# Penalties

`kaal:entity:penalties`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `penalties`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2013 to 2019.

**2013**

- [2317580-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-011) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Noncompliance with a CIA carries serious penalties, because the OIG may prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.
  > Upon noncompliance with the terms of a CIA, the OIG can prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580
- [2317580-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-018) [mechanism/evidenced] -- If the government finds problems on inspection it can escalate beyond the CIA's own substantive provisions to criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health care programs.
  > These penalties include criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health care programs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**2016**

- [2714974-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-014) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Adopting a generic compliance program is not sufficient under Rule 206(4)-7: advisers that fail to specifically tailor their compliance program to their own business have incurred large penalties in SEC enforcement.
  > Failure on the part of advisers to specifically tailor a compliance program for their business has led to large penalties.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974

**2019**

- [3373393-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-033) [mechanism/argued] -- Non-performance reputational penalties in a DAO are entirely free from racial or cultural biases, because the token holders imposing them are unlikely to even know each other.
  > Crucially, non-performance reputational penalties are entirely free from racial or cultural biases and associated implications as the token holders are unlikely to even know each other.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/penalties.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.