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 "name": "Public rulemaking",
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-007",
   "text": "The feedback effect between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers reduces incomplete information, which in turn enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "The feedback effect increases the availability of relevant information for rulemaking. At the same time, the reduction of incomplete information in the rulemaking process enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Supplementing the rulemaking process with dynamic elements increases the public rulemaker's ability to adapt public rules to unknown future states, and thereby curtails public trial-and-error rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Supplementing the rulemaking process with dynamic elements expands the availability of relevant information and increases the public rulemaker's ability to adapt public rules to unknown future states.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Private rulemakers have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers in the dynamic regulation framework because public rulemakers lack comparable access to timely and institution-specific information.",
   "abstract": "Private rulemakers in the dynamic regulation framework have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers who do not have comparable access to timely and institution-specific information.",
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   "text": "Parties subject to informal rules signal their preferences and efficient solutions to the public rulemaker, so informal rules and practices supply additional information that modifies rulemakers' actions and improves rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Parties who are subject to informal rules signal their preferences as well as efficient solutions to the public rulemaker. Informal rules and practices therefore provide additional information that can help modify the actions of rulemakers and improve rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.",
   "abstract": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, de-centralized, and institution-specific information.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to react in a timely fashion to emerging, decentralized, and institution-specific information, while public rulemakers are limited in the information they can obtain.",
   "abstract": "While public rulemakers are limited as to the information they can obtain to enact rules, private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "The feedback process between public and private rulemakers increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker, which induces and supports a learning process and creates incentives for that learning.",
   "abstract": "The feedback process between public and private rulemakers increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker. This induces and supports the learning process for the public rulemaker.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "text": "Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of the rulemaker's next action.",
   "abstract": "The consumer opt-out of existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker and triggers a modification of the public rulemaker's next action in the rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-050",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2267560-050",
   "text": "The feedback effect in dynamic regulation, as part of the organizational culture of rulemaking, may allow cooperation and coordination not only among private actors but also among public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.",
   "abstract": "rulemaking may allow cooperation and coordination not only among private actors but also among public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-011",
   "text": "Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce and react to necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that public rulemakers cannot readily obtain.",
   "abstract": "Private rule- makers often have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, compara- ble, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-012",
   "text": "Interaction and exchange of emerging information between public and private rulemakers creates a feedback process that increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker.",
   "abstract": "Interaction between public rulemakers and private rulemakers, including the exchange of emerging information, creates a feed- back process between them that increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "public and private rulemakers actually exchange emerging information"
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  }
 ],
 "description": "11 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'public-rulemaking'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}