# Reorganization

`kaal:entity:reorganization`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 5 claims that carry the concept tag `reorganization`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

5 claims across 1 works, 2011 to 2011.

**2011**

- [1908473-007](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-007) [mechanism/asserted] -- Beyond super-voting rights and dilution, the second trigger functions as a reorganization tool that operates independently of management decisions and of corrective action by regulators.
  > Besides providing for super-voting rights and increasing dilution, the second trigger would also be a reorganization tool independent of management decisions or corrective action by regulators.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-035) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital holders, as former creditors whose main interest is realizing their claims, have a natural interest in continuity and are therefore likely to support incumbent management after conversion.
  > CCS holders as former creditors will have a natural interest in consistency. It is their main interest to realize their claims. CCS holders are therefore likely to support incumbent management.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-036](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-036) [mechanism/argued] -- Contingent capital with increased voting rights delivers a more flexible and efficient outcome than Chapter 11, because it requires neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval.
  > The proposal in this Article would, however, create a far more flexible and efficient solution than Chapter 11. Neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval would be required.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Reorganization through contingent capital eliminates the holdout problem, because the majority of contingent capital holders, or those holders together with shareholders, determine governance after conversion, so a lone dissenter cannot collect more than other creditors.
  > The majority of CCS holders, or CCS holders and shareholders combined, determine corporate governance after conversion and prior to resolution. A sole holdout of consent will therefore not enable any creditor to collect more than any other creditor.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473
- [1908473-040](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-040) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Strategic maneuvering by creditors before a bankruptcy filing or during plan negotiations could distort the incentive structure the sequential trigger proposal depends on.
  > Strategic maneuvering of creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy protection or during the negotiations leading up to plan confirmation could distort the herein-proposed incentives for constituents.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/reorganization.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.