# Reputation value

`kaal:entity:reputation-value`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 4 claims that carry the concept tag `reputation-value`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

4 claims across 3 works, 2018 to 2021.

**2018**

- [3266953-030](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3266953-030) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- The other horn of the identity verification dilemma is that when reputation is not valuable, honest users will not bother to go through the hoops required to identify themselves securely.
  > If the reputation is not valuable, then you won't be able to get honest users to go through the hoops required to identify themselves securely, since it
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**2021**

- [3782203-038](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-038) [mechanism/argued] -- The value of reputation is directly related to how well punishment can be distributed in response to cheating, so a more transparent system produces more accurate and efficient policing and therefore more valuable reputation.
  > Another motivation for transparency is that the value of reputation is directly re- lated to how well punishment can be distributed in response to cheating. The more transparent the system, the more accurate and efficient policing can be.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203
- [3782210-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-028) [mechanism/evidenced] -- With the balanced staking and fee-sharing necessities implemented, the cost of faking reputation is at an absolute minimum double the value of that reputation, which is how reputation is made more valuable than money.
  > With #e and #j implemented, the cost of faking your reputation is (at an absolute minimum) double the value of the reputation.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210
- [3782210-035](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-035) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Reputation-based governance faces a chicken and egg problem: voting becomes more efficient once reputation is valuable, but reputation cannot become valuable without meaningful voting.
  > This is another chicken and egg problem. Voting will be more efficient with valu- able reputation. Reputation can't be valuable without meaningful voting.
  Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/reputation-value.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.
