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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:optimal-rules",
 "name": "Optimal rules",
 "termCode": "optimal-rules",
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 "author": {
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-010",
   "text": "Even institutional arrangements that produce optimal governance solutions generate solutions that become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.",
   "abstract": "Even if institutional arrangements produce optimal governance solutions, these solutions can become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-019",
   "text": "NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaking process, with the consequence that even optimal solutions to regulatory problems become unstable and suboptimal over time.",
   "abstract": "NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaking process (Homann and Kirchner 1995; Furubotn and Richter 2005) and even optimal solutions to regulatory problems can become unstable and suboptimal over time.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-002",
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   "text": "Because economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving, a rule set that is optimal at enactment ceases to be optimal over time.",
   "abstract": "The economic conditions and the corresponding requirements for optimal and stable rules are constantly evolving, suggesting that a different set of rules could be optimal.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-008",
   "text": "Congress, financial regulators, and the financial regulation literature rely almost exclusively on rules presumed to be stable and optimal, which is the common denominator of regulatory responses to crises.",
   "abstract": "Congress, financial regulators, and the literature on financial regulation rely almost exclusively on \"stable\" and presumptively \"optimal\" rules.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'optimal-rules'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}