# Regulatory sine curve

`kaal:entity:regulatory-sine-curve`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 12 claims that carry the concept tag `regulatory-sine-curve`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

12 claims across 3 works, 2013 to 2016.

**2013**

- [2273857-001](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-001) [failure/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- Governance adjustments enacted via stable rules in reaction to financial crises are inevitably followed by relaxation, revision, and retraction of those rules.
  > Governance adjustments via stable rules in reaction to financial crises are inevitably followed by relaxation, revision, and retraction.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-003](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-003) [predictive/argued] -- Dynamic regulation could dampen the volatility of both the cosine curve describing common elements of financial crises and the regulatory sine curve, by creating an anticipatory rather than reactive regulatory response.
  > Dynamic regulation could help dampen the degree of volatility of both the cosine curve and the regulatory sine curve by creating an anticipatory regulatory response to financial crises.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-014) [condition/argued] -- The regulatory sine curve itself may be inevitable, but its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can nonetheless be limited.
  > While the sine curve may be inevitable, its costly and suboptimal regulatory effects can be limited.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-028) [definitional/asserted] -- The regulatory sine curve is the pattern of governance adjustments made in reaction to financial crises together with the inevitable relaxation, revision, and retraction of the rules enacted as part of that adjustment.
  > The regulatory sine curve describes governance adjustments in reaction to financial crises and the inevitable relaxation, revision, and retraction of rules that were enacted as part of the governance adjustment.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-029](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-029) [definitional/argued] -- Regulatory intensity is never constant: it increases after a market crash and then wanes as society and the market return to normalcy.
  > The phrase "regulatory sine curve," means: "that (1) regulatory intensity is never constant, but rather increases after a market crash, and then wanes as (and to the extent that) society and the market return to normalcy
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-031](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-031) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The regulatory expansion that follows crises inevitably leads to amendments, revisions, and retractions of the previously established rules.
  > The regulatory expansion that follows crises inevitably leads to amendments, revisions, and retractions of previously established rules.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The SEC's failure to interpret Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, while not a formal retraction, shows that Section 402 is another instance of politically motivated rulemaking that later has to be scaled back.
  > While not a formal retraction, the SEC's lack of interpretation underscores that section 402 provides another instance of politically motivated rulemaking that later has to be scaled back.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-039](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-039) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- In the current regulatory environment the relationship between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises is suboptimal, because regulatory activity only begins its ascent once bank failures are already increasing.
  > In the current regulatory environment a suboptimal relationship exists between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [2273857-067](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-067) [predictive/argued] -- Adding dynamic elements to financial regulation would cause the sine curve of financial regulation to start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises, thereby dampening regulatory cycles.
  > By adding dynamic elements to financial regulation, the sine curve of financial regulation may start its upward slope before the occurrence of financial crises.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-028) [mechanism/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Following enactment, governance adjustments are often later repealed or diluted, and anticipation of future developments plays no significant role in the top down approach to regulation.
  > Worse yet, following the enactment, governance adjustments are often later repealed or diluted. 41 Anticipation of future developments and pre-emption of possible future crises does not play a significant role in the top down approach to
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)
- [kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-033) [design/asserted] -- Dynamic Regulation could help avoid the regulatory sine curve and its negative and costly consequences, and could provide a self enforcement mechanism independent of the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement.
  > 2.) Dynamic Regulation may help avoid the regulatory sine curve46 and its negative and costly consequences; 3.) Dynamic Regulation could provide a self – enforcement mechanism, independent from the existing regulatory structure and agency enforcement;
  Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

**2016**

- [2740477-026](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-026) [predictive/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Exponential innovation will intensify the frequency of the regulatory sine curve, because rulemakers are still trying to comprehend the regulatory demands of the last wave of innovation while the next wave is already in full force.
  > In effect, exponential innovation is likely to intensify the frequencies of the regulatory sine curve that is recognized by the literature.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-sine-curve.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
