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 "identifier": "kaal:entity:protocol-governance",
 "name": "Protocol governance",
 "termCode": "protocol-governance",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3652481-029",
   "text": "Kaal accepts that the arguments against on chain governance remain strong: in an off chain model miners supply checks and balances over protocol changes, and on chain governance arguably removes those checks and balances.",
   "abstract": "Despite the ever-widening need for on-chain governance solutions, arguments against on-chain governance remain strong. In an off- chain governance model, miners provide checks and balances on power over protocol changes. On-chain governance arguably removes such checks and balances.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "public blockchains with miner based off chain governance"
   ],
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-013",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782201-013",
   "text": "An open source design is necessary to run any program in a peer to peer environment, because decentralization means the source code must be shared by all if it is not controlled centrally.",
   "abstract": "An open source design is necessary to run any program in a PRP environment, because decentralization means the source code needs to be shared by all if it isn't controlled centrally.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "peer to peer environments with decentralized governance"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-028",
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   "text": "Since no algorithm can be perfectly secure in all circumstances, protocol developers should redirect effort from proving algorithms correct to building a governance process that updates the algorithm as network circumstances change, rewarding protocol improvement with meaningful reputation instead of leaving attack as the profitable option.",
   "abstract": "Given the impossibility of creating an algorithm that will be perfectly secure in all circumstances, we should instead focus on developing a governance process that al- lows us to update our algorithm to adapt to the changing network circumstances to the security level required",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "design",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "proof of stake and other consensus protocols",
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  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-004",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-004",
   "text": "Benevolent dictatorship is more efficient and effective than messy democracy in the short run, but centralized governance of that kind threatens the long term stability of a powerful public peer to peer network.",
   "abstract": "Benevolent dictators are much more efficient and effective than messy democracies, but the long-term stability of a powerful public PCP network is threatened by such centralized governance.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "large public peer to peer networks",
    "long time horizons"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-005",
   "text": "No major blockchain is entirely decentralized, because all of them lack binding, coded, anonymous peer to peer governance; on chain and off chain governance experiments to date fall short of that standard.",
   "abstract": "At the moment, however, no major blockchain is entirely decentral- ized, because they all lack pure binding coded PCP anonymous governance.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-006",
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   "text": "Declining to adopt explicit or formal rules is itself a governance choice, and it defaults to rule by might; since might in these systems is defined by wealth, the resulting order is oligarchy.",
   "abstract": "Choosing no explicit or formal rules is still a governance choice. That choice de- faults to the prehistoric rule of might makes right. Since might is defined by wealth, they've chosen oligarchy.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "platforms where power tracks token holdings or computing power"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-007",
   "text": "The absence of a governance process is especially dangerous for peer to peer platforms precisely because decentralized organizations find it extremely difficult to change their rules once established.",
   "abstract": "The lack of governance is especially dangerous for these PCP platforms, because it is extremely difficult for decentralized organizations to change their rules.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "large decentralized networks with distributed power"
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782214-022",
   "text": "The main problem with all current peer to peer governance structures is the lack of proper incentivization: participants are not motivated to improve the whole organization over the long term, so they game the system for short term personal profit.",
   "abstract": "The main problem with all current PCP governance structures (such as they are) is the lack of proper incentivization. In business or in government, all participants need to be motivated to improve the whole organization over the long term.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-027",
   "text": "Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.",
   "abstract": "Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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 "description": "9 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'protocol-governance'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}