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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-028",
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   "text": "Non-US individuals and companies are expressly prohibited by US law from contributing to US political campaigns and have a relatively weak lobby in Washington, which places EU financial intermediaries at a competitive disadvantage in the US political system.",
   "abstract": "prohibited by US law from contributing to US political cam-",
   "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809",
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   "text": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.",
   "abstract": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.",
   "abstract": "In the competition to shape policies and attain the most favorable conditions for themselves via rulemaking, small and well- organized special interest groups (such as the financial industry) dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "The central compromise in Revised Rule 2019 is that parties need not disclose the price or the date of acquisition of disclosable economic interests, which is precisely the outcome the hedge fund industry lobbied for.",
   "abstract": "Revised Rule 2019 does not require parties to disclose the price and the date of acquisition of such interests, which is exactly what the hedge fund industry lobbied for.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463",
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   "text": "Incumbent firms facing the competitive disadvantage created by disruptive entrants respond by using the existing regulatory process itself to build obstacles to competition, which converts rulemaking into an instrument of incumbent protection.",
   "abstract": "To counteract such disadvantages, incumbent firms that are exposed to a perceived threat of disruptive innovation from disruptive firms may attempt to use the existing regulatory process to create obstacles for disruptive firms to compete.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence a continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because with fewer stable rules latent majority groups and dominant minority groups have fewer opportunities to influence the continuously and timely adapting rulemaking process.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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   "text": "Incumbent firms facing a perceived threat from disruptive innovation may respond by using the existing regulatory process itself to create obstacles that prevent disruptive firms from competing.",
   "abstract": "disadvantages, incumbent firms that are exposed to a perceived threat of disruptive innovation from disruptive firms may attempt to use the existing regulatory process to create obstacles for disruptive firms to compete.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
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    "incumbents already burdened by existing rules",
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   "text": "In hierarchical structures where members are siloed and have few formal connections across tiers, letting service providers create the regulations produces moral hazard, because the provider has an incentive to weaken standards and regulations.",
   "abstract": "In a hierarchical structure, where members are siloed and have few formal connections with those immediately above and below their tier in the hierarchy, this leads to the moral hazard problem that the service pro- vider has an incentive to weaken the standards and regulations.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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   "text": "Strict privacy and transparency regulation produces a perverse result: because only large technology companies hold the data resources and infrastructure needed to comply and still build effective AI, such regulation consolidates rather than disperses their power.",
   "abstract": "Furthermore, while the move towards more explainable, private, and transparent AI is commendable, these regulations can paradoxically consolidate power within large tech companies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796714",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "applies to stringent data privacy regimes such as GDPR",
    "holds where compliance cost scales with organizational resources"
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   "text": "Although the move toward more explainable, private, and transparent AI is desirable, Kaal argues these regulations paradoxically consolidate power within large technology companies, because only they hold the data resources and infrastructure needed to comply and still ship effective AI.",
   "abstract": "Furthermore, while the move towards more explainable, private, and transparent AI is commendable, these regulations can paradoxically consolidate power within large tech companies.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "failure",
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    "where compliance requires vast data resources and sophisticated infrastructure",
    "where smaller developers cannot absorb compliance cost"
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 "description": "10 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'regulatory-capture'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}