# Public blockchain `kaal:entity:public-blockchain` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 8 claims that carry the concept tag `public-blockchain`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 8 claims across 6 works, 2017 to 2021. **2017** - [3002908-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-005) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Jurisdiction over the public blockchain does not exist within the present doctrinal infrastructure for jurisdiction, and in practice the blockchain cannot be regulated or governed because it is decentralized and autonomous. > More specifically, jurisdiction over the public blockchain does not exist within the present doctrinal infrastructure for jurisdiction. In practice, the blockchain itself cannot be regulated or governed because it is decentralized and autonomous. Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908 **2019** - [3373393-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-036) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The core issues that afflict centralized governance solutions, including information asymmetries, censorship, opportunism of agents, breaches of fiduciary duties, and fraud, can only be truly removed if and when a truly decentralized public blockchain emerges that is scalable and fully secure. > and fraud or third-party interference, can only be truly removed to fully reform the agency relationship if and when a truly decentralized public blockchain emerges that is scalable and fully secure. Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 - [3396522-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-017) [mechanism/argued] -- Conducting commerce on public blockchains counteracts corruption because every transaction becomes publicly visible and traceable to both consumers and the government, removing the untraceability that corrupt dealing requires. > The transparency and traceability of public blockchain transactions in business and commerce counteracts corruption. Using public blockchains in commerce makes every and all transactions publicly visible and traceable for consumers and the government alike. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The low transaction throughput of public blockchains is a core limitation holding back more advanced distributed applications and, with them, decentralized commerce. > The low transaction throughputs of public blockchains158 is a core limitation that holds back more advanced DApps. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 - [3396522-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3396522-033) [condition/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Decentralization technology is unlikely to proliferate without a core use case beyond store of value; banking, money transmission, and triple entry accounting are natural use cases but fall short of being universal use cases for public blockchains. > Moreover, without a core use case, other than the store of value, decentralization technology is less likely to proliferate. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522 **2020** - [3709041-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-025) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Blockchain voting solutions require political will as well as technical capability, and incumbent governments may refuse to surrender control over the voting process, preferring private blockchains that preserve their control. > Yet, governments in the existing representative democracies may not wish to surrender control over the voting process and may prefer to use private blockchains to facilitate voting outcomes. Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041 **2021** - [3808859-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-039) [design/asserted] -- A truly decentralized public blockchain must satisfy three simultaneous requirements: no points of centralization and corruption, full security at the level of proof of work, and transaction throughput above one hundred thousand transactions per second. > That is, a public blockchain that is not subject to points of centralization and corruption, that is fully secure at the level of proof of work security with a transaction throughput of over one hundred thousand transactions per seconds. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 - [3808873-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-025) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Decentralized legal infrastructure solutions were almost entirely missing in the early 2020s despite strong demand, because other prerequisite decentralized infrastructure products, notably a functional public blockchain, were still missing. > Yet, other important decentralized infrastructure products, such as a functional public blockchain were still missing which undermined decentralized infrastructure solutions. Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/public-blockchain.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.