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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3128900-015",
   "text": "Semada is stipulated as an autonomous, decentralized, open source protocol on the Ethereum blockchain that enables domain specific reputation verification for human task crowdsourcing.",
   "abstract": "Semada is an autonomous, decentralized, open-source protocol29 that enables domain specific reputation verification for human task crowdsourcing, built on the ETHEREUM blockchain.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900",
   "datePublished": "2018",
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   "text": "A key design goal is a minimal and robust architecture, because minimality is what permits later construction of more complex automated validation logic and machine expert validators.",
   "abstract": "A key design goal of Semada is to create a minimal and robust architecture that allows for creating much more complex and automated validation logic, as well as machine expert validators.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-039",
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   "text": "Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols, and socially optimal hard-forking rules cannot suffice.",
   "abstract": "Blockchain-based corporate governance solutions in DAOs require evolutionary blockchain governance protocols. Socially optimal hard- forking rules cannot suffice.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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   "text": "Stable cryptocurrencies escape part of the lobbying problem by hardcoding their policy rationales and outcomes into the protocol, which limits the amount of lobbying that can influence policy decisions.",
   "abstract": "By making part of their policy rationales and outcomes hardcoded solutions, stable cryptocurrencies limit the amount of lobbying that can affect policy decisions.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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    "holds to the extent policy is genuinely hardcoded rather than discretionary"
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   "text": "Because hardcoded cryptocurrency policy is transparent and therefore predictable, market participants can anticipate policy and adjust behavior in advance, and such anticipatory reactions could over time make actual policy making the exception rather than the rule.",
   "abstract": "Because of this transparency and associated predictability, market participants can anticipate policy making and adjust behavior accordingly. In fact, such anticipatory policy reactions could, over time, make actual policy-making the exception rather than the rule.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
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   "text": "Full hardcoding is impossible: no stable cryptocurrency can encode all required policies and policy actions with full transparency, because future policy needs cannot be anticipated ex ante.",
   "abstract": "No stable cryptocurrency can hardcode all required policies and policy making actions with full transparency as future policy cannot be fully anticipated ex ante, before the needs occur.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-027",
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   "text": "Monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies should combine hardcoded transparent rules with protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations, with decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs functioning as the policy makers for what cannot be hardcoded.",
   "abstract": "monetary policy for cryptocurrencies can additionally be supported by protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs).152 Decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs can help function as policy makers.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522",
   "datePublished": "2019",
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    "depends on DAO governance designs that address expertise and incentive problems"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-036",
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   "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate corruption, understood as behavior that profits a minority at the greater expense of the majority.",
   "abstract": "Finally, we repeat the idea that the Folk Theorems of game theory prove that it is impossible to create protocols, no matter how complex or well- engineered, which can eliminate corruption",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-038",
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   "text": "Conducting monetary policy through a central bank digital currency imposes a requirement on the technology layer: the underlying network protocol must enable the central bank to adjust the money supply at will and to act as lender of last resort with access to unlimited supply.",
   "abstract": "Moreover, in order to be able to conduct monetary policy with CBDC, the underlying network protocol would have to enable the central bank to adjust the money supply at will.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Digital Asset Market Evolution (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606663",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "condition",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "CBDC built on a blockchain style protocol",
    "central bank intends to conduct monetary policy through the CBDC"
   ],
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-018",
   "text": "Reputation policing games explain why a business will rationally tolerate a small level of theft when policing costs more than the loss, which also explains the rationality of long-term parasitic and bullying relationships and creates a need for careful protocol design to prevent that corruption.",
   "abstract": "Similar game setups with reputation policing explain the situation where a busi- ness will rationally tolerate a small level of theft when policing is more expensive, such as when a grocer will ignore a street urchin who nabs an apple once per day.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "policing costs exceed the value of the losses",
    "repeated interaction with asymmetric power"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-019",
   "text": "Groups with decentralized, diverse values require protocol centralization in the form of explicit enforceable rules, because stability depends on the impartial application of law to display fairness, and explicit rules can unite a larger and more diverse membership.",
   "abstract": "Diverse (decentralized) values require protocol centralization (explicit, enforcea- ble rules), because stability requires impartial application of laws to display fairness. Explicit rules can unite a larger group of more diverse members.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "ideologically diverse membership",
    "groups seeking maximum inclusiveness"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782217-012",
   "text": "The protocols governing how a particular oracle question is answered should be set by the subject matter experts themselves rather than by a static centralized hierarchy, because the experts know best how their own system can be gamed and how to prevent that gaming to protect their hard earned reputation.",
   "abstract": "Giving the experts, them- selves, control of their own organization is better than relying on a static centralized hierarchy. The experts know best how to game their own system, and how to prevent gaming to protect their hard-earned reputation.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217",
   "datePublished": "2021",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808873-017",
   "text": "To emulate nature's decentralized design, human designed decentralized systems must build experimentation with workable designs into the system as a core feature, yet at the beginning of the 2020s very few decentralized systems or design proposals incorporated such experimentation features.",
   "abstract": "To emulate nature's decentralized experimentation design features, human designed decentralized systems would need to build experimentation with workable designs as a core feature into the system.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3931933-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3931933-002",
   "text": "The core proposal of Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake is to separate block consensus from block rewards, making the reward a function of the node's reputation rather than of stake alone.",
   "abstract": "The main concept in Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (HSPoS) is to separate the block consensus from the block rewards. HSPoS proposes that the rewards become a function in the reputation of the node.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hybrid Secure Proof of Stake (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931933",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4015908-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4015908-038",
   "text": "Non-linear reward structures using weighting, tiers, or logarithmic curves counteract centralization of token supply by decentralizing disproportionate returns so that rewards do not scale linearly with the amount of liquidity a user holds.",
   "abstract": "Fair launch protocols can create some form of weighting, tier, and/or logarithmic curves for rewards. This decentralizes disproportionate returns, so they do not scale linearly with the amount user liquidity a user has.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Fair Token Launch (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015908",
   "datePublished": "2022",
   "claim_type": "design",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
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   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "15 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'protocol-design'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}