# Resolution

`kaal:entity:resolution`

**Status.** derived

This node is assembled mechanically from the 3 claims that carry the concept tag `resolution`. It is a roster of what the corpus says under this term. It is **not** an adjudicated definition: no single statement here has been ruled canonical, and no first-appearance call has been made. Read the claims and judge for yourself.

## Every claim under this term

3 claims across 2 works, 2012 to 2012.

**2012**

- [1998455-013](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-013) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- Converting contingent capital securities too late makes the capital injection superfluous, because by that stage the institution may face unresolvable difficulties that a capital injection can only marginally soften, and conversion may not suffice once the institution has entered resolution.
  > On the other hand, converting CCS too late could make the capital injection superfluous. At that stage, the financial institu- tion may have experienced unresolvable financial difficulties that may only marginally be softened with a capital injection.
  Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455
- [2061166-032](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-032) [failure/argued] *(failure mode)* -- A trigger that fires too late is equally useless: by then the financial institution may already be in the resolution stage, and conversion at that point will not supply enough equity to turn the company around.
  > If conversion from debt to equity is triggered too late, the financial institution may already be in the resolution stage and conversion at that stage would not supply the company with sufficient equity to turn the company around.
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166
- [2061166-034](https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-034) [design/argued] -- A second, sequential trigger placed before reorganization or resolution cushions the risk that policy makers misstructure the first trigger, absorbing the negative effects of inadequate or untimely conversion at the moment the institution needs capital.
  > Given the risk that policy makers may not structure the trigger appropriately, the negative effects of inadequate or untimely conversion of debt into equity at a time when the company requires a capital injection could be cushioned with a second trigger
  Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

## Verify

Every claim above resolves to a record carrying a verbatim source quote, the sha256 of the source PDF, and a preformatted citation. Nothing here asks to be taken on trust.

    curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/resolution.md | sha256sum

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of this entity node. Its sha256 is the content hash.