# Opt out

`kaal:entity:opt-out`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `opt-out`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2004 to 2013.

**2004**

- [617681-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Choosing another Member State's courts as the forum can silently strip substantive rights: if the forum state treats an unavailable remedy such as money damages as procedural and refuses to hear the claim, the charter has opted out of substantive law of the state of incorporation that ordinarily could not be waived.
  > If so, the corporate charter, by selecting Member State B as a forum opts out of an important part of the substantive corporate law of Member State A, even if Member State A ordinarily does not allow corporate charters to opt out of suits for money damages.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**2012**

- [2029983-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-016) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.
  > Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
- [2029983-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-025) [empirical/argued] -- The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue for collective settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in mass litigation to bind all class members who do not opt out.
  > The Netherlands is already Europe's most attractive venue to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the
  Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**2013**

- [2267560-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of the rulemaker's next action.
  > The consumer opt-out of existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker and triggers a modification of the public rulemaker's next action in the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/opt-out.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.