# Profit motive `kaal:entity:profit-motive` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 10 claims that carry the concept tag `profit-motive`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 10 claims across 3 works, 2021 to 2021. **2021** - [3782193-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-007) [mechanism/argued] -- The unstoppable power of decentralization is threatened by unregulated competition for profits, but it can be maintained even in extreme circumstances by a secure and meaningful reputational system. > The "unstoppable power of decentralization" is threatened by unregulated competition for profits, but can be maintained in the most extreme circumstances by a secure and meaningful reputa- tional system. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782193-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-025) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Giving the Apaches cattle in 1917 succeeded where military force had failed because the valuable assets created a zero-sum battle over resources between lineages, generating the internal competition necessary to produce a hierarchy of power over the disbursement of resources and property. > As Nevins explained, the introduction of the cattle created "a zero-sum battle over resources between lineages".26 The valuable assets created the internal competition necessary to generate a hierarchy of power over disbursement of resources and property. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782193-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-026) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The authors accept Brafman and Beckstrom's thesis that the best way to convert a decentralized organization into a centralized one is to introduce the profit motive, since money supplies a focal point for internal competition. > The thesis of The Starfish and the Spider is that the best way to convert a decentral- ized organization to a centralized organization is to introduce the profit motive. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782193-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-027) [empirical/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Bitcoin does not refute the thesis that money centralizes decentralized projects: hashing power has slowly become concentrated in mining pools until the majority of that power resides in the single country of China. > Slowly, Bitcoin hashing power has become more concentrated in mining pools, until today the ma- jority of power resides in the single country of China. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782193-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-028) [empirical/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Almost every blockchain project the authors are aware of is suffering under the centralizing force of competition for equity control and profit, and such projects predictably move toward centralization when unconscious of these forces. > In fact, almost every blockchain project we're aware of is suffering under the central- izing force of competition for equity control and profit. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193 - [3782205-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-012) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Historically, whenever a healthy decentralized organization began to earn money it quickly devolved into a centralized institution, because its uniting ideals shifted from transcendental value to a desire for money. > Whenever a healthy decentralized organization in the past began to earn money, it quickly devolved to a centralized institution. Their ideals shifted from the transcen- dental value which originally united them to a desire for money. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205 - [3782205-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782205-013) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Once the equalizing ideal that moderates a decentralized organization is lost, competition generated by the profit motive leads inevitably to centralization with rigid rules about who holds power and wealth. > Without the previous equalizing ideal to moderate, the competition generated by the profit motive led in- evitably to the organization centralizing with rigid rules for who has power and wealth. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205 - [3782214-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-014) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- When currency is the entire proximal goal of a transaction, all participants naturally behave as selfishly as possible and exploit any opportunity for individual profit at the group's expense, which makes cash profit a bad immediate incentive for both business and government. > If the entire proximal goal of a transaction is currency, all participants will naturally be- have in the most selfish manner possible, exploiting any opportunity for individual profit at the expense of the group. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-018) [mechanism/argued] -- Internal competition for profit creates a natural tendency to centralize power as members differentiate themselves through wins and losses, and this centralizing tendency is an additional destabilizing force on a decentralized organization. > The internal competition for profit creates the natural tendency to centralize power as the members differentiate themselves with wins and losses. This centralizing tendency is another force further destabilizing the organizations. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The alternatives to a reputational system for countering profit driven instability, namely external stabilizing forces such as governmental fiat and rapidly expanding profit opportunities, are inadequate because expansion driven stability lasts only as long as the expansion does. > Alternatives to reputational systems for countering the instability generated by profit competition include external stabilizing forces (such as governmental fiat) or rapidly expanding profit opportunities (which will only stabilize a group until the ex- pansion stops). Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/profit-motive.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.