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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-substitution",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:regulatory-substitution",
 "name": "Regulatory substitution",
 "termCode": "regulatory-substitution",
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  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "value": 2
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   "value": [
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-007",
   "text": "The business judgment rule can be read not as a balanced middle ground but as excessively deferential to management, signaling that corporate law is ceding risk regulation to targeted rules aimed at particular risks in particular institutions.",
   "abstract": "Alternatively, one could view the business judgment rule as be- ing too deferential to management, and an indication that corporate law is abandoning the field of risk regulation to more specific rules aimed at specific types of risk in specific types of institutions",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "offered as an alternative reading to the middle ground account of the rule"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-031",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-031",
   "text": "The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action litigation regime; substantive corporate law pushes the monitoring requirement toward leniency while securities enforcement pushes it back toward stringency.",
   "abstract": "In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit- ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime and robust securities class action litigation regime.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'regulatory-substitution'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}