# Protocol evolution

`kaal:entity:protocol-evolution`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `protocol-evolution`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2018 to 2021.

**2018**

- [3125827-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-002) [condition/argued] -- A successful proof of stake protocol must be flexible enough to continually police new attack strategies, because changing market forces and network performance keep creating new opportunities to profit at the expense of the majority.
  > Therefore a successful PoS protocol must be flexible enough to continually police new attack strategies.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
- [3125827-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-003) [condition/argued] -- A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three things at once: produce valuable blocks, police blocks that violate protocol, and improve the production protocols in response to gaming. Incentivizing only block production is insufficient.
  > A secure PoS protocol requires a proper incentive structure which perpetually motivates users to produce valuable blocks, to police the production of blocks which violate protocols, and to improve block production protocols in response to gaming.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
- [3125827-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-024) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A healthy expertise will have near unanimous consensus on every evidence of work validation pool, and that very unanimity creates an impediment to development, because honest members risk their stakes by voting for untested changes.
  > A healthy expertise will continually have near-unanimous consensus on every evidence-of-work validation pool. This creates an impediment to development.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**2021**

- [3782210-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-022) [mechanism/argued] -- Because eternally perfect protocols are impossible, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, the remedy is not a better static ruleset but a system that continually improves its protocols and smart contracts in reaction to market change.
  > The impossibility of creating eternally perfect protocols, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Folk Theorems of Game Theory, is addressed by a sys- tem which continually improves protocols and smart contracts to react to changes in the market.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/protocol-evolution.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.