# Regulatory design

`kaal:entity:regulatory-design`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 57 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-design`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

57 claims across 24 works, 2009 to 2024.

**2009**

- [1428387-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-001) [condition/argued] -- A uniform approach to hedge fund valuation is not possible because the variety of hedge fund investments and strategies means some positions, such as non-concentrated positions in liquid securities, are far easier to value than others.
  > The variety of hedge fund investments and strategies does not allow for a uniform approach to valuation because some types of investments, such as non-concentrated positions in liquid securities, are easier to value than other investments. To the extent that recent
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387
- [1428387-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-027) [normative/argued] -- Retail investors are more likely to benefit from investor protection rules that optimize hedge fund valuation, because their minority position in the industry, the absence of informal rules, and management's lack of incentive to protect them leave them unprotected.
  > Given their minority position in the industry and the lack of informal rules and management's disincentives to protect their investments, retail investors are more likely to benefit from investor protection rules that optimize valuation of hedge funds.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387
- [1428387-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-035) [design/argued] -- Limiting complex financial instruments in the portfolios of hedge funds open to retail investors, triggered once retail commitments exceed a set level of assets under management, would likely protect retail investors while limiting undue burdens on the industry.
  > limiting complex financial instruments in portfolios of hedge funds open to retail investors, if commitments from retail investors exceed some level of assets under management, would likely protect the interests of retail investors while at the same time limiting undue burdens for the industry.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387
- [1428387-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-039) [design/argued] -- Investor suitability standards would address the sophistication problem by requiring independent verification that investors in highly complex financial products can evaluate investment risk independently and are capable of making independent investment decisions.
  > Investor suitability standards would address these concerns by requiring independent verification that investors in highly complex financial products have the capability to evaluate investment risk independently and are capable of making independent investment decisions.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387

**2010**

- [1558614-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A country whose bankers do not embrace intentional risk taking is still exposed to risk, both through the collateral effects of intentional risk taking abroad and through unintentional risk taking at home, so domestic cultural restraint is not a sufficient safeguard.
  > Countries where bankers do not typically embrace intentional risk taking are still vulnerable to collateral effects of intentional risk taking in other countries as well as unintentional risk taking in their own financial institutions
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2011**

- [1806252-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Asymmetric hedge fund regulation, in which Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive regulate banks and hedge funds separately and differently, is counterproductive.
  > Asymmetric hedge fund regulation in Dodd—Frank and the AIFM Directive is counterproductive.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252
- [1806252-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-026) [design/argued] -- Implementing the hedge fund lending charge through Basel III would require no separate national implementation, because compliance falls on banks that have already joined the framework, so transaction costs for national regulators would be avoided.
  > Once the bank has signed on to join the framework, it would merely be the responsibility of the participating banks to comply with the framework. Hence, transaction costs for national regulators would be avoided.
  Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252
- [1908473-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-005) [design/argued] -- Because policymakers may adopt a suboptimal single trigger design, and because contingent capital has uses at several points in a firm's life cycle, contingent capital securities should be built with sequential triggers rather than one.
  > Given the risk that policymakers could structure contingent capital rules with a suboptimal trigger design combined with the multiple benefits of using contingent capital in different phases of a company's life cycle, this Article suggests a sequential trigger design for CCS.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**2012**

- [1998455-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-004) [empirical/asserted] -- Because both European regulatory initiatives and the United States academic debate concentrate on the technical design features of contingent capital securities, the possible corporate governance applications of those securities are mostly ignored.
  > Regulatory initiatives in Europe and the academic debate in the United States focus on improving the technical design fea- tures of contingent capital securities. Given the importance of technical design features, possible applications of CCS for corpo- rate governance are mostly ignored.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-029) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The social welfare maximization potential of contingent capital securities is lower if their design features are left entirely to private ordering, because private parties do not necessarily structure those features with a view toward the common good, the avoidance of future bailouts, or the limitation of systemic risk and contagion.
  > The social welfare maximization potential of CCS could be lower if the design features are entirely left to private ordering.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [1998455-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-040) [design/argued] -- Contingent capital can facilitate an incentive structure that lets regulators rely partially on private party contracting for the design of these securities while still accounting for systemic risk.
  > Contingent capital could help fa- cilitate an incentive structure that allows regulators to rely par- tially on private party contracting for the design of CCS to ac- count for systemic risk.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**2013**

- [2267560-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-017) [design/argued] -- Rules should be promulgated only after the particularized need for the rule has been identified and possible effects on society at large have been evaluated.
  > Rules are promulgated only after the particularized need for rules has been identified and possible effects on the society at large have been evaluated.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2273857-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-012) [design/argued] -- Dynamic elements built into the regulatory structure would allow regulators to continually adapt to new market environments, to financial innovation, and to changes in financial markets that are themselves caused by financial regulation.
  > Dynamic elements in the regulatory structure may allow regulators to continually adapt to new market environments, financial innovation, and to changes in financial markets as a result of financial regulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-043) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic regulation is the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively optimal regulation, and it is intended to counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than replace them.
  > Dynamic regulation may be seen as the antithesis of static, stable, and presumptively "optimal" regulation and it may help counterbalance the effects of stable and presumptively optimal rules.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-046](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-046) [normative/argued] -- Regulatory cycles would benefit from supplementing, rather than replacing, the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements.
  > The author identifies common elements of regulatory crises and suggests normatively that regulatory cycles could benefit from supplementing the existing regulatory framework with dynamic elements.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-051](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-051) [condition/argued] -- Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches is effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions.
  > Experimentation with different combinations of regulatory approaches can be effective when several different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different jurisdictions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-031) [design/argued] -- The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry that enhances and extends the established regulatory framework rather than replacing it.
  > The shortcomings of stable rules, especially the perpetual need for rule enactment and revision, could justify a supplemental dynamic approach to regulating the financial industry.43 Dynamic regulation would not replace the established regulatory framework but could enhance and extend it.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033) [design/asserted] -- Dynamic Regulation could help avoid the regulatory sine curve and its negative and costly consequences, and could provide a self enforcement mechanism independent of the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement.
  > 2.) Dynamic Regulation may help avoid the regulatory sine curve46 and its negative and costly consequences; 3.) Dynamic Regulation could provide a self – enforcement mechanism, independent from the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement;
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-034) [design/asserted] -- Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and to adapt stable rules accordingly.
  > 4.) Dynamic Regulation may enable regulators to anticipate future changes and challenges and adapt stable rules accordingly.
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**2014**

- [2447306-042](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-042) [design/argued] -- Standardizing private fund adviser reporting obligations is the author's proposed remedy for the shortcomings advisers identified, because standardization attacks the ambiguity and inefficiency in the reporting requirements at their source and simplifies the disclosure regime.
  > Standardization may help address the ambiguities and inefficiencies that currently exist in the reporting requirements and help simplify and streamline the disclosure requirements for the private fund industry.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306
- [2447306-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-043) [design/argued] -- A single standardized reporting model will not suffice: because different types of private fund advisers have competing needs, policy makers should evaluate several different models for standardizing Form PF reporting.
  > To adequately address the competing needs of different types of private fund advisers, policy-makers should consider different models for standardization of Form PF reporting requirements.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306
- [2470008-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-002) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Accuracy and consistency problems in the SEC's private fund data collection can impair the FSOC's ability to evaluate the systemic risk posed by private fund advisers.
  > Evidence that the SEC's data collection encounters accuracy and consistency problems might hamper the FSOC's ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private fund advisers.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [2470008-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-014) [design/argued] -- Form PF data was tailored primarily for the FSOC rather than for the SEC's own purposes, a design choice that shaped the level of reporting required.
  > The data collected via Form PF has been tailored primarily for the use of the FSOC.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [2470008-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-032) [design/argued] -- Form PF instructions need clarification and its definitions, including those for RAUM and AUM, need improvement, since there is evidence that questions and definitions had to be optimized.
  > There is also evidence that Form PF questions and definitions had to be optimized, including performance information required by Form PF.177 Form PF instructions generally needs clarification and the definitions for RAUM/AUM in Form PF, among others, have to be improved.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [2470008-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-040) [normative/argued] -- Fixing the identified problems with Form PF data would help optimize the FSOC's systemic risk assessment of private funds.
  > Addressing the identified problems with Form PF data could help optimize FSOC's systemic risk assessment of private funds.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The trial and error approach to rulemaking structurally prevents rulemakers from obtaining relevant information ex ante, before rules are enacted.
  > The trial-and-error approach53 to rulemaking does not allow rulemakers to attain relevant information for rule- making ex-ante, before rules are enacted.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)
- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Tailoring regulatory solutions to identified regulatory necessities through governmental contracts and then observing how those solutions perform over time lets rulemakers anticipate regulatory demands, which is institution specific ex ante experimentation.
  > Tailor- ing regulatory solutions to ascertainable regulatory necessities via govern- mental contracts and observing how these regulatory solutions function over time in governmental contracts allows rulemakers to anticipate regulatory demands
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2016**

- [2739479-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-031) [mechanism/argued] -- Because quarterly Form PF filing costs roughly $10,000 per reporting fund, the $1.5 billion threshold that triggers quarterly filing gives advisers a direct cost reason to factor that threshold into the AUM decision.
  > At an average quarterly cost of around $10,000 for each reporting fund, the Form PF190 costs may make participants more likely to consider the Form PF reporting threshold in the AUM decision.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2808132-048](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-048) [design/argued] -- Regulators should take anticipatory measures only after cross-validation and triangulation, that is, when multiple independent data analyses point unanimously toward a specific demand for regulatory action.
  > high-quality, decentralized, and real-time information for rulemaking. If and when multiple data analyses together point unanimously in the direction of a certain demand for regulatory action, regulators should take anticipatory measures after cross-validation
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132
- [2811729-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-015) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Proposed Rule 18f-4 would be highly limited in mitigating liquidity and other risks in an unconstrained mutual fund portfolio, because material leverage, counterparty, and liquidity risks in such a fund can arise from investments in a range of non-derivative instruments that the rule does not reach.
  > in mitigating significant liquidity or other risks in a UMF portfolio is therefore potentially (highly) limited, as material leverage, counter-party, liquidity, and other risks to a particular UMF could arise from the fund's investments in a range of non-derivative instruments,
  Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729
- [2831040-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-014) [definitional/asserted] -- Dynamic elements in the regulation of innovation are a supplement to the existing regulatory framework rather than a replacement for it, and their intent is to optimize that framework.
  > The author sees dynamic elements in the regulation of innovation as a supplement to the existing regulatory framework. The intent here is to help optimize that framework.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2017**

- [2834531-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-004) [definitional/argued] -- Regulation is never grounded in the full set of facts about a technology; it is always premised on a prior selection of the facts that regulators themselves treat as relevant when deciding what, when, and how to intervene.
  > In this respect, regulation is always premised on a selection of relevant facts about a particular technology.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-008](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-008) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The existing regulatory infrastructure cannot sufficiently distinguish beneficial innovation from other innovation, and therefore cannot harness it.
  > The existing regulatory infrastructure cannot sufficiently distinguish and harness beneficial innovation.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-010) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The current regulatory framework contains no mechanism that informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas succinctly and in advance, so regulators learn about innovation only after the fact.
  > The current regulatory framework lacks a mechanism that succinctly and anticipatorily informs rulemakers of beneficial innovative ideas.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-029) [normative/argued] -- The response to contested facts should not be to abandon facts, but to identify alternative grounds for regulation that would make the regulation of innovative products and services more effective and more legitimate.
  > And yet, rather than abandoning facts, we should be thinking about some alternative grounds for regulation that would allow the regulation of innovative products and services to be more effective and legitimate.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-031) [normative/asserted] -- Lawmaking and regulatory design need to become more proactive, dynamic, and responsive.
  > Lawmaking and regulatory design needs to become more proactive, dynamic and responsive.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-035) [normative/argued] -- Regulation should be demand driven, meaning its substantive direction should follow the interests of consumers, and where there is genuine demand for a product or technology it should in principle be permitted.
  > If there is a genuine demand for certain products or technologies, then such technologies should, in principle, be permitted.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-037) [design/argued] -- Regulatory experimentation matters within a single jurisdiction and not only across jurisdictions, because it gives regulators data on the real world effects of a particular regulatory scheme in a comparable setting.
  > But such experimentation is also important within a particular jurisdiction as it provides regulators with data on the real–world effects of a particular regulatory scheme in a comparable setting.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The principle based approach has a shortcoming the authors concede: it is usually impossible to comply with principles that could change after the fact, and the approach may let regulators promulgate fact based laws and rules through the backdoor.
  > The argument is that it is usually impossible to comply with principles that could change "after the fact."107 That is to say, a principle–based approach may facilitate policy makers, lawmakers, and regulators in promulgating facts–based laws and rules through the backdoor.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-043](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-043) [mechanism/argued] -- The sandbox generates legitimacy as well as information: because the tested technology remains open to discussion and democratic supervision, public entitlement to participate in regulatory debates creates a renewed sense of legitimacy that justifies the regulation.
  > In this way, public entitlement to participate in regulatory debates can help to create a renewed sense of legitimacy that justifies the regulation.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2834531-044](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-044) [condition/argued] -- A data based regulatory environment requires measures built on flexible and inclusive processes that involve startups and established companies, regulators, experts, and the public.
  > In a data–based regulatory environment there is a clear need for measures that are built on flexible and inclusive processes that involve startups and established companies, regulators, experts and the public.
  Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531
- [2957645-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-006) [design/argued] -- The issuance of contingent capital securities is a promising dynamic regulatory mechanism that can help address the suboptimal regulatory outcomes associated with disruptive innovation.
  > The issuance of contingent capital securities (CCS) is a promising dynamic regulatory mechanism that can help address the aforementioned suboptimal regulatory outcomes associated with disruptive innovation.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2957645-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-031) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Most of the design features of contingent capital securities and their triggering events remain underdeveloped, yet despite these shortcomings such securities could still help regulators anticipate regulatory needs in real time through feedback effects and improved information.
  > While most of the design features of CCS and their triggering events are underdeveloped, despite these shortcomings, CCS could help allows regulators to anticipate regulatory needs in real-time, supported by feedback effects and improved information for regulation.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645
- [2992962-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-006) [normative/argued] -- Because the challenges crypto transactions pose to the existing legal and jurisdictional infrastructure are severe, including good governance in crypto transactions requires instituting governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself.
  > Because of the severity of these challenges for the existing legal and jurisdictional infrastructure, we conclude that the sensible approach for including good governance in crypto transactions necessitates instituting governance solutions inherent in the blockchain technology itself.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962
- [2992962-024](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2992962-024) [condition/argued] -- Governing the creation and use of a blockchain may be the only practical way of exercising any form of traditional jurisdiction over blockchain technology.
  > In fact, governing the creation and use of a blockchain may be the only practical way of exercising any form of traditional jurisdiction over blockchain.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962
- [3002908-004](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3002908-004) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regulators cannot draft specific blockchain regulation because the risks, opportunities, and concrete outcomes of blockchain in reshaping financial markets are unpredictable.
  > The unpredictability of the risks and the opportunities as well as the concrete outcomes of blockchain in reshaping financial markets are clear obstacles for regulators' attempts at drafting new specific regulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Marco Dell'Erba, Blockchain Innovation in Private Investment Funds - A Comparative Analysis of the United States and (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002908

**2018**

- [3117224-027](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3117224-027) [design/evidenced] -- Gibraltar treats DLT regulation as better achieved through the application of principles rather than rigid rules, because the area of law is evolving and innovative.
  > Gibraltar recognizes that this area of the law is evolving and innovative, and as such is better achieved through the "application of principles rather than rigid rules"
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224

**2019**

- [3405660-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-005) [design/argued] -- Indirect regulation of hedge funds attains most regulatory objectives while still leaving the industry the operating freedom it needs, which makes it preferable to the direct alternatives.
  > The chapter shows that indirect regulation of the hedge fund industry attains most regulatory objectives while providing the industry with the needed freedoms.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660
- [3405660-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A single global financial regulator is not a serious policy option because national political interests are incoherent and cannot readily be united to establish such a body.
  > Given national incoherent political interests and the problem of uniting them to set up an international body, the idea of a single global regulator is not on any serious agenda.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660
- [3405660-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-017) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- There is currently no precise formula for devising effective integrated prudential hedge fund regulation, so the prudential model remains underspecified.
  > Currently, no precise formula exist for devising effective integrated prudential hedge fund regulation.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660
- [3405660-019](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-019) [definitional/asserted] -- Indirect regulation is defined as a regulatory approach that regulates the counterparties and intermediaries of hedge funds rather than the hedge funds themselves, addressing the critical regulatory issues without acting on the funds directly.
  > Indirect regulation of hedge funds is a regulatory approach that emphasizes the regulation of counterparties to hedge funds and intermediaries rather than hedge funds themselves.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660
- [3405660-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-022) [design/argued] -- Indirect regulation lets hedge funds preserve the opacity their strategies require, on the condition that their counterparties rather than the funds become the primary regulatory targets.
  > Indirect regulation allows the hedge fund industry to preserve the necessary opaqueness of the activities of hedge funds if hedge fund's counterparties become the primary regulatory targets.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660

**2020**

- [3652481-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-028) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Presumptively stable ex ante majoritarian rules are flawed because they are inevitably suboptimal in an environment that has evolved away from the conditions that produced the rule.
  > Presumptively stable ex-ante majoritarian rules are flawed because they are inevitably suboptimal in an ever-changing environment that evolves from the environment that precipitated the promulgation of the ex-ante majoritarian rule.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**2024**

- [4941807-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4941807-003) [design/argued] -- Kaal advocates an ex-ante governance approach within Web3 frameworks in which community coordinated regulatory measures and oversight mechanisms are set during the development phase of AI technologies rather than imposed after deployment.
  > In contrast, an ex-ante governance approach, advocated within Web3 frameworks as presented in this paper, involves setting community coordinated regulatory measures and oversight mechanisms during the development phase of AI technologies.
  Wulf A. Kaal, AI Governance Via Web3 Reputation System (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4941807
- [4957318-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-017) [design/evidenced] -- Sunsetting performs best in crisis driven financial legislation, where it supplies a built in mechanism for reviewing and potentially repealing laws enacted under emergency conditions and thereby mitigates the harms of legislating under pressure.
  > Sunsetting can mitigate the potentially negative consequences of crisis-driven financial legislation, providing a built-in mechanism for reviewing and potentially repealing laws that were enacted under emergency conditions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318
- [4957318-022](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-022) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Removing laws without fully understanding their current applications or interdependencies creates legal gaps and unintended policy outcomes, so the act of cleanup can itself weaken regulatory or protective frameworks.
  > Removing laws without fully understanding their current applications or interdependencies could create legal gaps or unintended policy outcomes.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318
- [4957318-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-025) [definitional/evidenced] -- Automatic adjustment mechanisms are pre established legislative components that let laws self update in response to changing circumstances, and their purpose is to counter policy drift, the divergence of policy from its original intent as conditions change.
  > By incorporating automatic adjustments, such as economic or social policy changes triggered by specific indicators, these mechanisms aim to address the issue of policy drift — the divergence of policy from its original intent due to changing conditions.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318

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