{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/public-goods",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:public-goods",
 "name": "Public goods",
 "termCode": "public-goods",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/public-goods.md",
 "sha256": "7803e29137a224d02eef4176644fa426bbfc926eaf156cb15b8c5e944614d281",
 "additionalProperty": [
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "work_count",
   "value": 4
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2011",
    "2021"
   ]
  },
  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "non_current_claims",
   "value": 0
  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1806252-014",
   "text": "Systemic risk and financial market stability are public goods, so individual banks free ride on other banks' hedge fund credit risk management and are not incentivized to adequately monitor or limit their own hedge fund risk exposure.",
   "abstract": "Systemic risk and financial market stability generate public good and free-rider problems: banks are not incentivized to adequately monitor or limit hedge fund risk exposure because of their reliance on hedge fund credit risk management by other banks.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3343ebfe05a925c3d1a75625c4b351ccff515c50819a48d155804daacf01429d",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-028",
   "text": "Contingent capital securities approximate the characteristics of a quasi-public good: just as ships cannot readily be excluded from a lighthouse, systemically important institutions benefit from the issuance of contingent capital by other such institutions whenever the design minimizes systemic risk and contagion.",
   "abstract": "CCS could have the potential to approximate quasi-public good characteristics. Similar to the difficulty of excluding ships from using the services of a lighthouse,219 SIFIs may benefit from the issuance of CCS by other SIFIs if the CCS design min- imizes systemic risk and contagion.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "only if the CCS design actually minimizes systemic risk and contagion"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3709041-020",
   "text": "Microdemocracies must confront the tragedy of the commons, because voters acting on self-interest independent of the totality of voters may, without controls, deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.",
   "abstract": "Acting for their own self-interest may be contrary to the common good of all voters. Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041",
   "datePublished": "2020",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to microdemocratic shared resource systems without controls"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "5216a7bca45a48e3bef11ec524936e66af737c0fd66271e9f6866dc20a4482cc",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3808867-016",
   "text": "Microdemocratic systems must solve the tragedy of the commons, because without controls self interested voters acting independently of the totality of voters may deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.",
   "abstract": "Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "microdemocratic shared-resource systems",
    "absence of controls"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "eeccf6d0587bd278a96ce6ac8ec5003e26d161c245f6c94b4144d84f374802eb",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "4 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'public-goods'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}