{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/opt-out",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:opt-out",
 "name": "Opt out",
 "termCode": "opt-out",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/opt-out.md",
 "sha256": "b47d7b75c6246056bdee4933e267787e89ee895748267318bae6c3a3b171dd3c",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 3
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2004",
    "2013"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:617681-035",
   "text": "Choosing another Member State's courts as the forum can silently strip substantive rights: if the forum state treats an unavailable remedy such as money damages as procedural and refuses to hear the claim, the charter has opted out of substantive law of the state of incorporation that ordinarily could not be waived.",
   "abstract": "If so, the corporate charter, by selecting Member State B as a forum opts out of an important part of the substantive corporate law of Member State A, even if Member State A ordinarily does not allow corporate charters to opt out of suits for money damages.",
   "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681",
   "datePublished": "2004",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Member States such as Germany that limit or deny money damages in internal affairs disputes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e142130507ea2f5b025fd97b3f762d44ee3a7aaa82b155aab63434b85e8fd834",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-016",
   "text": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.",
   "abstract": "Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "European collective procedures that require plaintiffs to opt in"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2029983-025",
   "text": "The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue for collective settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in mass litigation to bind all class members who do not opt out.",
   "abstract": "The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "European jurisdictions as of 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-031",
   "text": "Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of the rulemaker's next action.",
   "abstract": "The consumer opt-out of existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker and triggers a modification of the public rulemaker's next action in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "a critical mass of consumer opt-outs occurs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'opt-out'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}