# Regulatory reform

`kaal:entity:regulatory-reform`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 12 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-reform`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

12 claims across 8 works, 2010 to 2024.

**2010**

- [1558614-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-034) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The U.S. approach left both of its risk controls ineffective: the securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, while the expansive business judgment rule that permitted the risk taking in the first place survived the crisis unchanged.
  > The much-touted U.S. securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, yet the expansive U.S. version of the business judgment rule in cor- porate law that allowed the risk taking to begin with has remained in- tact.
  Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**2013**

- [2267560-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-015) [mechanism/argued] -- Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actions.
  > A presumption of reform feasibility for a given regulatory environment is unnecessary because the feedback effect in dynamic regulation makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-016) [mechanism/argued] -- Because feedback effects increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms and unwanted consequences.
  > Because the feedback effects in dynamic regulation allow rulemakers to increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex reforms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
- [2267560-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-040) [design/argued] -- Dynamic regulation should supplement existing institutional designs for rulemaking in order to counteract the negative consequences of cyclical rulemaking and improve corresponding institutional designs.
  > Dynamic regulation can supplement existing institutional designs for rulemaking, help counteract negative consequences of cyclical rulemaking, and improve corresponding institutional designs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**2014**

- [kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-016) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework cannot be adequately addressed from within that framework, because its structure rests on the assumption that rules ought to be stable and presumptively optimal.
  > They are unlikely to be adequately addressed within the existing institutional infrastructure be- cause the structure of the existing regulatory framework is based on the as- sumption that rules ought to be stable and presumptively optimal to address a given regulatory problem.
  Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

**2016**

- [2811729-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811729-038) [normative/argued] -- The SEC should re-evaluate its reliance on the Company Act's disclosure regime in its current form as the best means of protecting retail investors from the risks of investing in unconstrained mutual funds.
  > Regardless of the SEC's reason for inaction, the authors believe that the SEC should re-evaluate its reliance on the Company Act's disclosure regime in its current form as the best means of protecting retail investors in relation to the risks posed by investing in UMFs.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729
- [2831040-011](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-011) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Introducing a regulatory update where genuine regulatory reform is needed can deteriorate the relationship between regulation and innovation, because innovation driven by changing values and societal norms calls for reform rather than incremental updating.
  > If changing values and societal norms are driving innovation, calling for a regulatory reform, introducing a regulatory update where regulatory reform is needed can deteriorate the relationship between regulation and innovation
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

**2019**

- [3411110-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-015) [predictive/argued] -- If blockchain pushes settlement finality into the seconds range, the entire regulatory infrastructure built to address counterparty and systemic risk would have to be reformed, and most systemic risk and counterparty risk regulation would become unnecessary.
  > Arguably the entire regulatory infrastructure that has been tailored to address counterparty- and systemic risk would need to be reformed if settlement finality can be increased to the seconds range with blockchain technology.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110
- [3411110-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411110-035) [condition/argued] -- Using blockchain as a more efficient public offering medium will almost certainly require modifying the regulations governing the offering process, the processes for offering, settling, and administering securities, and the roles of market participants built up over decades.
  > The utilization of blockchain as a more efficient and reliable public offering medium will almost certainly require modifying many of the (i) regulations applicable to the offering process
  Wulf A. Kaal, Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411110
- [3441904-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-001) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The core underlying agency problems of corporate governance cannot be fully resolved within the existing theoretical and legal infrastructure, despite decades of governance experiments and extensive rule revisions.
  > Despite decades of governance experiments and extensive rule revisions, the existing scope of agency problems suggest that the core underlying agency problems cannot fully be resolved within the existing theoretical and legal infrastructure.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904
- [3441904-002](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-002) [failure/evidenced] *(failure mode)* -- Shareholder activism reform, taken by itself, has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.
  > Shareholder activism reform by itself has been unable to sufficiently improve the corporate governance system.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**2024**

- [4957318-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-010) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Sunset provisions fail on their own terms when the mandated reviews are not conducted thoroughly, because laws then either expire or continue without proper scrutiny, which defeats the purpose of the mechanism.
  > Moreover, if the necessary reviews are not conducted thoroughly, the effectiveness of sunset provisions is undermined, and laws may expire or continue without proper scrutiny, defeating the intended purpose of these mechanisms.
  Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-reform.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.