# Regulatory competition

`kaal:entity:regulatory-competition`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 17 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-competition`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

17 claims across 10 works, 2004 to 2025.

**2004**

- [617681-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-001) [design/argued] -- Bundling substantive corporate law together with adjudication, the arrangement that succeeded in Delaware, is likely to cause difficulties in Europe; Member States are most likely to succeed in post Centros and Inspire Art regulatory competition if they unbundle the corporate law product.
  > This bundling of statutory law and adjudication might, however, cause difficulties in Europe. We suggest that Member States are most likely to succeed in the regulatory competition following Centros and Inspire Art if they unbundle the corporate law product
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-002) [mechanism/argued] -- Under the seat theory, competition with respect to corporate law alone is impractical, because a corporation cannot choose a state's corporate law without also locating its principal place of business there and thereby submitting to that jurisdiction's other laws.
  > this context is impractical, because a corporation cannot choose the corporate law of a state without locating its principal place of business there and thus becoming subject to that jurisdiction's other laws.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-006) [mechanism/argued] -- Rule switching costs for a jurisdiction are probably higher when it must make substantial new demands on its courts in addition to changing its statutes, which raises the cost of competing with a bundled corporate law product.
  > Most important to the analysis in this paper, these rule switching costs are probably higher if the jurisdiction has to make substantial new demands on its courts as well as make changes to its statutes.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-008) [condition/argued] -- Regulatory competition for a bundled product of statutes plus courts is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.
  > In sum, regulatory competition for a bundled product is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-010) [condition/argued] -- For an unbundled product of statutes only, the key to successful regulatory competition shifts from the supply side to the demand side: drafting statutes that appeal to large numbers of managers and investors outside the jurisdiction.
  > For this unbundled product of statutes only, the key to successful competition would be the demand side: drafting statutes that appeal to large numbers of managers and investors outside the jurisdiction so they will incorporate there.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681
- [617681-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The quality problems in Delaware adjudication mean it is not a foregone conclusion that the bundled product of statutes plus specialized courts leads to optimal results.
  > These questions about the quality of Delaware adjudication suggest that it is not a foregone conclusion that the bundled product leads to optimal results.
  Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

**2011**

- [1806252-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-001) [mechanism/argued] -- Contrary to critics who blame the Basel Accords, harmonization through Basel II is not what made banks hold similar assets; banks held similar assets because those assets were profitable.
  > harmonization through Basel II that made banks hold similar assets: banks held similar assets because of the profitability of these assets.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**2012**

- [1998455-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-027) [mechanism/argued] -- Where jurisdictions are not compelled to agree on the same rule, some jurisdiction will try a different rule, and will do so more quickly, when changed economic circumstances make a different rule optimal.
  > diction will try a different rule, and will do so more quickly, than if all jurisdictions felt compelled to agree upon the same rule.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [2061166-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-037) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Convergence of contingent capital standards is impeded by a first mover problem: single jurisdictions hesitate to impose contingent capital requirements before they know how competing jurisdictions and their financial institutions will structure their own rules.
  > This could partially be due to a first mover problem. Single jurisdictions could be hesitant to implement contingent capital requirements without first knowing how other jurisdictions and financial institutions that compete with their home institutions may structure their contingent capital rules.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**2013**

- [2267560-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-029) [mechanism/argued] -- Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory solutions from other jurisdictions.
  > the competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, (Kirchner, Painter and Kaal 2005; Carbonara and Parisi 2008; Kerber 2000; Heine and Kerber 2002), it can nevertheless provide incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-030) [mechanism/argued] -- Because competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, it adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a feedback effect to the rulemaking process.
  > Because the competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, the competition between legislators adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a feedback effect to the rulemaking process.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**2016**

- [2831040-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Consumer choice adds a dynamic element to rulemaking because once consumers opt out of a suboptimal regulatory regime, public rulemakers in that jurisdiction can adjust their rulemaking in response, creating a feedback effect for the public rulemaker.
  > Consumer choice can add a dynamic element to the rulemaking process because public rulemakers in a given jurisdiction can adjust rulemaking to consumer choice once consumers have opted out of a suboptimal regulatory regime in that jurisdiction.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2834531-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-030) [mechanism/argued] -- In a world where regulatory competition is the new normal, regulators can pay a heavy economic price for being overly cautious or for abandoning the attempt to establish a meaningful basis for regulation, because first mover markets capture the benefits.
  > regulators can pay a heavy economic price for being overly cautious or abandoning the project of trying to establish a meaningful basis for regulation.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-037) [design/argued] -- Regulatory experimentation matters within a single jurisdiction and not only across jurisdictions, because it gives regulators data on the real world effects of a particular regulatory scheme in a comparable setting.
  > But such experimentation is also important within a particular jurisdiction as it provides regulators with data on the real–world effects of a particular regulatory scheme in a comparable setting.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531

**2020**

- [3652481-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-002) [condition/argued] -- A jurisdiction is only truly favorable to DAOs if it grants the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring any representative in that jurisdiction.
  > Only a jurisdiction that gives the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without the need for representation may truly be favorable for DAO concepts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2021**

- [3799320-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-004) [condition/argued] -- Only a jurisdiction that grants a DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring representation can be truly favorable to DAO concepts.
  > Only a jurisdiction that gives the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without the need for representation may truly be favorable for DAO concepts.
  Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**2025**

- [5554218-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5554218-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Harmonizing substantive law would suppress jurisdictional diversity by imposing a one size fits all model that ignores cultural, economic, and technological differences, thereby reducing the resilience of global digital asset ecosystems.
  > Harmonization of the substantive law would suppress this diversity, imposing a one-size-fits-all model that fails to account for cultural, economic, and technological differences, thereby reducing the resilience of global digital asset ecosystems.
  Furrer Andreas, Wulf A. Kaal, Universal Digital Law Codex (UDLC) Building the Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Era (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5554218

## Verify

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    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-competition.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.