# Reputation architecture

`kaal:entity:reputation-architecture`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `reputation-architecture`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 2 works, 2021 to 2022.

**2021**

- [3782210-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-013) [condition/argued] -- Because members of a decentralized network are assumed relatively equal, evidence of all bureaucratic work must be posted in a universally accessible location for eternal review, and every reputation token needs an openly verifiable history just as digital currency creation does without a central verifying authority.
  > To remain decentralized, all members are assumed to be relatively equal. Therefore, evidence of all bureaucratic work needs to be posted in a universally accessible loca- tion for eternal review.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782210-015](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-015) [condition/argued] -- Reputation tokens are meaningful only if grounded in something real, so in a profit-seeking DAO all new reputation tokens must be minted in proportion to the fees the DAO earns.
  > Whenever a new reputation token is minted, to be meaningful it must be grounded in something real. In any DAO devoted to profit, the foundational object is money. So all reputation tokens need to be tied to the fees the DAO earns.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782210-020](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-020) [condition/argued] -- Reputation tokens must have their power limited to their proper domain: for each different expertise there must be a separate type of non-interchangeable reputation token, so that a token carries power only within the DAO whose members hold that specific skill.
  > Reputation tokens need to have power limited to their proper domain, meaning that for each different expertise, there is a separate type of non-interchangeable reputa- tion token.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

**2022**

- [4067783-025](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-025) [design/argued] -- The friction generated by anonymous trolling can be mitigated through incentivized reputational architecture governed by protocols the community itself decides on, so anonymity does not have to corrupt DAO governance.
  > By contrast, if implemented correctly, anonymity significantly upgrades DAO governance. The friction that arises from anonymous trolling can be mitigated through the implementation of incentivized reputational architecture governed by protocols decided upon by the community.
  Wulf A. Kaal, DAO Fallacies (2022). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4067783

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/reputation-architecture.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
