# Protocol governance `kaal:entity:protocol-governance` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `protocol-governance`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 9 claims across 5 works, 2020 to 2021. **2020** - [3652481-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Kaal accepts that the arguments against on chain governance remain strong: in an off chain model miners supply checks and balances over protocol changes, and on chain governance arguably removes those checks and balances. > Despite the ever-widening need for on-chain governance solutions, arguments against on-chain governance remain strong. In an off- chain governance model, miners provide checks and balances on power over protocol changes. On-chain governance arguably removes such checks and balances. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 **2021** - [3782201-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-013) [condition/argued] -- An open source design is necessary to run any program in a peer to peer environment, because decentralization means the source code must be shared by all if it is not controlled centrally. > An open source design is necessary to run any program in a PRP environment, because decentralization means the source code needs to be shared by all if it isn't controlled centrally. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 - [3782203-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-028) [design/argued] -- Since no algorithm can be perfectly secure in all circumstances, protocol developers should redirect effort from proving algorithms correct to building a governance process that updates the algorithm as network circumstances change, rewarding protocol improvement with meaningful reputation instead of leaving attack as the profitable option. > Given the impossibility of creating an algorithm that will be perfectly secure in all circumstances, we should instead focus on developing a governance process that al- lows us to update our algorithm to adapt to the changing network circumstances to the security level required Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 - [3782214-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Benevolent dictatorship is more efficient and effective than messy democracy in the short run, but centralized governance of that kind threatens the long term stability of a powerful public peer to peer network. > Benevolent dictators are much more efficient and effective than messy democracies, but the long-term stability of a powerful public PCP network is threatened by such centralized governance. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-005) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- No major blockchain is entirely decentralized, because all of them lack binding, coded, anonymous peer to peer governance; on chain and off chain governance experiments to date fall short of that standard. > At the moment, however, no major blockchain is entirely decentral- ized, because they all lack pure binding coded PCP anonymous governance. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-006) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Declining to adopt explicit or formal rules is itself a governance choice, and it defaults to rule by might; since might in these systems is defined by wealth, the resulting order is oligarchy. > Choosing no explicit or formal rules is still a governance choice. That choice de- faults to the prehistoric rule of might makes right. Since might is defined by wealth, they've chosen oligarchy. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-007) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The absence of a governance process is especially dangerous for peer to peer platforms precisely because decentralized organizations find it extremely difficult to change their rules once established. > The lack of governance is especially dangerous for these PCP platforms, because it is extremely difficult for decentralized organizations to change their rules. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3782214-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The main problem with all current peer to peer governance structures is the lack of proper incentivization: participants are not motivated to improve the whole organization over the long term, so they game the system for short term personal profit. > The main problem with all current PCP governance structures (such as they are) is the lack of proper incentivization. In business or in government, all participants need to be motivated to improve the whole organization over the long term. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 - [3799320-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply. > Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token. Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/protocol-governance.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.