{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-trigger",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:regulatory-trigger",
 "name": "Regulatory trigger",
 "termCode": "regulatory-trigger",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/regulatory-trigger.md",
 "sha256": "a99dc6f51b7498c498bb83f0d89e00814930d3dab80fd34374aa80df43bee7b0",
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   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
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   "value": [
    "2012",
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   ]
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  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-014",
   "text": "Regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty and can produce ad hoc regulatory decisions and adverse market responses, so they are not the best option for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation.",
   "abstract": "Regulatory triggers may lead to market uncertainty and ad hoc decisions by regulators and result in adverse market responses. Because regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty,152 they may not be the best option",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "triggers left to regulatory discretion"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-015",
   "text": "Regulatory triggers insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk, because executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their own risk-taking preferences in order to avoid the trigger.",
   "abstract": "regulatory triggers may insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk because the executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their risk-taking preferences to avoid the trigger.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conversion decided by regulators rather than by an automatic institution-specific term"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'regulatory-trigger'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}