{
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 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/risk-incentives",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:risk-incentives",
 "name": "Risk incentives",
 "termCode": "risk-incentives",
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-017",
   "text": "Contingent capital rules could contribute to overriding the moral reasoning of decision makers, in which case contingent capital would actually increase, not reduce, risk incentives for institutions that are too big to fail.",
   "abstract": "This could mean that contingent capital rules could actually contribute to overriding decision maker's moral reasoning. In that case, contingent capital could actually increase risk incentives for SI- FIs that are too big to fail.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where decision makers operate under an illusion of heightened protection",
    "where the underlying contingent capital design is flawed"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1998455-019",
   "text": "Switching to contingent capital financing could reinforce rather than dampen risk incentives, and these distorted risk incentives are a drawback of contingent capital issuances.",
   "abstract": "In effect, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk in- centives and these distorted risk incentives could create draw- backs for CCS issuances.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "where the issuing institution is already treated as too big to fail",
    "the author notes these drawbacks are unlikely to materialize in the near term given the nascent market"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'risk-incentives'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}