# Proof of work

`kaal:entity:proof-of-work`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 16 claims that carry the concept tag `proof-of-work`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

16 claims across 14 works, 2017 to 2025.

**2017**

- [2992962-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-007) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Proof of work mining carries significant externalities: the authors estimate that the total energy cost of running the global network of computers solving proof of work puzzles was around 700 million US dollars per year before publication.
  > One problem with proof-of-work mining is that there are significant externalities. Before the publication of this article, the total energy costs for running the global network of computers devoted to solving the proof-of-work puzzles was estimated at around $700 million USD per year.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962

**2018**

- [3125827-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-032) [mechanism/argued] -- SPoS is far more computationally efficient than proof of work implementations because nodes no longer hash mine; the only computation added beyond the block validity checking every blockchain performs is one validation pool per block, in which each node sends a single up or down vote transaction.
  > Nodes will no longer hash mine. They will check the validity of the blocks, but they do that under any blockchain. The only added computation is the validation pool which happens once for each block, where nodes send one transaction, an up- or downvote.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
- [3128900-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-032) [mechanism/argued] -- The gamification design borrows the foundational proof of work principle that verifying a game was played properly is far easier than playing it properly, which is why bench validators can check task performance almost fully automatically.
  > The foundational principle of proof of work in the blockchain suggests that it is a lot easier to verify a game was played properly than it is to play it properly.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900
- [3227933-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227933-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Most current blockchain applications lack complete decentralization: proof of work style validation has produced mining pools because of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures.
  > For instance, the traditional mechanism for validating and verifying a new block of transactions – e.g., Bitcoin's proof of work protocol - has led to "mining pools" as a result of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Why 'Blockchain' Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227933
- [3227967-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3227967-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Existing blockchains and DAOs still lack genuine decentralization, and there are currently no true DAOs: Bitcoin's proof of work protocol has produced mining pools because of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures.
  > In our discussion, the following weaknesses were highlighted. There is still a lack of decentralization (there are currently no "true" DAOs). For instance, Bitcoin's proof of work protocol has led to "mining pools" because of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967
- [3249860-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3249860-038) [empirical/evidenced] -- Proof of Work remains the most popular consensus protocol type among the top 100 tokens, and the Other category alone comprises thirty-four tokens.
  > Figure 9a shows that the "Other" consensus protocol type, made up of thirty-four tokens.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860
- [3266953-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-017) [design/argued] -- Meaningful and secure reputation tokens supply the incentives needed for secure proof of stake consensus in block production, which eliminates the unsustainable inefficiencies of proof of work based blockchains.
  > giving the proper incentives for guaranteeing secure proof-of- stake consensus protocols for block production. This eliminates the unsustainable inefficiencies of proof-of-work based blockchains.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**2021**

- [3782198-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Bitcoin proved that a decentralized peer to peer network can manage valuable assets without a central authority, but the centralizing force of competition concentrated power anyway, as economies of scale produced large mining farms in place of millions of individual members maintaining the ledger.
  > But the centralizing forces of competition led to concentration of power in the Bitcoin network, as econo- mies of scale led to large computer farms devoted to mining for bitcoins, instead of millions of individual network members maintaining the ledger on their laptops.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198
- [3782198-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782198-031) [empirical/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Proof of work consensus is energetically wasteful because the entire global network redundantly computes wrong nonces, with the Bitcoin network consuming as much energy as the country of the Czech Republic.
  > The Bitcoin network is performing about #)!% =K55,555,555,555,555,555,555 hashes every second in June )5)5. That requires as much energy as the entire country of the Czech Republic.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198
- [3782203-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-029) [predictive/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The authors hold that the Bitcoin proof of work algorithm is ultimately flawed, that every consensus algorithm is flawed, and that it is not possible to create an algorithm that is not flawed.
  > However, we suspect that the Bitcoin PoW algorithm is ultimately flawed. In fact, we believe that every consensus algorithm is flawed. Further we are confident it is not possible to create an algorithm that is not flawed.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3782203-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-030) [empirical/asserted] -- Bitcoin's proof of work has produced no protocol violation in more than a decade, meaning no rule breaking message has been incorporated into the finalized blockchain, even though anyone can run a hacked version of the algorithm anonymously at any time.
  > Despite the fact that anyone can run any hacked version of the algo- rithm at any time from an anonymous account, there has not been a single protocol violation—meaning no message has been incorporated in the finalized blockchain which breaks the rules of the algorithm.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3808859-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-039) [design/asserted] -- A truly decentralized public blockchain must satisfy three simultaneous requirements: no points of centralization and corruption, full security at the level of proof of work, and transaction throughput above one hundred thousand transactions per second.
  > That is, a public blockchain that is not subject to points of centralization and corruption, that is fully secure at the level of proof of work security with a transaction throughput of over one hundred thousand transactions per seconds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859
- [3808873-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-008) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Proof of Work block rewards structurally reintroduce centralization: the economic nature of mining rewards incentivizes degrees of centralization through collective action of nodes that share rewards as a group, that is, mining pools.
  > The economic nature of these rewards incentivizes degrees of centralization in collective action of nodes that share in the mining rewards as a group, so called mining pools.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873
- [3981021-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-014) [condition/asserted] -- Only applicants who demonstrate both successful fundraising and successful fulfillment of donative intent are eligible for CHARITYxDAO voting associate status.
  > Only those who demonstrate both 1. Successful fundraising, and 2. Fulfilling the donative intent are eligible for CHARITYxDAO voting associate (VA) status.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Optimize Charitable Giving (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981021

**2022**

- [4015908-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-031) [empirical/evidenced] -- Grin avoided privileging miners who could develop ASICs before launch by gradually scaling up the portion of coins allocated to the ASIC-friendly algorithm over two years, which allowed hobbyist miners to participate.
  > However, Grin did not privilege miners who could develop ASICs prior to launch, rather they gradually scaled up the portion of coins allocated to the ASIC-friendly algorithm over 2 years, allowing hobbyist miners to participate.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908

**2025**

- [5225296-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5225296-006) [mechanism/evidenced] -- SPoS shifts the burden of consensus from energy expenditure to validator reputation, measured against a baseline of over 140 terawatt-hours consumed annually by Bitcoin as of 2023.
  > 140 terawatt-hours annually for Bitcoin alone as of 2023—SPoS shifts the burden of consensus to validator reputation
  Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/proof-of-work.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
