# Regulatory history

`kaal:entity:regulatory-history`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-history`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 6 works, 2016 to 2019.

**2016**

- [2714974-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-005) [mechanism/argued] -- The collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and its Federal Reserve orchestrated bailout made hedge fund risk to international markets apparent, and concerns over excessive leverage combined with a lack of transparency drove the demand for new regulation.
  > Concerns over excessive leverage by hedge funds and a lack of transparency led to increasing demands for new regulation.
  Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974
- [2739479-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-001) [definitional/asserted] -- Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act ended more than fifty years during which the hedge fund industry operated under low-level regulatory oversight, constituting a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework for private funds.
  > Over fifty years of low-level regulatory oversight for the hedge fund in- dustry ended with Title IV.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479
- [2811718-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Lacking standards for private fund investor due diligence can partly be attributed to private funds' unique market position: unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities free from most regulatory oversight, so their due diligence evolved without regulatory oversight as well.
  > Lacking standards for private fund IDD can partially be attributed to private funds' unique position in markets. Unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities, free from most regulatory oversight. Accordingly, the private fund IDD evolved without regulatory oversight.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence – Evidence from 1995 to 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718
- [2816408-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-032) [empirical/argued] -- For much of its history the private fund industry has treated adviser registration and disclosure of proprietary information as a threat to its profitability, a view this study's evidence does not support.
  > For much of its history, the private fund industry has viewed private fund adviser registration and the disclosure of proprietary information as a threat to its profitability.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408

**2017**

- [2998097-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-031) [mechanism/argued] -- The absence of due diligence standards traces to private funds' unique market position: unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities free from most regulatory oversight, so their investor due diligence also evolved without oversight.
  > Lack of standards for private fund investor due diligence could partially be attributed to private funds' unique position in markets—unlike mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities, free from most regulatory oversight. Accordingly, private fund investor due diligence evolved
  Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

**2019**

- [3405660-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3405660-028) [empirical/argued] -- Basel II was at least partly motivated by the LTCM rescue and the 1998 market turbulence, so it responds to the same concerns that animate hedge fund regulation.
  > Accordingly, Basle II was, at least partly, motivated by the events surrounding LTCM and, therefore, by the same concerns and problems.
  Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-history.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.