{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/polarization",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:polarization",
 "name": "Polarization",
 "termCode": "polarization",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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   "value": [
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-011",
   "text": "Plurality voting predictably produces a system that swings between two polarized parties who are less acceptable to the majority but strongly preferred by interested minorities, because voters are incentivized to vote for their preferred one of the perceived top two rather than waste their vote.",
   "abstract": "So plurality voting predictably leads to a system which swings between two polarized parties who are less acceptable to the majority, but strongly preferred by interested minorities—Duverger's Law.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "plurality voting rules",
    "voters who want their vote to matter"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-028",
   "text": "Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vote voting mechanisms.",
   "abstract": "First, it overcomes the all too common polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes of one- token-one-vote voting mechanisms.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "governance systems choosing between token weighted and reputation weighted voting"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'polarization'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}