# Precedent

`kaal:entity:precedent`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 15 claims that carry the concept tag `precedent`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

15 claims across 13 works, 2004 to 2025.

**2004**

- [617681-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-037) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Compensating arbitrators by the number of cases they hear gives litigants a substantial role in shaping the system but may yield decisions so eager to please all parties that they lack decisiveness, sound reasoning and value as precedent.
  > This approach gives litigants a substantial role in shaping the arbitration system, but may result in decisions that are so eager to please all parties that they lack decisiveness or sound legal reasoning and thus lack value as precedent.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- One objection to arbitration of corporate governance disputes holds in Europe as in the United States: arbitration as ordinarily used yields little relevant precedent.
  > Coffee has one objection to arbitration of corporate governance disputes that is as persuasive in Europe as in the United States. Arbitration, as it is used in most contexts, yields little relevant precedent.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**2011**

- [1765901-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1765901-020) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- If Section 10(b) were held to reach swap agreements based on stocks traded outside the United States, plaintiffs' attorneys would use that holding as precedent to limit Morrison broadly, and other courts might create a general exception for U.S. derivative contracts referencing non-U.S. securities.
  > If Section 10(b) is held to apply to cases involving swap agreements based on stocks traded outside the U.S., plaintiffs' attorneys would be encouraged to use such a holding in Porsche as precedent to limit the application of Morrison in a wide range of contexts.
  Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901

**2013**

- [2317580-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-036) [predictive/speculative] -- It is unclear whether corporations with CIAs will be uniformly affected, and future courts are likely to expand the basic legal duty of care only where the facts suggest that the CIA actually provided directors with more knowledge about compliance activities.
  > In light of the Pfizer precedent, future courts could hold directors of corporations that executed CIAs to a higher standard and thereby expand their basic legal duty of care if the facts suggest that CIAs provided directors with more knowledge about compliance activities.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**2016**

- [2831040-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-017) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The doctrine of stare decisis and judicial adherence to precedent decided decades or centuries earlier mean the court system is structurally a suspension system for rapid change, built to supply stability and predictability rather than speed.
  > The doctrine of stare decisis and the courts' adherence to and application of precedent decided decades or centuries earlier illustrate that the court system is actually structured as a suspension system for rapid change in order to provide stability and predictability.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2018**

- [3125822-046](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-046) [design/argued] -- The proposed fix is to value tokens by how the post was received and cited: tokens minted at a node with a large branch of positive references are worth more, while tokens from a post whose betting pool was close to 50-50 are worth less in future salaries than tokens from a post with uniform agreement.
  > For instance if there is a large branch of positive references based at a node, the tokens minted at that node should be worth more. If the post was contentious, and its betting pool was close to 50-50, the tokens will be worth less in future salaries than uniform agreement.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822
- [3125822-047](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-047) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Under the proposed weighting scheme a post that was initially downvoted can never yield its creator tokens even if expert opinion later reverses, an asymmetry the authors flag as a limitation of the core design.
  > Unfortunately a post p) which was initially downvoted can never give its creator tokens, even if opinion eventually reverses.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

**2019**

- [3405401-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405401-036) [condition/argued] -- A functioning decentralized reputation system requires that counterparties' actions in decentralized commerce endure and become part of a public record: their actions must stick and become part of a meaningful precedence system.
  > This necessitates that counterparties' actions in decentralized commerce endure and become part of a public record. In other words, counterparties' actions need to stick. Their actions have to become part of a precedence system that is meaningful.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401
- [3406323-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-037) [condition/argued] -- Increasing counterparty trust in decentralized commerce requires that the full history of transactions be openly viewable and verifiable, so that counterparties' actions endure as part of a public record and a meaningful precedence system.
  > The history of transactions has to be fully openly viewable and verifiable, so that business parties can see that their counterparties will perform as expected.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323
- [3411110-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-005) [empirical/evidenced] -- Overstock.com issued the first SEC registered digital securities using blockchain technology, and because the issuer was a public company conducting a shelf registration, the offering functions as a working model of blockchain benefits and as a map of the U.S. regulatory gaps.
  > OSTK issued the first Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") registered "digital securities" that utilizes blockchain technology.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110

**2020**

- [3652481-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-027) [design/argued] -- To avoid the corruptive gaming and arbitrage that static complex DAO rules invite, effective DAO governance designs should be focused on dynamic elements, including members' ability to re evaluate existing precedent in the system.
  > To avoid these negative effects of static complex DAO rules, effective DAO governance designs should be focused on dynamic elements.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3782210-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-019) [design/argued] -- Each new post should be able to reference older posts, so that when a new post is validated it can raise or lower the reputational value of past posts depending on how users come to perceive the precedent.
  > If the new post is validated, their value can affect the value of past posts positively or negatively. Old posts can have their reputational value change, depending on how important users perceive the precedent for the system.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3962614-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-033) [mechanism/asserted] -- Through the decentralized governance precedent system, projects upvoted by the whale validation pool that have the highest comparative ROI get more citations in the reputation system and continually enhance the reputation of the whale who sourced and proposed them.
  > Through the decentralized governance precedent system, projects that were upvoted by the Whale validation pool and have the highest comparative ROI get more citations in the reputation system and continually enhance the reputation of the whale who sourced and proposed it.
  Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

**2025**

- [5554218-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-039) [design/argued] -- By defining legal standards for smart contracts, the Universal Digital Law Codex makes arbitration DAO awards enforceable by courts, and its precedent system records outcomes in a transparent ledger to promote consistency and predictability in later disputes.
  > UDLC ensures that disputes are resolved within a legally sound framework, enabling arbitration awards to be enforced by courts. The precedent system records outcomes in a transparent ledger, promoting consistency and predictability in future resolutions.
  Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218
- [5887242-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5887242-011) [mechanism/argued] -- The WDAG itself constitutes an evolutionary precedent system: each rule is an immutable vertex, new rules must cite existing vertices to create weighted directed edges reflecting citation frequency, recency and expert consensus strength, and rarely cited rules decay organically.
  > Each UDLC article or rule exists as an immutable vertex. New rules must cite existing vertices, creating weighted, directed edges that reflect citation frequency, recency, and expert consensus strength. Rarely cited rules experience organic weight decay
  Wulf A. Kaal, The UDLC DAO Operationalizing a Continuously Evolving Universal Digital Law Codex Through Weighted (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5887242

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/precedent.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.