# Political economy `kaal:entity:political-economy` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 21 claims that carry the concept tag `political-economy`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 21 claims across 14 works, 2010 to 2026. **2010** - [1558614-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-040) [predictive/argued] -- Because of the political climate and concern about the social externalities of business failure, monitoring requirements and their enforcement procedures are likely to become more severe regardless of whether the increased monitoring costs are offset by fewer bad business decisions. > The severity of the substantive moni- toring requirement and the procedures used to enforce it may in- crease regardless of net costs to the company. Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614 - [1664809-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-028) [mechanism/argued] -- Non-US individuals and companies are expressly prohibited by US law from contributing to US political campaigns and have a relatively weak lobby in Washington, which places EU financial intermediaries at a competitive disadvantage in the US political system. > prohibited by US law from contributing to US political cam- Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 - [1664809-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-029) [mechanism/argued] -- The defendants harmed by section 7216 would almost all be non-US financial intermediaries and issuers who are less able to defend themselves in the US political system, which helps explain why Congress is not seriously considering repeal of the PSLRA but is seriously considering section 7216. > be non-US financial intermediaries and issuers who are less able Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809 **2011** - [1765901-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-035) [predictive/asserted] -- The SEC study is very unlikely to produce an extraterritorial extension of private rights of action so long as Republicans control the House of Representatives. > The SEC study, whatever it recommends, is very unlikely to result in extend- ing private rights of action extraterritorially so long as the Republicans control the House of Representatives. Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901 - [1806252-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-024) [mechanism/argued] -- Legislators had disincentives to impose harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry before the crisis, because harsher regulation could have driven franchise taxes and other business to offshore centers. > Legislators also had disincentives to impose harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry, because harsher regulation could have resulted in a loss of franchise taxes and other business to offshore centers. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252 **2012** - [1998455-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-025) [predictive/argued] -- The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of regulatory regimes after a crisis is followed by a gradual easing of regulatory strictures. > The political economy of financial regulation ensures that af- ter the Dodd-Frank-induced expansion of regulatory oversight there will be a subsequent phase of relaxation of regulatory over- sight. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 - [2029983-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2029983-008) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Harmonization is politically unattainable absent either a central authority able to preempt the law of many jurisdictions or a single jurisdiction with enough economic clout to impose its rules on others, which makes harmonization especially difficult beyond national borders. > Second, harmonization is difficult to accomplish politi- cally unless there is a central authority that can preempt the law in a multitude of jurisdictions or, alternatively, a jurisdic- tion has so much economic clout that it can impose its rules on others. Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 **2013** - [2273857-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The aftermath of a financial crisis creates shock conditions that constitute a suboptimal environment for rulemaking. > The aftermath of financial crises creates suboptimal conditions (shock conditions) for rulemaking. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-017) [mechanism/argued] -- Post-crisis rulemaking occurs in an economic, political, and legal environment whose sense of urgency prevents a full evaluation of the consequences of new rules for all affected constituencies. > Rulemaking takes place in an economic, political, and legal environment that creates a sense of urgency for rulemaking and may not permit a full evaluation of the possible consequences for all constituencies. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-018) [mechanism/argued] -- The shock conditions that trigger calls for rulemaking have typically not been analyzed or absorbed systematically, so rulemaking under those conditions is associated with high levels of incomplete information. > Shock conditions that call for rulemaking often have not been appropriately analyzed and absorbed in a systematic fashion and are, thus, often associated with high levels of incomplete information. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-020) [mechanism/argued] -- Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant. > Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem. As a result, regulatory oversight is never constant. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-021](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-021) [mechanism/evidenced] -- In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors. > In the competition to shape policies and attain the most favorable conditions for themselves via rulemaking, small and well- organized special interest groups (such as the financial industry) dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors). Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-023) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted in quick succession. > Following crises, the process is reversed and regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium. As a result of this dichotomy, reform and deregulatory legislation are often enacted in quick succession. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 **2014** - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information becomes available, is often politically, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible. > a core tenet of incomplete contract theory – rulemakers should act when sufficient information becomes available – is often political- ly, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017) [mechanism/argued] -- The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both. > The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) **2016** - [2740477-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The rising complexity of innovation driven regulatory issues confuses political and policy makers about rapidly emerging disruptive change, which makes a coherent political and policy solution to those challenges less likely. > the increasing complexity of innovation-driven regulatory issues causes political and policy makers' confusion over rapidly-emerging disruptive change, making a coherent political and policy solution to these challenges less likely. Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 - [2808132-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-012) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The political system is less likely to be able to resolve the challenges of disruptive innovation because the increasing complexity of innovation-driven regulatory issues causes confusion among political and policy makers about rapidly emerging change. > political system is, however, less likely to be able to deal with the challenges of disruptive innovation because the increasing complexity of innovation-driven regulatory issues causes political and policy makers' confusion over rapidly-emerging disruptive Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132 **2019** - [3405660-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A single global financial regulator is not a serious policy option because national political interests are incoherent and cannot readily be united to establish such a body. > Given national incoherent political interests and the problem of uniting them to set up an international body, the idea of a single global regulator is not on any serious agenda. Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660 - [3406323-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-009) [mechanism/argued] -- Decentralization transcends the capitalism versus socialism dichotomy because it uses elements of both profit generation and redistribution, organizing economic structures that generate profits while simultaneously redistributing resources. > Decentralization uses elements of profit generation and redistribution in a way that in effect combines capitalistic and socialistic ideas. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323 **2024** - [4900880-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4900880-028) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Redistributive preferences are shaped by perceived exposure to automation: priming individuals to consider their own vulnerability to an automation shock shifts what redistribution they support. > Priming individuals to consider their vulnerability to an automation shock influences their redistributive preferences. Wulf A. Kaal, Quantum Economy and the Future of Work (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4900880 **2026** - [6421319-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6421319-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Redistribution after the fact is likely to fail, because by the time it becomes politically feasible those controlling the AI economy may be powerful enough to evade meaningful taxation, a pattern history has repeated from the Medici to the robber barons to contemporary tech monopolists. > By the time redistribution becomes politically feasible, those controlling the AI economy may be powerful enough to evade meaningful taxation. Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/political-economy.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.