# Regulatory avoidance

`kaal:entity:regulatory-avoidance`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-avoidance`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2012 to 2014.

**2012**

- [2150377-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Managers who avoided registration by restructuring, for example by changing organizational form or assets under management, are practically and administratively very difficult to identify, so the population that adapted away from the rule remains largely unobservable to researchers.
  > Identifying hedge fund managers who had been exposed to the treatment and decided to avoid the treatment, by changing their organizational structure, AUM, et cetera, proved practically and administratively very difficult and would have resulted in a very small sample size for the control group.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-028) [mechanism/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Where the Form PF quarterly reporting threshold does influence behavior, it distorts fund size downward: a majority of the advisers who take the threshold into account plan to stay under $1.5 billion in assets under management, and some would close funds to new investors to do so.
  > A majority of those respondents who would take it into account plan to stay under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion AUM.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2014**

- [2389416-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-004) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Strategic behavior by fund advisers around the assets under management registration threshold produces a strong increase in the measured discontinuity at that threshold.
  > Strategic actions by fund advisers lead to a strong increase in the discontinuity around the AUM registration threshold.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416
- [2389416-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-029) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The Dodd-Frank Act registration threshold creates incentives strong enough that some advisers opt out of registration and disclosure by strategically changing their AUM size to stay below $150 million.
  > It is possible that the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act introduces incentives that are powerful enough to cause some hedge fund advisers to opt out of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure through a strategic change of AUM size.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-avoidance.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.