# Regulatory exemption

`kaal:entity:regulatory-exemption`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-exemption`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2011 to 2016.

**2011**

- [1908473-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-033) [normative/argued] -- Exchange uniform voting rights policies should not be applied to contingent capital securities, and the NYSE and Nasdaq would themselves benefit from an exemption because it could increase marketability and trading on each exchange.
  > we believe these restrictions should not be applied to CCS. NYSE and Nasdaq would benefit from exempting CCS from their respective policies because an exemption from the policies could increase the marketability and the trading on each exchange.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**2014**

- [2447306-006](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2447306-006) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- High quality private fund data is scarce because the industry's entrenched interest in confidentiality combined with decades of regulatory exemption from registration and transparency requirements left no reservoir of comparable disclosure to study.
  > Because of the private fund industry's particular interest in confidentiality and privacy and decades-old regulations that allowed the industry to remain exempt from registration and transparency requirements, high quality private fund data are rather limited.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306

**2016**

- [2714974-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-001) [mechanism/asserted] -- The originators of the earliest U.S. hedge funds deliberately structured the funds to maximize trading freedom by minimizing exposure to federal regulation, so the industry's private, unregistered form was a design choice rather than an accident of history.
  > The originators of the early funds designed the funds to maximize their freedom to employ complex trading strategies by minimizing their exposure to regulation under various federal statutes.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2714974-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-002) [condition/asserted] -- Qualifying for one of the Investment Company Act statutory exclusions, fewer than 100 investors or exclusively qualified purchasers, is what permits a hedge fund to use investment techniques such as shorting that are forbidden to registered investment companies.
  > A hedge fund that qualifies for one of these statutory exclusions may use investment techniques that are forbidden to the registered investment companies.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-exemption.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.