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 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/reputation-weighting",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:reputation-weighting",
 "name": "Reputation weighting",
 "termCode": "reputation-weighting",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-012",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3125822-012",
   "text": "The platform is Sybil attack resistant because all power is weighted by reputation rather than by account: an owner of a single account holding 1000 tokens has the same or more power than an owner of 1000 accounts holding one token each.",
   "abstract": "The platform is Sybil attack resistant because all power in the platform is weighted by reputation. An owner of a single account with 1000 tokens has the same or more power than an owner of 1000 accounts with one token.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822",
   "datePublished": "2018",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "assumes every power in the system is reputation weighted"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782210-018",
   "text": "Distributing salary equitably, for example equally to all members, is self-defeating: the obvious gaming strategy becomes creating multiple accounts and distributing one's work between them, which is why the salary must be reputation-weighted.",
   "abstract": "If salary is distributed more equitably, say equally to all members, then the obvious strategy for gaming the system is to create multiple accounts and distribute your work between the accounts.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "open membership systems where accounts are cheap to create"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3799320-039",
   "text": "Reputation weighted salary distribution solves the sockpuppet attack, because a member who creates ten accounts holding one reputation token each ends up in the same position as one account holding ten reputation tokens.",
   "abstract": "This solves the sockpuppet attack because if a DAO of DAOs member creates 10 accounts with 1 reputation token each, it is the same as 1 account with 10 reputation tokens.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "salary pool distributed in proportion to reputation holdings"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4957318-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4957318-033",
   "text": "In the WDAG system a legal precedent or rule that gains favor because it is effective automatically receives a higher weight, and that weight is set by user preferences and citations rather than by any legislative act.",
   "abstract": "In the WDAG system, when a new legal precedent or rule gains favor due to its effectiveness, it automatically receives a higher weight in the system based on user preferences and citations.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Future of Law - Dynamic Web3 Governance (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4957318",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where citation and user preference data are recorded on chain",
    "where effectiveness is revealed through use"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "137fb77eb82111a85f0ab5581926f762a7414ae84aaf3d56e8299db670e0e0c1",
   "status": "current"
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6655138-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:6655138-003",
   "text": "Because the agent action space in HDCA is closed and workers only select among existing postings, the architecture collapses to the Neoclassical labor market with reputation weighting, the very framework whose expiration the author's companion paper demonstrates.",
   "abstract": "The agent action space is closed: workers select among existing postings. This collapses to the Neoclassical labor market with reputation weighting, which is to say, to the framework whose expiration The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (Kaal 2026b) demonstrates.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6655138",
   "datePublished": "2026",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "architectures where postings are the only action-set elements"
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  }
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 "description": "5 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'reputation-weighting'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}