# Quadratic voting

`kaal:entity:quadratic-voting`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `quadratic-voting`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 4 works, 2020 to 2024.

**2020**

- [3709041-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3709041-017) [design/argued] -- Under a quadratic style microdemocratic allocation, each voter receives a capped number of votes to distribute by priority, so voters concentrate votes on the issues most relevant to them and outcomes track actual preference intensity.
  > Each voter in a given microdemocratic voting scenario may be allocated a maximum number of votes. Such votes may be allocated by priority to any issues the respective voter wants to engage with.
  Kaal, Blockchain Technology for Good (2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709041

**2021**

- [3808867-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-015) [mechanism/argued] -- Microdemocratic vote allocation improves voting outcomes because the proportion of votes a voter allocates to an issue evidences that voter's higher level of knowledge on the issue, and voters are unlikely to give top priority to issues they know little about.
  > Moreover, part of the power of this microdemocratic approach derives from the higher levels of knowledge a given voter has on a particular issue that is evidenced by the voters' proportional allocation of votes on such issue.
  Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867

**2023**

- [4529715-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-019) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Quadratic voting remains open to manipulation and strategic voting, and it depends on a robust and transparent voting system to count votes accurately.
  > However, quadratic voting also has some limitations and challenges, such as the potential for manipulation or strategic voting, and the need for a robust and transparent voting system to ensure that all votes are counted accurately.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715

**2024**

- [5254152-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5254152-002) [mechanism/asserted] -- Quadratic voting suppresses domination by any single participant because the cost of each additional vote rises quadratically, making concentrated control prohibitively expensive.
  > The cost of additional votes increases quadratically, making it prohibitively expensive for any one individual to dominate the voting process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Market Meta Analysis 2024 (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254152

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/quadratic-voting.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.