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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before March 30, 2012.",
   "abstract": "This Article presents the results of the first survey study with hedge fund advisers after the SEC's registration effective date. The population consists of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "A majority of surveyed advisers, 72.09%, do not plan any strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements.",
   "abstract": "Figure 4.0 indicates that a majority (72.09%) of survey respondents do not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377",
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   "text": "Compliance with the registration and disclosure requirements cost a majority of surveyed advisers between $50,000 and $200,000, while a significant minority estimated total compliance cost from $200,000 to over $400,000.",
   "abstract": "A majority of respondents found the compliance cost will range from $50,000 to $200,000. However, a significant minority estimates the total compliance cost will range from $200,000 to over $400,000.",
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   "text": "Registration and disclosure did not push advisers to change what they invest in: only 2.44% of respondents said they would have to change strategy significantly over five years, while 4.88% expressly reported no strategy change.",
   "abstract": "Only 2.44% of respondents indicated that they would have to change their strategy significantly as a result of the registration and disclosure requirements, but 4.88% reported that the new requirements would not result in a strategy change.",
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   "text": "A surplus of larger private fund advisers holding correspondingly larger amounts of assets under management could increase systemic risk, so a regulation that consolidates the industry may work against its own systemic risk objective.",
   "abstract": "A surplus of larger private fund advisers with correspondingly larger amounts in AUM could increase systemic risk.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
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   "text": "The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information, a combination that marks a shift in how private funds are regulated.",
   "abstract": "The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information (Dodd–Frank §§ 401, 402).",
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   "text": "The analysis uses data from a 2012 survey study of a population of 1,264 private fund advisers registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds of March 30, 2012.",
   "abstract": "The data used for the analysis in this article was collected in the context of a 2012 survey study (Kaal [2013]) with a population of 1,264 private fund advisers, registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012.",
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   "text": "The results contradict other studies finding an inverse relationship between the size of regulated firms and the per-unit cost of compliance, and suggest that financial regulation does not bring increasing returns to scale in the private fund industry.",
   "abstract": "contradict other studies that find an inverse relationship between the size of regulated firms and the per-unit cost of compliance. The results suggest that financial regulation does not bring increasing returns to scale in the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
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   "text": "Financial regulation has disparate effects on private fund advisers in comparison with other financial services providers, so evidence of scale economies in compliance drawn from banking does not transfer to private funds.",
   "abstract": "Financial regulation has disparate effects on private fund advisers in comparison with other financial services providers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
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   "text": "The results suggest that the private fund industry may be more robust and less affected by financial regulation than other financial services providers.",
   "abstract": "The results suggest that the private fund industry may be more robust and less affected by financial regulation than other financial services providers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
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   "text": "There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale, which counters the most damning putative concern raised about regulatory compliance costs.",
   "abstract": "There is no evidence that private fund adviser regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act increases returns to scale.",
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   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC rules implementing it produced a paradigm shift in United States private fund regulation, raising regulatory oversight of an industry that had been largely exempt to unprecedented levels.",
   "abstract": "Title IV and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules implementing the requirements under Title IV created a paradigm shift for the regulation of private funds in the United States, increasing the level of regulatory oversight to unprecedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "text": "The Form PF filing obligation is triggered by a bright line asset threshold: every registered investment adviser with more than $150 million in assets under management attributable to private funds at the end of its most recently completed fiscal year must file.",
   "abstract": "All registered investment advisers holding more than $150 million in assets under management (AUM) attributable to private funds at the end of their most recently completed fiscal year, are required to file Form PF with the SEC.",
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   "text": "Form PF's counterparty credit exposure requirement is difficult to satisfy at the source, because the exposure is highly sensitive information that individual fund managers often cannot readily determine.",
   "abstract": "For instance, the disclosure of counterparty credit exposure is sensitive information that can often not readily be determined by the individual fund managers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-005",
   "text": "Prior scholarship, including the author's own earlier work, established that Form PF created core challenges for the private fund industry but did not clarify what impact the disclosure requirements actually have on managers; this study is designed to fill that gap.",
   "abstract": "While prior studies have acknowledged that the SEC's mandated collection of private fund data via Form PF created several core challenges for the private fund industry, these studies do not sufficiently clarify the impact of Form PF disclosure requirements on managers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
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    "literature available before the first mandatory Form PF collection"
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-006",
   "text": "High quality private fund data is scarce because the industry's entrenched interest in confidentiality combined with decades of regulatory exemption from registration and transparency requirements left no reservoir of comparable disclosure to study.",
   "abstract": "Because of the private fund industry's particular interest in confidentiality and privacy and decades-old regulations that allowed the industry to remain exempt from registration and transparency requirements, high quality private fund data are rather limited.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-012",
   "text": "Initial Form PF compliance was inexpensive for most filers: 59.18 percent of respondents put the total cost of completing Form PF for the first time under $10,000.",
   "abstract": "The majority of respondents (59.18%) indicated that the total estimated cost of first time Form PF completion was under $10,000.00.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-019",
   "text": "Form PF compliance is not staff intensive for most filers: 67.35 percent of respondents used only one to three individuals and 69.39 percent reported the work took staff less than 50 hours.",
   "abstract": "A majority of respondents (67.35%) used only one to three individuals to complete Form PF. Similarly, a majority of respondents (69.39%) indicated that it took staff less than 50 hours to complete Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-031",
   "text": "Most private fund advisers did not need new infrastructure to comply: 65.22 percent reported that their existing internal reporting systems adequately capture the information Form PF requires.",
   "abstract": "A majority of respondents (65.22%) stated that their existing internal reporting systems adequately capture the information required by Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-033",
   "text": "Form PF's counterparty disclosure proved far less burdensome in practice than anticipated: 93.75 percent of respondents encountered no difficulty identifying counterparties for the counterparty credit exposure questions.",
   "abstract": "Figure 35 shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents (93.75%) did not encounter difficulties in identifying counterparties to answer Form PF questions about counterparty credit exposure.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "responses to survey Question 16b",
    "predominantly smaller, annually filing advisers"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-036",
   "text": "Investor demand for Form PF filings is limited: 74.47 percent of respondents had never been asked by an investor for a copy of their Form PF filing.",
   "abstract": "Figure 38 shows that a majority of respondents (74.47%) in the sample have not been asked by their investors to provide a copy of their Form PF filing.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "responses to survey Question 17",
    "within the first year of Form PF filing"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0c950d73240845e78faf1c3ca0ab820fcc50556faf7ff07f7f773d0876f0be8a",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2447306-039",
   "text": "The measured effect of Form PF data reporting on the private fund industry is milder than the pre-adoption debate predicted.",
   "abstract": "The findings of this study suggest that the overall effect of Form PF data reporting requirements on the private fund industry may be less severe than widely expected.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "first year of mandatory Form PF filing",
    "n=52 respondents"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0c950d73240845e78faf1c3ca0ab820fcc50556faf7ff07f7f773d0876f0be8a",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-001",
   "text": "The SEC data collected from private fund advisers feeds every stage of the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, and the FSOC leans most heavily on precisely those disclosure items that are the most problematic.",
   "abstract": "The author shows that while the SEC's data plays a crucial role in all stages of FSOC's systemic risk assessment of private fund advisers, the FSOC relies most heavily on some of the most problematic disclosure items collected by the SEC.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers reporting under SEC Form PF",
    "FSOC systemic risk assessment of nonbank financial companies"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-007",
   "text": "The 2008 to 2009 financial crisis altered market conditions and the factors driving private fund systemic risk, which triggered a second, distinct wave of scholarship on private funds' systemic implications.",
   "abstract": "The 2008-09 global financial crisis changed market conditions and several related factors that contribute to private funds advisers' posing a possible systemic risk, precipitating the second major wave of scholarship in the context of possible systemic implications of private funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "post crisis period after 2009"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-008",
   "text": "Some estimates place private funds ahead of banks in size and importance during and after the financial crisis.",
   "abstract": "According to some estimates, private funds surpassed banks in size and importance during and after the financial crisis.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "during and after the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-009",
   "text": "The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry combined with the low interest rate environment created by post crisis quantitative easing drove private fund managers to reach for yield.",
   "abstract": "The unprecedented growth in the private fund industry in combination with the low interest rate environment following the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing after the financial crisis of 2008-09 resulted in private fund managers' increasingly \"reaching for yield\".",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "low interest rate environment following quantitative easing",
    "post 2009 private fund industry"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-010",
   "text": "Because private fund advisers supply liquidity and perform liquidity transformation in the manner of banks, the vulnerabilities their bank like activities create can carry large consequences for financial stability.",
   "abstract": "Like banks, private fund advisers can provide liquidity to clients and to financial markets and engage in various forms of liquidity transformation. The vulnerabilities created by private fund advisers engaging in bank-like activities may have large implications for financial stability.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers engaging in bank like activities",
    "use of leverage, liquidity transformation, or funding mismatches"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-017",
   "text": "Commonly managed investment funds holding $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets can be designated systemically important, and following a similar investment strategy across those funds makes designation more likely.",
   "abstract": "Commonly managed investment funds that manage $50 billion or more in the aggregate of total consolidated assets could be designated a SIFI, particularly if such funds all follow a similar investment strategy.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "aggregate total consolidated assets at or above $50 billion",
    "funds under common management pursuing similar strategies"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-020",
   "text": "The FSOC's three stage SIFI review process depends heavily on information that private fund investment advisers supply through Form PF.",
   "abstract": "FSOC's three-stage review process for SIFI designation153 depends heavily on the information provided by private fund investment advisers in Form PF.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SIFI review of private funds and their advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-005",
   "text": "The private fund industry grew 26 percent between 2013 and 2015, rising from just over 2 trillion dollars of assets under management to 2.7 trillion dollars.",
   "abstract": "Between 2013 and 2015, the private fund industry grew by 26%, increasing from just over 2 trillion dollars AUM in 2013 to 2.7 trillion dollars AUM through 2015",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "BarclayHedge industry data, 2013 to 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-001",
   "text": "Five years after the Dodd-Frank Act, the private fund industry is most affected by the uncertainty and the higher costs the Act generates, yet on multiple metrics the industry is coping well with the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape.",
   "abstract": "The findings in this study suggest that the industry is mostly affected by the uncertainty and higher costs associated with the Act, but under multiple metrics the industry appears to be coping well overall with the evolving post Dodd- Frank Act regulatory landscape.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey of a population of 1267 registered investment advisers, N=69 respondents",
    "United States, post Title IV registration"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-002",
   "text": "The private fund industry is adjusting well to the evolving post Dodd-Frank regulatory landscape, and the long-term impact of that landscape is much less intense than the industry itself initially anticipated.",
   "abstract": "This Article demonstrates that the private fund industry is adjusting well to the evolving regulatory landscape pertaining to it. The long-term impact of the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory landscape appears to be much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered U.S. private fund advisers five years after enactment"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-003",
   "text": "The long-term cost implications of Title IV registration and reporting obligations are absorbed relatively quickly after registration, so that Dodd-Frank compliance costs are largely manageable depending on the size of the investment adviser.",
   "abstract": "The long-term cost implications of registration and reporting obligations as reported in this study appear to be absorbed relatively quickly after registration. The costs of compliance associated with the Dodd-Frank Act are, depending on size of the investment adviser, largely manageable.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "cost absorption measured after the initial registration period",
    "manageability varies with adviser size"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2732915-004",
   "text": "Although the industry adapted well to the post Dodd-Frank environment, the Act has already produced some negative effects on the private fund industry and may produce further negative long-term effects.",
   "abstract": "Nevertheless, the findings of this study show that the Act has already had some negative effects on the industry and that it may have some negative long-term effects.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years after the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732915",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "based on survey responses about the next five years"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "643658c02f6625bca35595696116d0ad74d681ed8579c644832ae4a88b2a8c14",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-001",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act ended more than fifty years during which the hedge fund industry operated under low-level regulatory oversight, constituting a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework for private funds.",
   "abstract": "Over fifty years of low-level regulatory oversight for the hedge fund in- dustry ended with Title IV.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private fund industry",
    "period following the 2010 enactment of Title IV"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-003",
   "text": "The reporting obligations imposed on private fund advisers by Form PF raised regulatory oversight of private funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "abstract": "Reporting obligations on Form PF72 increase the regulatory oversight of pri- vate funds to unprecedented levels.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC-registered private fund advisers",
    "after Form PF became operative in 2012"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-005",
   "text": "Growth in the private fund industry has been concentrated among the largest advisers: assets managed by advisers with more than $5 billion in AUM grew 141 percent, compared with 53 percent for firms below $5 billion.",
   "abstract": "The larger private fund advisers have generated most of the private fund industry's growth. Assets managed by private fund ad- visers with more than $5 billion AUM have grown 141%, compared to 53% for firms with less than $5 billion.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers",
    "growth measured through 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-006",
   "text": "Private fund underperformance may be a product of institutionalization: pension funds have increased their private fund holdings and institutions now make up over two thirds of the private fund investor base, up from 20 percent a decade earlier.",
   "abstract": "The underperformance may result from the institutionalization of private funds, because pension funds increase private fund holdings, and, furthermore, institutions represent over two-thirds of the private fund base—up from 20% a decade ago.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "hedge fund investor base as of 2015",
    "explanation offered as possible, not established"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-008",
   "text": "Underperformance combined with the influx of institutional money means that pension funds, endowments and other institutions, which now outnumber wealthy individuals as private fund investors, hold more bargaining power over fees.",
   "abstract": "of underperformance in the private fund industry, combined with the rush of new investors into alternative investments—pension funds, endowments, and other institutions now outnumber rich individuals as private fund investors— means that those investors have more bargaining power regarding fees.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund fee negotiation",
    "as of 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-010",
   "text": "The private fund industry generated a disproportionate share of asset management profits: it produced 34 percent of the industry's 2013 profits, $31.2 billion of $93.0 billion, while controlling only 4 percent of total AUM.",
   "abstract": "Although it manages only 4% of the global asset management indus- try's total AUM ($2.8 trillion out of $68.7 trillion),121 the private fund industry represented 34% of profits generated by that industry in 2013 ($31.2 billion out of $93.0 billion).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "global asset management industry",
    "2013 profit figures"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-012",
   "text": "The stronger performance of activist strategies lets activist private fund managers keep charging the higher 2 and 20 fee structure that other fund managers can no longer demand.",
   "abstract": "The higher performance of this investment strategy allows activist pri- vate fund managers to use the higher 2/20 fee structures, which other fund man- agers can no longer demand.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "activist private funds",
    "as of 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-015",
   "text": "Registered investment advisers should expect a more demanding regulatory environment ahead, including new or proposed regulations, more SEC enforcement actions against private fund managers, and longer and more intrusive examinations.",
   "abstract": "Given the trends discussed above and the SEC guidance provided in public statements, it is likely that the private fund industry will encounter new or proposed regulations; increased SEC enforcement actions against private fund managers; lengthier, more intrusive SEC examinations;",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "SEC-registered private fund advisers",
    "years following 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-017",
   "text": "Survey research on private fund advisers is structurally constrained because these advisers traditionally oppose publicity and hold a strong preference for confidentiality and privacy, which makes a substantial effective sample size difficult to obtain.",
   "abstract": "The 2012 and 2015 surveys were subject to sampling constraints. Private fund advisers traditionally oppose publicity and have a strong preference for confi- dentiality and privacy.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey research on registered private fund advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-018",
   "text": "Neither the 2012 nor the 2015 sample is biased, and the comparison across the two populations is consistent because respondents in both surveys were equally subject to Title IV compliance obligations.",
   "abstract": "Neither the population sample for the 2012 survey188 nor the 2015 follow-up study189 sample are biased. The comparison of the two populations is consistent and unbiased because respondents in both surveys are equally required to com- ply with Title IV.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of the 2012 and 2015 survey samples",
    "both drawn from the same 1267 adviser population"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-019",
   "text": "The decline in survey response rate between 2012 and 2015 is itself evidence of the private fund industry's relatively rapid adaptation to the new statutory and regulatory regime.",
   "abstract": "The decline in response rate may itself be suggestive of the relatively rapid adaptation to changes brought about by the new statutory and regulatory regime.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of 2012 and 2015 responses from the same adviser population"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-020",
   "text": "A majority of private fund adviser respondents in both surveys, 72 percent in 2012 and 75 percent in 2015, did not plan any strategic response, meaning any action to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV.",
   "abstract": "Figure 2 indicates that in both 2012 and 2015 a majority (72% and 75%) of private fund adviser respondents did not plan a strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. \"Strategic responses\" in both surveys describe actions taken to avoid or limit the impact of Title IV.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 (N = 94) and 2015 (N = 69)"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-021",
   "text": "The share of advisers reporting that they changed their communications with investors nearly doubled from 25 percent in 2012 to 47 percent in 2015, a shift the author attributes to advisers increasing investor communications on advice of counsel.",
   "abstract": "a substantially higher rate of responses (47% in 2015 versus 25% in 2012) suggests that respondents changed their communications with investors. Since 2012, many private fund advisers have changed and increased their communications with in- vestors, often based on advice from counsel.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-023",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-023",
   "text": "Rather than outsourcing required compliance work, the industry is on some metrics increasingly performing that work in-house, a shift consistent with the SEC's emphasis on compliance officer liability and post-2012 enforcement actions aimed at compliance departments.",
   "abstract": "The compar- ative data also suggest that—at least under some metrics—rather than outsourcing required compliance work, the industry is increasingly doing such work in-house.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of 2012 and 2015 survey responses",
    "holds under some metrics only"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-024",
   "text": "Between 2012 and 2015 the annual cost of Dodd-Frank compliance doubled for many survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range into the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "abstract": "In fact, the data suggest that the annual cost of compliance doubled for many survey respon- dents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range to the $100,000 to $200,000 range.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "respondents to the 2012 and 2015 surveys",
    "self-reported total compliance costs"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-026",
   "text": "If compliance hour requirements are treated as a proxy for compliance cost, the survey data indicate that the cost of complying with all federal regulation, not just Dodd-Frank, increased between 2012 and 2015.",
   "abstract": "Assuming that compliance hour re- quirements are proxies for compliance costs, the comparative data in Figure 9, like that in Figure 7, suggest that the cost structure for all federal regulation increased between 2012 and 2015.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conditional on hours being a valid proxy for cost",
    "all federal regulation applicable to private fund advisers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-027",
   "text": "Private fund advisers increasingly factor the regulatory structure into decisions about the size of their assets under management, a shift partly explained by the higher post-Dodd-Frank cost structure, since higher AUM and the corresponding fee revenue can offset higher compliance costs.",
   "abstract": "Private fund advisers are increasingly taking the regulatory structure into account in determining their AUM. This can par- tially be explained with the higher overall post-Dodd-Frank-Act cost structure for the industry, which is shown in Figures 6, 8, and 9.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of 2012 and 2015 survey respondents",
    "AUM sizing decisions"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-028",
   "text": "The finding that advisers size AUM around regulatory cost is in tension with anecdotal evidence, since only a minority of private investment funds pay expenses out of the management fee at all.",
   "abstract": "However, this finding is inconsistent with anecdotal evidence sug- gesting that only in a minority of private investment funds would expenses be paid using either all or a portion of the management fee.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund expense allocation practice",
    "survey inference about the AUM decision"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-029",
   "text": "Advisers typically try to allocate as many operating expenses as possible to the fund so that as much of the net management fee as possible becomes manager compensation, a practice that private fund investors heavily criticize.",
   "abstract": "To ensure that as much as possible of the net management fee becomes compensation for the managers, investment advisers typically try to allocate as many operating expenses to the fund as possible.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "standard private fund adviser compensation practice"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-032",
   "text": "A majority of respondents in both surveys, 76.1 percent in 2012 and 65 percent in 2015, believed the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect their reporting funds' earnings.",
   "abstract": "Figure 16 illustrates that the majority of survey respondents in both the 2012 survey (76.1%) and 2015 survey (65%) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act did not affect reporting funds' earnings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents in 2012 and 2015",
    "perceived effect on fund earnings, not measured returns"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-033",
   "text": "Although Dodd-Frank compliance costs fall primarily on the investment adviser rather than the fund, advisers have increasingly built fund structures that pass most of those compliance expenses through to their reporting funds.",
   "abstract": "Although Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs predominantly affect the investment advisers of private funds rather than the funds themselves, investment advisers have increasingly created fund struc- tures that allow them to pass most of their compliance expenses through to their reporting funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "adviser and private fund contractual structures",
    "between 2012 and 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-034",
   "text": "Passing compliance costs through to reporting funds applies those costs against the funds' trading revenues, which produces an overall adverse impact on fund earnings and so shifts the burden of regulation onto investors.",
   "abstract": "These pass-through costs are applied to the funds' trading rev- enues, which results in an overall adverse impact on the funds' earnings.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "funds subject to adviser expense pass-through terms"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-035",
   "text": "Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cost between 2012 and 2015, with opportunity cost references rising from 9 percent to 32 percent while increased expense references fell from 53 percent to 36 percent.",
   "abstract": "and 2015, investment advisers saw the costs on fund earnings increasingly asso- ciated with opportunity costs (rates rose from 9% in 2012 to 32% in 2015) and not with increased expenses (rates fell from 53% in 2012 to 36% in 2015).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "only respondents who reported an effect on fund earnings",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-036",
   "text": "By 2015 a clear majority of respondents, 93 percent, attributed effects on their investment management company's profits to additional expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act, and no respondent reported no additional expenses, compared with 19 percent in 2012.",
   "abstract": "Figure 19 illustrates that a clear majority of respondents in 2015 (93%) be- lieved that the profits of their investment management company were affected by additional expenses associated with the Dodd Frank Act.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "survey respondents reporting on management company profits",
    "2012 and 2015 surveys"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-037",
   "text": "Even though the Dodd-Frank Act's overall regulatory impact on the private fund industry was low, the compliance costs generated by the evolving regulatory environment carry many unexpected consequences with the potential to further reshape industry practices.",
   "abstract": "Despite the low regulatory impact of the Dodd-Frank Act overall, this article indicates that compliance costs associated with the evolving regulatory environment for private fund advisers have many unexpected consequences that could have the potential to further shape industry practices.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers",
    "period from 2012 to 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2739479-039",
   "text": "The comparative evidence suggests the long-term effects of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank regulatory environment may be more substantial than either the industry or regulators initially anticipated.",
   "abstract": "The comparative evidence in this study suggests that long-term ef- fects of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank-Act regulatory environment might be more substantial than the industry and regulators initially anticipated.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private fund advisers and their reporting funds",
    "based on 2015 responses citing lower returns and plans to consolidate or close funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b2e7b81a16ab01c73478b62e85068f9dadc5cdd18427241e8bc5e8216a967730",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2748096-009",
   "text": "Private fund advisers in the shadow banking system perform bank-like functions, providing liquidity to clients and to financial markets and engaging in various forms of liquidity transformation, and the vulnerabilities this creates may have large implications for financial stability.",
   "abstract": "Like banks, private fund advisers can provide liquidity to clients and to financial markets and engage in various forms of liquidity transformation. The vulnerabilities created by private fund advisers engaging in bank-like activities may have large implications for financial stability.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to private fund advisers engaged in liquidity provision and liquidity transformation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8f30260f2c1db728b45c4f3b9b7c64358cf9d3217277bc3c63a910c32f87b508",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-001",
   "text": "The study rests on two datasets: SEC Form ADV Part II filings by private investment fund advisers from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392) and the publicly available litigation record on private fund investor due diligence from 1995 to 2015 (N=572).",
   "abstract": "the author examines two datasets: (1) private investment fund advisers' SEC Form ADV II filings from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392), and (2) the publicly available litigation record pertaining to private fund investor due diligence from 1995 to 2015 (N=572).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private investment funds",
    "1995 to 2015"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-002",
   "text": "The private fund industry grew by 26 percent between 2013 and 2015, rising from just above 2 trillion dollars in assets under management to 2.7 trillion dollars.",
   "abstract": "Between 2013 and 2015, the private fund industry grew by 26%, increasing from just above $2 trillion AUM in 2013 to $2.7 trillion AUM through 2015.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "2013 to 2015",
    "hedge fund industry assets under management as reported by BarclayHedge"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-007",
   "text": "Because a material omission or misstatement in Form ADV Part 2A can support a serious securities law charge, private fund managers have an incentive to keep the narrative language of that required disclosure as high level, summary, and non committal as possible.",
   "abstract": "the imperative for a private fund manager is to keep the narrative language as high-level, summary, and as non-committal as possible, because a material omission and/or misstatement in that section could lead to a serious charge of violating the securities laws.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Form ADV Part 2A narrative brochure",
    "private fund managers"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-037",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811718-037",
   "text": "Lacking standards for private fund investor due diligence can partly be attributed to private funds' unique market position: unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities free from most regulatory oversight, so their due diligence evolved without regulatory oversight as well.",
   "abstract": "Lacking standards for private fund IDD can partially be attributed to private funds' unique position in markets. Unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities, free from most regulatory oversight. Accordingly, the private fund IDD evolved without regulatory oversight.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private funds compared to registered mutual funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "b52152af561288173840a1cabbcf8f4b337e73507c856ee01600799073f4156f",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-004",
   "text": "Unconstrained mutual funds combine the regulatory structure of a mutual fund with the investment strategy of a private fund implementing a credit strategy and principally trading fixed income instruments, which lets them transcend traditional investment and legal distinctions.",
   "abstract": "by combining the regulatory structure of a mutual fund with the investment strategy of a private fund implementing a credit strategy and principally trading fixed income instruments.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "credit-focused unconstrained funds registered under the Company Act"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-016",
   "text": "If a private fund's offering process successfully limits its investors to accredited investors or qualified purchasers, the retail investor protection principles of the Company Act do not apply to the fund's trading, operation, and governance.",
   "abstract": "Accordingly, if a private fund's offering process successfully limits its investors to either \"accredited investors\" or \"qualified purchasers,\" the retail investor protection principles of the Company Act will not apply to the private fund's trading, operation, and governance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private funds relying on Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-024",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-024",
   "text": "The high turnover rate of unconstrained mutual funds distinguishes them from other mutual funds and makes them directly comparable to private funds, which typically trade at high levels.",
   "abstract": "The high UMF turnover rate is a characteristic that distinguishes these funds from other mutual funds, and makes them directly comparable to private funds, which typically engage in high trading levels",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of unconstrained mutual funds with private funds on trading intensity"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-025",
   "text": "Unconstrained mutual funds engaged in almost 50 percent more futures contract transactions than other mutual funds, and the overall scope and nature of their derivative use is consistent with what the authors would expect of a private fund.",
   "abstract": "most importantly, futures contracts, where UMFs engaged in almost 50 percent more transactions than other mutual funds. These statistics reflect the scope and nature of derivative use by UMFs, and are consistent with what the authors would expect of derivative use by a private fund.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "schedule of investments from the sample funds' latest N-CSR filings, April 2016"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-026",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-026",
   "text": "Because unconstrained mutual funds share investment strategy and risk attributes with private funds, the average unconstrained fund's risk profile is substantially more complex and generally involves more risk than the average mutual fund, and is closer to that of a private fund.",
   "abstract": "Because of these shared investment strategy and risk attributes, the average UMF's risk profile is substantially more complex, and generally involves more risks, than the average mutual fund, and is rather more similar to that of a private fund.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of the sample funds against average mutual funds and private funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-027",
   "text": "Unconstrained mutual funds take on private fund-like risk without a corresponding return advantage: private funds' incentives and investment flexibility help explain their performance advantage over mutual funds, but the performance record of unconstrained mutual funds is less clearly distinguished from that of other mutual funds.",
   "abstract": "can help explain their performance advantage over mutual funds,180 the performance record for UMFs is less clearly distinguished from that of other mutual funds.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "comparison of unconstrained mutual funds with private funds and conventional mutual funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2811729-036",
   "text": "The Company Act's retail investor protection policies do not take sufficiently into account the investment strategy and risk attributes that unconstrained mutual funds share with private funds.",
   "abstract": "Company Act's retail investor protection policies do not take these risks sufficiently into account.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Investment Company Act protections as applied to unconstrained mutual funds"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0877b0a076f2614559cb0b1a736f73401cecbee7cfe014da6e36709208e92a74",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-001",
   "text": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 is the most significant regulatory change in the history of the private fund industry, ending decades in which the industry operated with little regulatory supervision.",
   "abstract": "Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 introduced the most significant regulatory change in the history of the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States private fund industry",
    "post 2010"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-002",
   "text": "Attempts to rescind Title IV through the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 demonstrate that private fund registration and disclosure obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act are highly politically sensitive.",
   "abstract": "Politician's attempts to rescind Title IV via the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 (IAMA 2016) illustrate the highly politically sensitive nature of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure obligations for the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States",
    "2016 legislative context"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-011",
   "text": "Estimates of annual Dodd-Frank Act compliance cost for private fund advisers range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year.",
   "abstract": "Some estimates suggest that compliance cost will range from $50,000 to $400,000 per year (Kaal 2013a and 2015b).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "registered private fund advisers",
    "estimates drawn from prior work"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-015",
   "text": "Beyond the authors' own prior work, there is no other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.",
   "abstract": "We are not aware of any other empirical evidence on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "as of the paper's writing in 2016"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "dc3b2f9e60e42ea1b42c2e0062d65569675b014c05fcd30b15ad44d2410b2ce7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-001",
   "text": "Private fund advisers' increasing use of blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data is a distinct source of downward pressure on the traditional 2/20 fee structure that commentators have not examined.",
   "abstract": "A factor contributing to the market pressure on the fee structure that has not been examined by commentators pertains to the increasing use of use of blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data by private fund advisers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private investment fund industry",
    "period of roughly 2007 to 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-002",
   "text": "The majority of private fund advisers that deploy blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data in their operations or strategy charge their investors lower fees, even though not all blockchain enabled funds charge per transaction fees.",
   "abstract": "While not all blockchain-enabled private investment funds charge per-transaction fees, the majority of private fund advisers that use blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, and big data in different aspects of their operations or strategy charge their investors lower fees.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers using the technologies in operations or strategy"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-003",
   "text": "Using a hand coded dataset of 98 private investment fund advisers that use blockchain technology in their strategy or internal operations, the article shows that advisers using the new technology are able to charge overall lower fees.",
   "abstract": "Using a dataset of private investment fund advisers that utilize blockchain technology in their investment strategy or internal operations (N=[98]), this article shows that the fund advisers who use the new technology are able to charge overall lower fees.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "sample of 98 blockchain using private fund advisers",
    "hand coded by the author and two research assistants"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-012",
   "text": "Private investment fund management fees deviate from the market rate of 1.5% to 2% of the fund's capital commitments because affiliates and other employees of the investment manager who invest in the fund are not charged management fees.",
   "abstract": "In recent years, private investment fund management fees can deviate from the market rate of 1.5%–2% of the fund's capital commitments because affiliates or other employees of the investment manager who invest in the fund are not charged management fees",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "funds with affiliate or employee investors"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2959730-042",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2959730-042",
   "text": "The rise of blockchain applications in private investment funds can exacerbate the industry's already changing fee structure.",
   "abstract": "The paper has illustrated that the rise of blockchain applications in private investment funds can exacerbate the already changing fee structure of the industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Applications and Fee Structure Developments in Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959730",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private investment fund industry as of 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ebd86972d8817b0c1c80326ae5564476983cedba3f258ff3b2610f156b93fb50",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-013",
   "text": "The SEC's reasoning against the Bitcoin exchange traded fund does not transfer to blockchain based private investment funds, because such funds trade a diverse array of cryptocurrencies rather than Bitcoin alone and reach a much narrower investor audience, which curtails investor risk.",
   "abstract": "Most importantly, private investment funds on Melonport would be actively trading a more diverse array of cryto- currencies, not just Bitcoin. Moreover, the audience of a Melonport-type fund is much more limited and curtails the risk to investors.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to private funds created through Ethereum smart contracting on platforms such as Melonport"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-027",
   "text": "Private fund management fees have compressed materially: the historical two percent of commitments has shifted in recent years to roughly 1.0 percent for new managers and 1.5 to 1.8 percent for established managers with an adequate track record.",
   "abstract": "However, the historical fee of 2% of commitments through the reinvestment period, then 2% on the cost basis for the investments/value of fund has shifted in recent years closer to 1.0% for new managers and 1.5-1.8% for established managers with an adequate track record.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "describes private equity and hedge fund fee practice as of 2016 and 2017"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-035",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-035",
   "text": "The study rests on a hand coded dataset of 120 private investment funds that use blockchain technology in either their strategy or their operations, compiled by the author and research assistants from web searches and multiple databases.",
   "abstract": "The dataset comprises a representative sample of private investment funds that utilize blockchain technology in either their strategy or operations (N=120). The author and a team of two research assistants hand-coded individual use of blockchain technology for each fund in the dataset.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998033-040",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998033-040",
   "text": "Regulatory guidance is essential to the continuing evolution and blockchain integration of the private investment fund industry, so the constraint on further adoption is regulatory rather than technological.",
   "abstract": "Regulatory guidance will be essential to ensuring the continuing evolution and blockchain integration for the private investment fund industry.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "normative",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "aafb1be3c25cd33da477d759df9ca2f856f0a8fe133d6396da2e75d0af573dbd",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3002908-013",
   "text": "The IRS confined its virtual currency position to transactions in convertible virtual currency, which leaves the tax treatment of crypto limited partnership interests unaddressed.",
   "abstract": "However, the IRS was very specific about limiting its current position to transactions involving \"convertible virtual currency,\" leaving the tax treatment of crypto-limited partnership interests unaddressed.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "under IRS Notice 2014-21"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "06a7b61e75f905ee07e422e875d83a65c5033a248a6e05a213523b034e5db534",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4033886-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4033886-012",
   "text": "Digital asset fund valuation disputes are aggravated by nondisclosure: Polychain Capital told a redeeming investor that the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.",
   "abstract": "Upon request, Polychain Capital told Greenhouse the fund's asset valuation policy would not be disclosed.16",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Hayley Howe, Digital Asset Valuation (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033886",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "private digital asset funds",
    "Polychain Capital redemption dispute"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "52ba05b1292b1be4bfaf1ee5cf56b14fea9c196d870603e794d7ee316df129bd",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "87 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'private-funds'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}