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 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/political-entrepreneurs",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:political-entrepreneurs",
 "name": "Political entrepreneurs",
 "termCode": "political-entrepreneurs",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-038",
   "text": "During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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   "scope_conditions": [
    "during and after crises"
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-022",
   "text": "During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest groups in rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'political-entrepreneurs'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}