{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "DefinedTerm", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/policing", "identifier": "kaal:entity:policing", "name": "Policing", "termCode": "policing", "inDefinedTermSet": { "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json" }, "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "Wulf A. Kaal", "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X" }, "dateModified": "2026-07-29", "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/policing.md", "sha256": "3597271f2e345166a95948db58654baf801131b9b1600e32a66e38aebc8c72ef", "additionalProperty": [ { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "status", "value": "derived" }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "claim_count", "value": 15 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "work_count", "value": 11 }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "year_span", "value": [ "2018", "2022" ] }, { "@type": "PropertyValue", "name": "non_current_claims", "value": 0 } ], "subjectOf": [ { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-011", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125822-011", "text": "Enforcing a protocol in which all work fees are shared with the expertise produces a positive feedback loop: more fees raise the worth of reputation, which makes sem tokens more desirable than one time fees, which makes vested experts police the system carefully, which makes the system more secure.", "abstract": "The more fees are sent to the platform, the more the reputation is worth; which means the sem tokens will be more desirable to experts than one-time fees; which means the system will be carefully policed by vested experts; this makes the system more secure", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "requires that the expertise tag enforces full fee payment to the platform" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125822-017", "text": "The author concedes an arbitrage attack is feasible when experts fail to police their expertise and a significant share of the technically fungible tokens is offered on an exchange, since a malicious actor can then buy 51 percent of the tokens, vote against common sense, and sell before the tokens lose value.", "abstract": "However, it is feasible that an arbitrage opportunity could evolve if the experts do not police their expertise. If a significant percentage of the (technically fungible) tokens were put on sale in a token exchange, a malicious actor would have the opportunity to 1) buy 51% of tokens", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "requires expert policing to be absent", "requires a liquid exchange holding a large share of tokens" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-003", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125827-003", "text": "A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three things at once: produce valuable blocks, police blocks that violate protocol, and improve the production protocols in response to gaming. Incentivizing only block production is insufficient.", "abstract": "A secure PoS protocol requires a proper incentive structure which perpetually motivates users to produce valuable blocks, to police the production of blocks which violate protocols, and to improve block production protocols in response to gaming.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized systems without a central enforcement authority" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-025", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3266953-025", "text": "New reputation tokens are minted in every validation pool for every block, so block production is strongly encouraged through a larger share for the successful producer while policing is only gently encouraged through a shared allocation to all active members.", "abstract": "Active participation is encouraged because new reputation tokens are minted in every validation pool for every block. So block production is strongly encouraged (because a greater percentage of the new tokens are given to a successful producer) and policing is gently encouraged", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953", "datePublished": "2018", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "every block and its validation pool" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "781758dea356e55d79c73ad7f1debe7c83de398bd1cd9e0a9a6c2802f276b4c0", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-019", "text": "Vote delegation inevitably reintroduces corruption into a microdemocratic system, because representatives may seek to bribe or purchase votes to gain power, so delegation necessitates a policing system.", "abstract": "Yet, the delegation of voting power inevitably allows corruptive element back into the system as certain representatives may wish to bribe or purchase votes to provide them with more power in the system.", "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041", "datePublished": "2020", "claim_type": "failure", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "applies where microdemocratic systems permit delegation of voting power" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "5216a7bca45a48e3bef11ec524936e66af737c0fd66271e9f6866dc20a4482cc", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-016", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-016", "text": "The efficiency gain from cooperation in repeated games can only be achieved if a policeable reputation system exists: players must have histories and those histories must be available to other players, which makes transparency and communication essential to effective policing.", "abstract": "This new leap in efficiency as the players cooperate can only be achieved if there is the possibility of creating a policeable reputational system. The players must have a history, and that history must be available to the other players.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "repeated games", "grim trigger or similar punishment strategies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-038", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-038", "text": "The value of reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in response to cheating, so a more transparent system produces more accurate and efficient policing and therefore more valuable reputation.", "abstract": "Another motivation for transparency is that the value of reputation is directly re- lated to how well punishment can be distributed in response to cheating. The more transparent the system, the more accurate and efficient policing can be.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "systems with reputation based punishment" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782205-019", "text": "The executive policing functions of business and government should be automated through smart contracts in order to prevent corruption.", "abstract": "The executive policing functions of our business and government should be auto- mated to prevent corruption.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-026", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-026", "text": "A central authority is perfectly well incentivized to ignore minor problems that only partially eat into its profits, so long as it maintains ultimate control of those profits, which is why platform level abuses persist under centralized ownership.", "abstract": "A central authority is perfectly well incentivized to ignore minor problems which only partially eat into their profits, as long as they maintain ultimate control of profits.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": true, "scope_conditions": [ "platforms with centralized profit control" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-034", "text": "A culture of respect for history is unnatural and must be consciously policed, which makes it another of the essential catalyst institutions that has to be deliberately built into the decentralized economy.", "abstract": "It's unnatural to have a culture of respect for history, and needs to be consciously policed—it's another of the essential catalyst institutions which needs to be built into the decentralized economy.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "condition", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "decentralized economies" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "358779557d8e7dcd101720ca0fad90b9146d24f1c7c03909eb431fcf1fb7e103", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-017", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782220-017", "text": "Demand for insurance and reputation policing runs counter to prosperity: when the system runs well and everyone profits there is less need for insurance, and when profits fall and competition intensifies cheating becomes more attractive and more policing is needed.", "abstract": "If the system is running well and everyone is profiting, there is less need for insurance. When the profits decrease and the system becomes more competitive, cheating becomes more attractive, and more insurance and reputation policing is needed.", "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Transcendental Unifying Values for Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782220", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "competitive market conditions" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "f0bf1e80c6da60a6f8ba20630562bdf1dab171ccb5267f497dc0b815113cde99", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-037", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-037", "text": "In the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can exclude cheating members from market access, so punishment becomes automated and therefore credible, and free riding in policing is at least partially eliminated by automation.", "abstract": "By contrast, in the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can be written which exclude DAO of DAOs members who cheat from having access to their market. Punishment for cheating becomes automated and therefore credible. Free riding in policing can at least partially be eliminated by automation.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "algorithmic contract allocation conditioned on reputation" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-034", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-034", "text": "Anonymity increases the value of the reputation token, because as information asymmetries and incomplete information increase, the value of the information that derives from reputation tokens increases.", "abstract": "- Anonymity increases the value of the reputation token. As the information asymmetries and incomplete information increase because of the increasing anonymity, the value of the information that derives from reputation tokens increases.", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "pseudonymous participation in reputation based systems" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-035", "identifier": "kaal:claim:3981021-035", "text": "Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes credible when it is automated, and the value of a voting associate's reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in response to nefarious conduct.", "abstract": "- Punishment for nefarious conduct becomes automated and therefore credible. The CHARITYxDAO reputation staking design also enhances policing and compliance. The value of CHARITYxDAO VA reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021", "datePublished": "2021", "claim_type": "mechanism", "confidence": "argued", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [ "algorithmic detection and slashing of misconduct in DAO governance" ], "source_pdf_sha256": "9d8bc78d119c780c96c89ce3e820f4ac8b037d39b3ade59feb4e40d46b048288", "status": "current" }, { "@type": "Claim", "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-019", "identifier": "kaal:claim:4067783-019", "text": "Reputation in a DAO should be generated only for long term valuable work and for the policing of work, and never for business development work.", "abstract": "3. Reputation generated ONLY for long term valuable work and policing of work NOT for business development work", "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783", "datePublished": "2022", "claim_type": "design", "confidence": "asserted", "is_failure_mode": false, "scope_conditions": [], "source_pdf_sha256": "48f1e307cdbbe28c7843f7744d0ba8cf01662f257a53f2066a7a6c7e03a5acec", "status": "current" } ], "description": "15 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'policing'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition." }