{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/risk-control",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:risk-control",
 "name": "Risk control",
 "termCode": "risk-control",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/index.json"
 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/risk-control.md",
 "sha256": "0bbaa4cde069c7aa79a6d629e0b7c9e85fd29fddf1c42f4eeea8c4d3d74171cc",
 "additionalProperty": [
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   "name": "status",
   "value": "derived"
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   "name": "claim_count",
   "value": 2
  },
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   "value": 2
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  {
   "@type": "PropertyValue",
   "name": "year_span",
   "value": [
    "2012",
    "2012"
   ]
  },
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  }
 ],
 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-034",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-034",
   "text": "Management incentives for risk control are heightened upon conversion, especially where management knows that holders of converted contingent capital would command a majority vote, with or without institutional shareholders.",
   "abstract": "More importantly, management incen- tives for risk control could be heightened upon conversion, espe- cially if management knows that CCS holders would have a ma- jority vote upon conversion (with or without institutional shareholders).",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "depends on the volume of CCS issuance, which determines the influence of CCS holders"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2061166-021",
   "text": "Contingent capital supports general risk control and reduces moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing the costs of bank failure rather than externalizing them onto taxpayers.",
   "abstract": "Contingent capital may also support general risk control in financial institutions454 and may contribute to minimizing moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible and internalizing bank failure costs.",
   "citation": "Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'risk-control'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}