# Research design

`kaal:entity:research-design`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 9 claims that carry the concept tag `research-design`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

9 claims across 4 works, 2012 to 2016.

**2012**

- [2150377-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-017) [design/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A treatment and control design is unavailable for studying registration effects, because managers who did not have to register have no exposure to the treatment and therefore cannot generate informative responses about its effects.
  > Interviewing the treatment group, hedge fund managers who had to register, and a control group, hedge fund managers who did not have to register, would not have yielded appropriate responses because the control group would have had no exposure to the effect of the treatment, registration.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377
- [2150377-018](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2150377-018) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Managers who avoided registration by restructuring, for example by changing organizational form or assets under management, are practically and administratively very difficult to identify, so the population that adapted away from the rule remains largely unobservable to researchers.
  > Identifying hedge fund managers who had been exposed to the treatment and decided to avoid the treatment, by changing their organizational structure, AUM, et cetera, proved practically and administratively very difficult and would have resulted in a very small sample size for the control group.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**2014**

- [2389416-010](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-010) [empirical/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Because hedge funds developed under little or no regulatory supervision before the Dodd-Frank Act, the existing hedge fund performance literature largely fails to assess the implications of hedge fund regulation.
  > Because hedge funds evolved in a regulatory environment with low or no regulatory supervision until the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, most prior studies on hedge fund performance do not assess the implications of hedge fund regulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416
- [2389416-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389416-032) [empirical/asserted] *(failure mode)* -- The study's most important limitation is data availability: the preliminary findings rest on only ten months of hedge fund adviser earnings data.
  > The most important limitation of our study is the availability of data. For the preliminary findings in this study, we worked with ten months of available hedge fund advisers earnings data.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389416

**2015**

- [2629451-012](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-012) [design/argued] -- The event study design is appropriate for N/DPAs because the wrongdoing event is identifiable through the execution of a reasonably standardized agreement and because information about the firm's wrongdoing can change the distribution of stock returns.
  > (1) the event of corporate wrongdoing is identifiable through N/DPAs execution and N/DPA executions are reasonably similar in format, (2) the information pertaining to N/DPA firm wrongdoing has the potential to change the distribution of stock returns,
  Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451

**2016**

- [2816408-014](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-014) [empirical/argued] -- Because private funds evolved under low or no regulatory supervision until Dodd-Frank, the large prior literature on private fund performance largely does not assess the implications of private fund regulation, leaving a gap this study fills.
  > Because private funds evolved in a regulatory environment with low or no regulatory supervision until the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, most prior studies on private fund performance do not assess the implications of private fund regulation.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-016](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-016) [design/argued] -- The study identifies the causal effect of Title IV by treating the March 30, 2012 registration effective date combined with the $150 million AUM threshold as an exogenous regulatory shock, so that any discontinuity in returns at the cutoff is evidence of a causal treatment effect.
  > The basic idea behind the RD design is that any discontinuity in the conditional distribution of Yi as a function of Xi at the cutoff value c is interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of the treatment.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-017](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-017) [design/argued] -- A fuzzy regression discontinuity design was run to test whether the discontinuity occurred at a date other than March 30, 2012, on the theory that advisers may have anticipated compliance costs in the preceding months.
  > The reason for implementing FRD is that hedge fund advisers may have anticipated the costs of compliance with mandatory disclosure in the months preceding the enactment of the Dodd Frank Act.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408
- [2816408-028](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-028) [design/argued] -- To sharpen assignment to treatment and control, actual registration histories were pulled from the SEC's IAPD website and historical Form ADV data and combined with Morningstar variables to build two additional control groups: firms already registered with no status change, and foreign firms completely unaffected by the US legal regime.
  > create two additional control groups of exempt reporting advisers (ERAs): (1) only firms that were already registered and had no change in status, and (2) foreign firms that are completely unaffected by the US legal regime.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/research-design.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.