# Regulatory discretion

`kaal:entity:regulatory-discretion`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-discretion`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 3 works, 2012 to 2014.

**2012**

- [2097160-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-014) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty and can produce ad hoc regulatory decisions and adverse market responses, so they are not the best option for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation.
  > Regulatory triggers may lead to market uncertainty and ad hoc decisions by regulators and result in adverse market responses. Because regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty,152 they may not be the best option
  Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**2013**

- [2273857-057](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-057) [mechanism/argued] -- Institution specific automatic triggers in contingent capital securities are flexible and can be tailored to the parties' needs precisely because they operate independently of regulatory discretion.
  > Because institution-specific automatic triggers are independent from regulatory discretion, they have the advantage of being flexible and can be tailored to the parties' respective needs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**2014**

- [2470008-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-016) [mechanism/argued] -- The quantitative measures used in systemic risk assessment are not codified in statute, so the FSOC can alter its thresholds and its analysis through rulemaking.
  > the quantitative systemic risk assessment measures are not specifically codified and the FSOC can change thresholds and analysis via the rule making process
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-discretion.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.