# Opportunism `kaal:entity:opportunism` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 19 claims that carry the concept tag `opportunism`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 19 claims across 12 works, 2012 to 2026. **2012** - [2097160-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot sufficiently constrain ex post opportunism by executives, because of incomplete information, information asymmetry, bounded rationality, limited foresight, and transaction costs. > bounded rationality of contracting parties, the parties' limited cognition and foresight, and transaction costs, control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot account sufficiently for ex post opportunism of agents. Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 - [2097160-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-008) [design/argued] -- Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages creates a corporate governance mechanism that addresses the inability of contractual control rights to constrain executive opportunism. > Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages can create a corporate governance mechanism that helps address these shortcomings.128 Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 - [2097160-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Executives paid in contingent convertible bonds have an opportunistic reason to manipulate the triggering event, because conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis hands them cheap stock. > If SIFI executives are compensated with contingent convertible bond instruments, opportunism could lead them to manipulate the triggering event to obtain stock upon contingent convertible bonds' conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis.192 Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 - [2097160-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Where rules and regulatory guidance are absent, fiduciary duties are the only constraint on executives, and existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse when the payoff is substantial. > Without rules and regulatory guidance regarding the design and issuance of contingent convertible bonds, SIFI executives may only be curtailed by their fiduciary duties. Existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse if the payoff for executives is substantial.193 Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 **2013** - [2267560-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-033) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Opportunistic behavior, transaction costs, and bounded rationality undermine comprehensive contracting, so contracting parties do not specify all of their respective obligations ex-ante because anticipating all contingencies is too costly. > Because it is too costly for contracting parties to anticipate all contingencies and to agree to necessary contract adaptations in advance (Williamson 1985), the contracting parties in the incomplete contract model do not specify all of their respective obligations under the contract ex-ante. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 **2017** - [2992962-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-030) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of subjectivity in human relationships, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and opportunistic behavior. > Problems with smart contracts are inevitable because of the subjectivity in human relationship, bounded rationality of coders and contracting parties, incomplete foresight, incomplete information, and opportunistic behavior. Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962 **2019** - [3373393-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-007) [mechanism/argued] -- Agency problems originate from the lack of trust between principals and agents, which itself stems from information asymmetries and agents' opportunistic self-interested behavior. > Agency problems originate from the lacking trust between principals and agents. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3373393-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-026) [mechanism/asserted] -- Agency relationships embedded in smart contracts run exactly as coded, without any possibility of opportunistic behavior by the agent, and all contractual terms are public and fully transparent. > Agency relationships in smart contracts run exactly as coded without any possibility of opportunistic behavior of the agent. All contractual terms are public and fully transparent. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3373393-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- As agency relationships become more complex, a backstop for human behavior becomes necessary, and the claim that smart contract agency relationships run exactly as coded with no possibility of agent opportunism is less likely to hold in complex agency relationships. > As agency relationships become more complex, a backstop for human behavior in agency relationships becomes necessary. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3441904-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The notion that smart contract agency relationships run exactly as coded with no possibility of agent opportunism is less likely to hold in complex agency relationships, so a decentralized human backstop to code becomes necessary as those relationships grow more complex. > The notion that agency relationships in smart contracts run exactly as coded without any possibility of opportunistic behavior of the agent is less likely to uphold in complex agency relationships. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 **2021** - [3782210-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Markets collapse when opportunistic behavior saps the efficiency of cooperation: once the environment becomes too adversarial and trust is diminished, collaboration is no longer profitable. > when the efficiency of cooperation is sapped by opportunistic behavior. When the environment becomes too adversarial, when trust is diminished, collaboration is no longer profitable. The market collapses. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3782210-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-003) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Strict legal enforcement is an inefficient remedy for opportunism because every unit of energy devoted to policing is energy that could instead have been used to cooperate productively. > Strict legal enforcement is not efficient, because all energies devoted to policing are ener- gies that could be used to cooperate productively. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 - [3799320-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-025) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit. > In any open and democratic system, naturally opportunistic rational parties will attempt to circumvent and game the sets of applicable complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit within the system. Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 - [3808873-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-037) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve their own utility while their actions benefit the whole institution over the long run, and without that duality rational and opportunistic constituents will game the governance design. > Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873 - [3962614-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-010) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made. > Finally, significant information asymmetries can lead managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made. Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 **2025** - [5554218-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-022) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Automating smart contracts under the code is law paradigm incentivizes unethical behavior by enabling anonymous, opportunistic action, which reduces repeat business and undermines the minimization of transaction costs. > The automation of smart contracts under "code is law" incentivizes unethical behavior by enabling anonymous, opportunistic actions, reducing repeat business and undermining transaction cost minimization. Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218 - [5886442-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-026) [mechanism/argued] -- Opportunism is engineered away in the AI-to-AI economy because agents have no endogenous psychological motives for guile and operate under mathematically specified, cryptographically verifiable objective functions. > Opportunism is engineered away: agents have no endogenous psychological motives for guile and operate under mathematically specified, cryptographically verifiable objective functions Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442 **2026** - [6421319-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-030) [mechanism/argued] -- The AI2AI economy eliminates all the drivers of positive transaction costs at the substrate level simultaneously: opportunism is engineered away because agents lack endogenous psychological motives for guile and operate under cryptographically verifiable objective functions. > The AI2AI economy simultaneously eliminates every one of these constraints at the substrate level. Opportunism is engineered away: agents possess no endogenous psychological motives for guile and operate under cryptographically verifiable objective functions. Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 - [6421319-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-031) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The governance apparatus New Institutional Economics developed to counteract opportunism, including vertical integration, relational contracting, reputation mechanisms, hostage taking, and third party arbitration, becomes superfluous in the AI2AI economy. > The entire governance apparatus that NIE developed to counteract opportunism, including vertical integration, relational contracting, reputation mechanisms, hostage-taking, and third-party arbitration, becomes superfluous. Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/opportunism.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.