# Regulatory cycles `kaal:entity:regulatory-cycles` **Status.** derived This node is assembled mechanically from the 26 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-cycles`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself. ## Every claim under this term 26 claims across 5 works, 2012 to 2016. **2012** - [1998455-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-025) [predictive/argued] -- The political economy of financial regulation ensures that the expansion of regulatory oversight induced by Dodd-Frank will be followed by a phase of relaxation, since historically the introduction of regulatory regimes after a crisis is followed by a gradual easing of regulatory strictures. > The political economy of financial regulation ensures that af- ter the Dodd-Frank-induced expansion of regulatory oversight there will be a subsequent phase of relaxation of regulatory over- sight. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 **2013** - [2273857-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-001) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Governance adjustments enacted via stable rules in reaction to financial crises are inevitably followed by relaxation, revision, and retraction of those rules. > Governance adjustments via stable rules in reaction to financial crises are inevitably followed by relaxation, revision, and retraction. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-005) [empirical/evidenced] -- Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of regulatory activity in a short timespan that is itself striking. > Since 2002, corporate governance in the United States has been, not just once but twice, substantially upgraded in response to crises, after more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-006) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The existing literature on financial regulation has not adequately addressed the underlying causes and consequences of cyclical regulation. > The literature on financial regulation may not have addressed the underlying causes and consequences of cyclical regulation adequately. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-014) [condition/argued] -- The regulatory sine curve itself may be inevitable, but its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can nonetheless be limited. > While the sine curve may be inevitable, its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can be limited. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-020) [mechanism/argued] -- Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem, and as a consequence regulatory oversight is never constant. > Financial regulation is characterized and controlled by a classic collective action problem. As a result, regulatory oversight is never constant. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-022) [mechanism/evidenced] -- During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest groups in rulemaking. > During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-023](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-023) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Once crises recede, regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium, and this dichotomy causes reform legislation and deregulatory legislation to be enacted in quick succession. > Following crises, the process is reversed and regulatory oversight diminishes as societies and markets return to their prior equilibrium. As a result of this dichotomy, reform and deregulatory legislation are often enacted in quick succession. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-026) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy. > The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and can produce suboptimal regulatory outcomes, often with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-027) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regulatory cycles make it nearly impossible to address financial regulatory concerns adequately, and systemic risk in particular is difficult to address if rules are enacted in a cyclical and reactive format. > Regulatory cycles also make it nearly impossible to adequately address financial regulatory concerns. Systemic risk is particularly difficult to address if rules are enacted in a cyclical and reactive format. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-028) [definitional/asserted] -- The regulatory sine curve is the pattern of governance adjustments made in reaction to financial crises together with the inevitable relaxation, revision, and retraction of the rules enacted as part of that adjustment. > The regulatory sine curve describes governance adjustments in reaction to financial crises and the inevitable relaxation, revision, and retraction of rules that were enacted as part of the governance adjustment. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-029) [definitional/argued] -- Regulatory intensity is never constant: it increases after a market crash and then wanes as society and the market return to normalcy. > The phrase "regulatory sine curve," means: "that (1) regulatory intensity is never constant, but rather increases after a market crash, and then wanes as (and to the extent that) society and the market return to normalcy Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-041](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-041) [design/argued] -- Business and regulatory cycles will persist, but optimizing the relationship between indicators of financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, especially the timing of regulatory responses, could soften some of the effects of crises. > While business and regulatory cycles are bound to persist, optimizing the relationship between indicators for financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, especially the timing of regulatory responses to crises, could soften some of the effects of regulatory crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-046](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-046) [normative/argued] -- Regulatory cycles would benefit from supplementing, rather than replacing, the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements. > The author identifies common elements of regulatory crises and suggests normatively that regulatory cycles could benefit from supplementing the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-066](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-066) [design/argued] -- A mixture of mandatory rules, market solutions, and private ordering would increase the adaptive capabilities of rulemaking, curtail the effects of the collective action problem of rulemaking, and dampen regulatory cycles. > A mixture of mandatory rules, market solutions, and private ordering could help increase the adaptive capabilities of rulemaking, curtail the effects of the collective action problem of rulemaking, and dampen regulatory cycles. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 - [2273857-067](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-067) [predictive/argued] -- Adding dynamic elements to financial regulation would cause the sine curve of financial regulation to start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises, thereby dampening regulatory cycles. > By adding dynamic elements to financial regulation, the sine curve of financial regulation may start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 **2014** - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004) [mechanism/argued] -- Dynamic elements function as an economizing device: they address the scarcity of regulatory resources and lower the cost of rulemaking by curtailing the collective action problem in rulemaking, the resulting regulatory cycles, and trial and error rulemaking. > Dynamic elements in the regula- tory infrastructure can be conceptualized as an economizing device that addresses the scarcity of regulatory resources and lowers the cost of rule- making by curtailing the effects of a classic collective action problem in rule- making, resulting regulatory cycles Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are generally not enacted at the moment appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available. > Because rulemak- ing is subject to regulatory cycles22 and a classic collective action problem23, rules are generally not enacted when appropriate information for rulemaking becomes available. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The existing framework of stable and presumptively optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce stable presumptively optimal rules and therefore keeps generating costly rule revision, updating, and revocation. > The existing framework for stable and presumptively optimal rules reinforces rulemaking processes that perpet- uate stable and presumptively optimal rules, necessitating costly rule revision, updating, and revocation. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) - [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-018) [condition/argued] -- Costly regulatory cycles become less likely if the regulatory framework integrates dynamically adapting elements, because rule revisions, revocations, and reenactments become less necessary. > Costly regulatory cycles are less likely to exist if the existing regulatory framework integrates dynamically adapting elements in the rulemaking process because rule revisions, revoca- tions, and reenactments become less likely. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014) **2016** - [2740477-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-024) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Accepting suboptimal rules temporarily buys rule certainty and predictability but guarantees a later cycle of revision, amendment, and repeal, so rulemakers trade short term certainty for a costly correction process. > Temporary acceptance of suboptimal rules increases temporary rule certainty and predictability, but it also precipitates the inevitable need for rule revision, amendments, and repeals Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 - [2740477-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-026) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Exponential innovation will intensify the frequency of the regulatory sine curve, because rulemakers are still trying to comprehend the regulatory demands of the last wave of innovation while the next wave is already in full force. > In effect, exponential innovation is likely to intensify the frequencies of the regulatory sine curve that is recognized by the literature. Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 - [2740477-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-027) [mechanism/argued] -- The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than from independent causes. > The collective action problem of rulemaking, problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules. Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 - [2808132-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-020) [mechanism/argued] -- The historically evolved rulemaking infrastructure could cope with its own collective action problems, regulatory cycles, and trial-and-error rulemaking without major disruption because the scope of regulatory issues was limited and institutional designs were consensus driven. > issues.80 Because of the limited scope of regulatory issues and the need for consensus- driven institutional designs, the historically evolved infrastructure for rulemaking could cope with its inherent collective action problems,81 regulatory cycles,82 and trial-and-error Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132 - [2808132-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-028) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules themselves, not from unrelated institutional defects. > problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.108 Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the use of institution-specific, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132 - [2808132-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-030) [mechanism/argued] -- Regulatory cycles and trial-and-error rulemaking become less prevalent under adaptive rulemaking because adaptive capabilities supplement stable rules, making rule revisions less frequent. > Similarly, regulatory cycles and trial-and-error rulemaking become less prevalent because adaptive rulemaking processes supplement stable rules with adaptive capabilities that make rule revisions less prevalent and minimize trial-and error rulemaking. Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132 ## Verify Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust. curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-cycles.md | sha256sum **Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.