# Regulation by prosecution

`kaal:entity:regulation-by-prosecution`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `regulation-by-prosecution`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 1 works, 2014 to 2014.

**2014**

- [2486570-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to prefer regulation by prosecution over regulation by legislation because prosecution and execution of an agreement carry large reputational implications.
  > Because of the large reputational implications of prosecution and N/DPA execution, corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to favor "regulation by prosecution" to regulation by legislation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-032) [condition/argued] -- Regulation by prosecution denies corporations the channels of influence available under legislative and administrative rulemaking, since it offers no comment process and no opportunity to lobby regulations in their favor.
  > Regulation by prosecu- tion also does not allow corporations to influence regulations in their favor through the comment process and lobbying.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570
- [2486570-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-033) [predictive/speculative] -- In the long run, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of legislative governance reform, even though it is less predictable than legislation.
  > In the long run, however, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of leg- islative governance reforms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulation-by-prosecution.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.