# Repeated games

`kaal:entity:repeated-games`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 6 claims that carry the concept tag `repeated-games`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

6 claims across 5 works, 2021 to 2026.

**2021**

- [3782193-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-032) [mechanism/argued] -- Adding reputation to the contracting game converts it from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game in which the rest of the community becomes relevant, because reputation is a future-oriented commodity that pays off with the promise of future contracts.
  > By adding reputation to the game, it becomes a repeated game, and the rest of the community becomes relevant. Reputation is a future-oriented commodity, which pays off profits with the promise of future contracts. Now the game is a repeated game which is positive-sum.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193
- [3782203-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-016) [condition/argued] -- The efficiency gain from cooperation in repeated games can only be achieved if a policeable reputation system exists: players must have histories and those histories must be available to other players, which makes transparency and communication essential to effective policing.
  > This new leap in efficiency as the players cooperate can only be achieved if there is the possibility of creating a policeable reputational system. The players must have a history, and that history must be available to the other players.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3782210-005](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-005) [mechanism/argued] -- Reputation converts a transaction from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game by holding out the promise of future business opportunities, so the value created is the improved reputation of both parties.
  > Reputation does this with the promise of future business opportunities. This changes the transaction from a single-stage zero-sum game into a repeated positive-sum game.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782217-033](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-033) [mechanism/argued] -- The solution to the game theory problem of getting a player to freely give up intellectual property at one stage of a repeated game is to guarantee a reward at a future stage by fostering a culture that acknowledges past contributions, so players seek future fame by distributing their work in the present.
  > The solution to the game theory conundrum of how to incentivize a player to freely give up their intellectual property at one stage of a repeated game, is by guaranteeing a reward in a future stage, by fostering a culture of acknowledge- ment of past contributions.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217
- [3782217-037](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782217-037) [mechanism/argued] -- Review changes the game theoretical perspective from a single stage game to a repeated game, which produces more efficient cooperation instead of internal competition and is what makes the open source environment sustainable in the long run.
  > Review changes the game theoretical perspective from a single stage game, to a repeated game. This leads to more efficient cooperation instead of internal compe- tition.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of History In Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782217

**2026**

- [6244278-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6244278-028) [mechanism/evidenced] -- Under persistent reputation and multiplicative updates in the repeated game, honest evaluation is stronger than a one-shot focal point: it is the strategy that minimizes long-run regret for each validator and is the Nash equilibrium of the repeated expert aggregation game.
  > Honesty is the Nash equilibrium of the repeated expert aggregation game under multiplicative updates.
  Wulf A. Kaal, AI's Mother's Instinct Engineered Consequence Emergent Ethics and the Institutional Trajectory Toward Agentic Alignment (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6244278

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/repeated-games.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.