promoters and their developers will increase the value of the acquired token and not create another token with identical features. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 - [3067615-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3067615-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Legacy businesses own their code and can sue competitors who copy it, whereas open source crypto start-ups rely only on licenses, and this weaker incentive structure makes ICO investments riskier. > While open-source crypto start-ups have licenses that help protect them from competitor companies who may be using their code for profit, legacy businesses that own their code and can sue competitors who copy such code which provides a different incentive structure and makes ICO investments riskier. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings Emerging Practices, Risk Factors, and Red Flags (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067615 **2018** - [3128900-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-043) [mechanism/argued] -- Building interface modules as reusable open source components lets future requesters build new modules on existing ones, which generates network effects within the platform. > All open source software components of modules are reusable and enable future requesters to build new modules on existing ones, enabling superior network effects within the Semada Platform. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 - [3227933-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-033) [mechanism/argued] -- A DAO inhibits rent-seeking and delivers transparency because its governance protocols are open source, so weaknesses are constantly tested and revised in the open rather than hidden inside a managerial hierarchy. > Such an organization inhibits "rent-seeking" and offers transparency. And they are secure. For instance, the governance protocols used in a DAO are open source and weaknesses are constantly tested and revised. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933 **2019** - [3406323-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-010) [mechanism/argued] -- In decentralized systems profit generation rests less on capitalistic economies of scale and more on open source volunteer contributions and greater good perspectives, with profits arising only if and when the solutions become mainstream. > The profit generation is less based on capitalistic notions of economies of scale but rather revolves around notions of open source volunteer contributions and greater good perspectives for society. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323 **2021** - [3782192-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-033) [predictive/argued] -- The proposed technological upgrades to democracy would be trivial to implement by reusing existing open source projects, yet they are unlikely to happen naturally without a powerful catalyst in the form of coherent social demand. > These changes would be technologically trivial to implement, cutting and pasting ex- isting open source projects. This is quite unlikely to happen naturally, however, with- out a powerful catalyst—coherent social demand. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192 - [3782198-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-007) [design/argued] -- If a peer to peer network were decentrally owned by its users, its algorithms could be open source and still remain safe, because the network could reward members for policing exploitation instead of relying on a centralized company to keep the algorithm opaque. > if the P)P network were decentrally owned by the users them- selves, the algorithms can be open source and still remain safe. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-015) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If any single person could own the copyright to software that a decentralized organization uses, that person would hold de facto power over the organization, re establishing hierarchies of power inside it. > If one person could own the copyright to some of the software a decentralized organization uses, then they would have de facto power over the organization, again establishing hierarchies of power within the organization. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Paid corporate contributors are a source of tension in open source communities: they can outwork and push out volunteers, then leave once their employer's duties are complete, leaving no one to maintain and upgrade the software. > These workers often devote far more effort to a project and sometimes push out volunteers. Then the paid workers leave once their duties are complete, leaving no one to maintain and upgrade the software in the future. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-018) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Open source projects sometimes fail to attract the quality of developer that a closed source project can reliably procure with greater funding and control. > Sometimes open source projects fail to attract the necessary quality of developer that a closed-source project can reliably procure with more fund- ing and control. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The success of the open source movement itself creates a vulnerability: major corporations can pressure smaller projects to reveal their code, then take it and exploit the work more profitably than the startup can. > Another problem is that the very success of the open source move- ment allows major corporations to pressure smaller projects to reveal their code, then take it and use their power to exploit the work more profitably than the startup. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782198-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-040) [predictive/argued] -- Truly successful DAOs do not yet exist, but once the architecture of a single DAO succeeds it will be quickly cloned and adapted to every imaginable economic and social organization. > Truly successful DAOs don't exist, yet. Once the architecture of a single DAO is successful, however, it will be quickly cloned and adapted to every imaginable economic and social organization. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 - [3782201-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-003) [mechanism/argued] -- A DAO that is internally well governed by a reputation verification engine lets other entities clone its governance for their own purposes and run with the same governance metrics, so mastery of internal decentralization becomes transplantable infrastructure governance. > DAOs that are internally well-governed by a reputation verification engine allow other IoT infrastructure entities to simply clone the DAO governance for their own purposes and run a DAO with the same gov- ernance metrics. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 - [3782201-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-013) [condition/argued] -- An open source design is necessary to run any program in a peer to peer environment, because decentralization means the source code must be shared by all if it is not controlled centrally. > An open source design is necessary to run any program in a PRP environment, because decentralization means the source code needs to be shared by all if it isn't controlled centrally. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 - [3782201-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Instead of building compatible technologies in the service of interoperability, most crypto projects compete with each other, contradicting the open source culture the space needs if it has any hope of thriving. > Instead of building compatible tech- nologies in the service of interoperability, most are competing with each other, con- tradicting the open source culture that should pervade the space if it has any hope of thriving. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 - [3782217-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-031) [condition/argued] -- Transparency in a decentralized network is not optional: every function needs to be publicly auditable for people to trust it, because without a central authority to approve code, unexpected malicious behavior can be built into any opaque code. > Transparency is crucial in a decentralized net- work. Every function needs to be publicly auditable for people to trust it. Without a central authority to approve it, unexpected malicious behavior can be built into any opaque code. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3782217-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- From a game theory perspective the open source culture advocated in the Web3 movement is not sustainable in the long term unless it is married with a culture of respect for history. > the current open source culture advocated in the WebM movement is not sustainable in the long term. Unless we marry it with a culture of respect for history. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3782217-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-033) [mechanism/argued] -- The solution to the game theory problem of getting a player to freely give up intellectual property at one stage of a repeated game is to guarantee a reward at a future stage by fostering a culture that acknowledges past contributions, so players seek future fame by distributing their work in the present. > The solution to the game theory conundrum of how to incentivize a player to freely give up their intellectual property at one stage of a repeated game, is by guaranteeing a reward in a future stage, by fostering a culture of acknowledge- ment of past contributions. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3782217-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Review changes the game theoretical perspective from a single stage game to a repeated game, which produces more efficient cooperation instead of internal competition and is what makes the open source environment sustainable in the long run. > Review changes the game theoretical perspective from a single stage game, to a repeated game. This leads to more efficient cooperation instead of internal compe- tition. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217 - [3808852-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Even though the creator of a DEX plays a limited role in its evolution, the code that provides the exchange's operational rules may still be subject to the centralized control of certain developers, and a completely open source DEX with no ongoing developer involvement remains untested. > the code that provides the operational rules of the exchange may still be subject to the centralized control of certain developers. The idea of a completely open source DEX without any ongoing developer involvement remains untested. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization and Feedback Effects (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808852 - [3808859-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-001) [mechanism/asserted] -- The ethos of interoperability in software development arose from a survival calculation rather than altruism: developers recognized that software which could not work across platforms would not survive. > In turn, the realization in the software development community that interoperability of software means survivability, gave rise to an ethos of interoperability. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-017) [empirical/evidenced] -- Open source software accounts for somewhere between 78 percent and 98 percent of all core digital infrastructure software, according to industry estimates. > According to some estimates, open source software accounts for between 78%14 and 98%15 of all core digital infrastructure software. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-018) [mechanism/argued] -- Open source contribution is governed by a cost-benefit calculation rather than pure altruism: the volunteer's opportunity costs of forgone paid work must be offset by satisfaction, autonomy, peer recognition, skill acquisition, or downstream commercial opportunity. > Software developers perform a cost-benefit analysis when they decide to make an open source project contribution and throughout the respective project. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The dominant failure of the open source model is that most projects never reach critical mass; only a small elite of projects attracts enough developers who believe in the vision, and the majority simply cannot. > Perhaps most significantly, most open source projects cannot reach critical mass to further their development agenda. Only a small number of elite open source projects can attract developer contributions. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The absence of a centralized authority makes open source projects prone to separation movements, because rival developer cliques form their own belief systems about the direction of development with no authority to resolve the dispute. > Because no centralized authority decides the direction of development, open source projects are more prone to cliques of developers that develop their own belief system regarding certain aspects of the development process. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-021) [design/speculative] -- An optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool would make separation movements in open source less likely, because voters who know the process rewards truth-seeking are more likely to accept an adverse outcome; emerging decentralization technology makes such a tool theoretically feasible. > Perhaps if the open source movement had an optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool, such separation of interests and development would become less likely. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Open source products are systematically weak on usability, documentation, support, and testing, because contributors are experts writing for experts and are more interested in the code than in explaining it to other users. > The usability of open source products is often underdeveloped and support and testing are often less evolved and not as readily available in open source projects. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-023) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Courts expanded software patentability without proof that it would increase innovation, and the result was that corporations filed and acquired thousands of software patents used to strategically undermine competitor projects. > What makes things worse, courts decided to increase the protections for software despite lacking proof that additional patentability of software would increase the level of innovation. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Expanded patentability chills open source contribution because developers fear inadvertent infringement yet typically lack the knowledge and skills to determine whether their contribution infringes an existing software patent. > As a result of the accelerating patentability of open source solutions, developers increasingly fear they could inadvertently infringe patents during the open source development process. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-025) [definitional/asserted] -- The degree of decentralization of an open source project is determined by the degree of hierarchy in its governance: a flat structure with consensus decision-making and no power disparities between developers is the most decentralized form. > The degree of decentralization in open source communities and projects is dictated by the degree of hierarchies in the governance of a given project. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808859-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Open source communities are not immune to centralization, because humans have a natural inclination to convert knowledge and resources into power over others, which is why projects such as Apache developed multiple ranked developer tiers with unequal voting rights. > The open source development community is not immune to centralization. Humans have a natural inclination to use knowledge and resources to exert power over others. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 **2022** - [4015908-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-017) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Open-source code combined with protocol fee flowback to users, as with the Uniswap V2 0.3% swap fee that is automatically distributed to liquidity providers, guarantees transparency, accountability, market confidence in the product, and associated protections for the community. > Open-source code and protocol fee flowback to users guarantee transparency, accountability, market confidence in the products, and the associated protections for the community. Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/open-source.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.