# Registration `kaal:entity:registration` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 31 claims that carry the concept tag `registration`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 31 claims across 7 works, 2012 to 2018. **2012** - [2150377-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-001) [mechanism/asserted] -- Freedom from supervision and disclosure obligations was functional rather than incidental for hedge funds: it enabled successful fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors, which is why manager registration is contested. > Hedge funds' ability to invest in global markets without supervision and significant disclosure obligations was important for successful hedge fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-002) [empirical/argued] -- The immediate deregistration of hedge fund advisers following Goldstein v. SEC is revealed-preference evidence of the industry's opposition to registration and disclosure requirements, not merely a technical response to the vacatur. > The advisers' decision to deregister in 2006 seems to confirm the industry's opposition to registration and disclosure requirements. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-005) [mechanism/asserted] -- Losing the private adviser exemption imposed a bundle of obligations, disclosure duties and code of ethics requirements on top of inspections and record keeping, and the direct consequence was significantly higher legal fees for hedge funds. > Without the private adviser exemption, hedge funds were also faced with disclosure requirements62 and code of ethics requirements63 resulting in significantly higher legal fees. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-006) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The SEC's 2004 attempt to reach hedge fund advisers failed as a matter of administrative law: in July 2006 the D.C. Circuit vacated the hedge fund rule in Goldstein v. SEC as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking, because the SEC had no authority to define a term the Advisers Act left undefined. > Eventually, in July 2006, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC vacated the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by the SEC.71 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-008) [design/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Because Title IV's registration exemptions are broad enough to threaten the rule they qualify, the Dodd-Frank Act deliberately gives the SEC rulemaking authority to keep the exemptions from swallowing the rules. > The Dodd-Frank Act also empowers the SEC to utilize its rulemaking authority to prevent the exemptions from registration to "swallow the rules."100 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-012) [empirical/evidenced] -- This Article reports the first survey study of hedge fund advisers conducted after the SEC's registration effective date, drawing on a population of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before March 30, 2012. > This Article presents the results of the first survey study with hedge fund advisers after the SEC's registration effective date. The population consists of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before the SEC's registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Managers who avoided registration by restructuring, for example by changing organizational form or assets under management, are practically and administratively very difficult to identify, so the population that adapted away from the rule remains largely unobservable to researchers. > Identifying hedge fund managers who had been exposed to the treatment and decided to avoid the treatment, by changing their organizational structure, AUM, et cetera, proved practically and administratively very difficult and would have resulted in a very small sample size for the control group. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 - [2150377-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-022) [empirical/evidenced] -- A majority of surveyed advisers, 72.09%, do not plan any strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements. > Figure 4.0 indicates that a majority (72.09%) of survey respondents do not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 **2013** - [2337268-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-007) [condition/asserted] -- A broker dealer who holds himself or herself out as a financial planner does not thereby trigger registration obligations under the IAA. > A broker dealer holding him or herself out as a financial planner alone does not trigger IAA registration obligations.14 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 - [2337268-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-011) [definitional/asserted] -- Mid-sized investment advisers, those with between $25 and $100 million AUM, fall to state authorities rather than the SEC, though they may still have to register with the state agency where their principal place of business is located. > Under Title IV, state authorities are responsible for mid- sized investment advisers.20 While mid-sized advisers are not required to register with the SEC, they may still be required to register with the state agency in the state of their principal place of business.21 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 - [2337268-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-013) [definitional/asserted] -- Advisers with more than $150 million in regulatory assets under management are defined as large private fund advisers and must register with the SEC. > Investment advisers having more than $150 million regulatory assets under management (RAUM) are defined as large private fund advisers and are required to register with the SEC.23 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 - [2337268-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-014) [mechanism/asserted] -- Registering large private fund advisers works by increasing the volume of data available to regulators, which in turn may help protect against systemic risk. > The registration of large private fund advisers increases the availability of data and may help protect against systemic risk. Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 - [2337268-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-018) [mechanism/argued] -- Registration is the gateway that makes data collection and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers possible, and the Dodd-Frank Act raised disclosure requirements for registered advisers specifically to address systemic risk concerns. > The registration of investment advisers facilitates the collection of data and enhanced disclosure by hedge fund managers. The Dodd-Frank Act increased the disclosure requirements for registered investment advisers to address concerns over systemic risk.40 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 - [2337268-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2337268-034) [condition/argued] -- A person who provides investment advice over the Internet escapes registration only if the advice is impersonal; personalized advice delivered through chat rooms and websites can trigger the registration requirement. > Registration is not required if the person provides impersonal investment advice.97 Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268 **2014** - [2389416-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-001) [definitional/asserted] -- Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act represents the most significant regulatory change in the history of the hedge fund industry, imposing mandatory adviser registration and disclosure for the first time since the industry's inception. > Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act introduced the most significant regulatory change in the history of the hedge fund industry. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-003) [empirical/evidenced] -- The hedge fund adviser registration requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date of March 30, 2012. > The registration requirement for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act creates a discontinuity in hedge fund returns at the registration effective date, March 30, 2012. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-007) [empirical/evidenced] -- Hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects adviser returns in March 2012, but the effect does not persist in the months after the registration effective date. > We find evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act positively affects hedge fund adviser returns in March 2012, but this effect is not persistent in the subsequent months after the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-008) [empirical/evidenced] -- The authors find no empirical evidence that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects hedge fund performance, contradicting the industry's claims. > Contrary to the claims of the hedge fund industry, we find no empirical evidence that would suggest that hedge fund adviser registration under the Dodd-Frank Act negatively affects hedge fund performance. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-015) [empirical/evidenced] -- The largest number of strategic funds moving their AUM below $150 million occurs in the April to May 2012 window, which suggests a lagged response to the March 30, 2012 registration effective date. > The largest positive spike, which corresponds to the largest number of funds that decreased their AUM below $150 million is in the period April-May 2012, possibly suggesting some lagged effect of the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-017) [empirical/evidenced] -- In the period close to and following the registration effective date, fund size has a positive relationship with fund performance, with positive beta coefficients in March through May and July 2012. > In the period close to and following the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act, the size of funds seems to have a positive relationship with the fund performance. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-020) [empirical/evidenced] -- Under the sharp regression discontinuity design, the estimated treatment coefficient exceeds one only in March 2012, at 1.104 with a p-value of 0.015, and is close to zero and insignificant in every other month. > Only in March 2012, i.e. the registration effective date for hedge fund advisers, the estimated coefficient has value larger than one, while it is always close to zero in the other periods. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-023) [empirical/evidenced] -- The March 2012 discontinuity effect is not persistent and is completely absorbed in the months following the registration effective date for private fund advisers. > However, this discontinuity effect we observe in March 2012 is not persistent and is completely absorbed in the months following the registration effective date for private fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-028) [mechanism/argued] -- Hedge fund advisers with very small AUM likely did not respond to the Dodd-Frank Act registration requirement because they anticipated that disclosure would remain voluntary for them. > Hedge fund advisers with a very small AUM would have probably been unresponsive to the regulation, anticipating that information disclosure would remain on a voluntary basis. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389416-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-039) [empirical/evidenced] -- The mandatory registration requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act affects the hedge fund industry asymmetrically, with advisers whose AUM floats around the $150 million threshold showing evidence of strategic AUM reduction. > Our regression analysis also suggests that the mandatory registration requirement imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act affects the hedge fund industry asymmetrically. Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416 - [2389423-009](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-009) [mechanism/argued] -- The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information, a combination that marks a shift in how private funds are regulated. > The new regulatory framework for private funds in the United States requires hedge fund manager registration in combination with enhanced disclosure of sensitive proprietary information (Dodd–Frank §§ 401, 402). Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423 - [2389423-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-012) [definitional/asserted] -- Title IV mandates hedge fund adviser registration in order to increase record keeping and disclosure, requiring advisers above the statutory AUM threshold to register as investment advisers and to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC. > Title IV mandates hedge fund adviser registration to increase record-keeping and disclosure (Dodd-Frank § 408). Hedge fund advisers with more than $150 AUM are required to register as investment advisers and have to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423 - [2389423-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-015) [empirical/evidenced] -- Prior work shows that registration and the increased compliance requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act only marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds. > requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act marginally increase the cost structure of hedge funds (Kaal [2013]). Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423 **2016** - [2714974-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-006) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- The SEC's 2004 hedge fund adviser registration rule failed in court because the agency lacked authority to define the term client, which the Investment Advisers Act had not otherwise defined, and the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein vacated the rule as arbitrary rulemaking. > Because the term "client" had not otherwise been defined in the Investment Advisers Act, the SEC had no authority to determine the meaning of the term. Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 - [2714974-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-013) [empirical/evidenced] -- The cost of hedge fund manager registration under the Dodd-Frank Act brings increasing returns to scale for the industry, meaning compliance burdens fall disproportionately on smaller advisers. > Kaal shows that the cost of hedge fund manager registration under the Dodd-Frank Act brings increasing returns to scale for the industry (Kaal 2016a). Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 **2017** - [2998097-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-036) [mechanism/argued] -- Hedge fund advisers already required to register with the SEC have an incentive to also manage mutual funds or set up retail alternative funds, because the incremental regulatory burden of doing so is only minimally higher than their post registration requirements. > Hedge fund advisers who are required to register with the SEC have incentives to also manage mutual funds or set up retail alternative funds because the regulatory burden is minimally higher in comparison with preregistration legal requirements.191 Some registered hedge fund advisers may choose Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097 **2018** - [3117224-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-030) [empirical/evidenced] -- At the time of publication there were no registered marketplaces or alternative trading systems for cryptocurrency in Canada. > At the time of publication, there were no registered marketplaces or ATS's in Canada. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/registration.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.