# Public goods

`kaal:entity:public-goods`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `public-goods`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2011 to 2021.

**2011**

- [1806252-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Systemic risk and financial market stability are public goods, so individual banks free ride on other banks' hedge fund credit risk management and are not incentivized to adequately monitor or limit their own hedge fund risk exposure.
  > Systemic risk and financial market stability generate public good and free-rider problems: banks are not incentivized to adequately monitor or limit hedge fund risk exposure because of their reliance on hedge fund credit risk management by other banks.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**2012**

- [1998455-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-028) [definitional/argued] -- Contingent capital securities approximate the characteristics of a quasi-public good: just as ships cannot readily be excluded from a lighthouse, systemically important institutions benefit from the issuance of contingent capital by other such institutions whenever the design minimizes systemic risk and contagion.
  > CCS could have the potential to approximate quasi-public good characteristics. Similar to the difficulty of excluding ships from using the services of a lighthouse,219 SIFIs may benefit from the issuance of CCS by other SIFIs if the CCS design min- imizes systemic risk and contagion.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**2020**

- [3709041-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-020) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Microdemocracies must confront the tragedy of the commons, because voters acting on self-interest independent of the totality of voters may, without controls, deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.
  > Acting for their own self-interest may be contrary to the common good of all voters. Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.
  Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041

**2021**

- [3808867-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Microdemocratic systems must solve the tragedy of the commons, because without controls self interested voters acting independently of the totality of voters may deplete or spoil shared resources such as the environment and public goods.
  > Without controls, some self-interested voters may be depleting or spoiling resources they share with the rest of society, such as the environment, public goods, among others.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/public-goods.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.