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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-003",
   "text": "Contesting the view that the 2008 crisis was an American problem inflicted on foreign victims, the authors argue that non U.S. institutions such as German banks were willing participants in the risk taking, even where they did not fully understand the risks they assumed.",
   "abstract": "The experience of German banks with CDOs, however, revealed that some of the non- U.S. victims were willing participants in the risk, even if they did not always fully understand the risks.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
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    "applies to European banks that bought or sponsored U.S. structured credit products"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-014",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-014",
   "text": "The U.S. governance structure, built on periodic disclosure of performance data and stock price maximization, encourages risk taking because managers feel compelled to meet shareholder expectations at every reporting interval.",
   "abstract": "Risk taking in this context may be encour- aged by the perceived need to satisfy expectations of shareholders. Managers feel compelled to fulfill performance expectations whenev- er results are disclosed, be it quarterly, bi-annually, or annually.",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
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   "text": "The incentive effects of corporate governance controls may not operate in systemically important financial institutions, because managers and owners who anticipate a bailout commitment adjust their risk preferences upward.",
   "abstract": "the incentives originating from corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs. SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out.108 If that is the case, SIFI principals-managers-owners may anticipate a bailout commitment and adjust their risk preferences upwards.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
   "datePublished": "2011",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1908473-018",
   "text": "The threat of loss on conversion and the implicit dilution of existing stock holdings reduce shareholders' incentive to press management for higher risk in pursuit of higher returns.",
   "abstract": "The threat of loss due to conversion of CCS and the implicit dilution of stock holdings could reduce incentives for shareholders to encourage management to take higher risks for higher returns.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473",
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   "text": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss on conversion, reduces the pressure shareholders place on the management of systemically important financial institutions to take higher risks.",
   "abstract": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings in combination with a threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder pressure on SIFI management to take higher risks.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
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   "text": "A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important institutions to lower risk taking implicitly and to achieve an indirect, institution specific form of corporate governance reform through increased checks and balances.",
   "abstract": "With a design that increases voting rights, SI- FIs could implicitly lower risk-taking and allow for a form of in- direct and institution- specific corporate governance reform, i.e., increased checks and balances.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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    "where CCS are issued with a voting rights increase upon conversion",
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   "text": "Because the threat of a change of control leads leaders to take fewer risks in order to avoid triggering conversion, a contingent capital design with increased voting rights allows those leaders to act more in accordance with their moral convictions and conscience.",
   "abstract": "It could allow SIFI leaders to increasingly act in accordance with their moral convictions and conscience because the threat of change of control may influence SIFI leaders to take fewer risks to avoid triggering the conversion of CCS and a possible change of con- trol.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "A contingent capital award to executives without a conversion feature yields only limited governance improvement and only limited incentive to lower risk-taking; in its current form it operates as a mere compensation supplement.",
   "abstract": "Barclays's issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "text": "Regulatory triggers insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk, because executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their own risk-taking preferences in order to avoid the trigger.",
   "abstract": "regulatory triggers may insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk because the executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their risk-taking preferences to avoid the trigger.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
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    "conversion decided by regulators rather than by an automatic institution-specific term"
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   "text": "Because conversion damages both the debt portion and the surviving equity portion of an executive's package at the moment equity matters most for total pay, the combined effect is a strong incentive for executives to lower risk in order to avoid the triggering event.",
   "abstract": "convertible bonds portion is converted and when equity is increasingly important to maintain the overall value of executive compensation.174 The combined effect could be a strong incentive for executives to take lower risks in order to avoid the triggering event.175",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
   "datePublished": "2012",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-035",
   "text": "Before conversion, contingent convertible bonds incentivize executives to lower risk-taking because their prices are sensitive to the downside risks of SIFIs, including default risk.",
   "abstract": "before conversion into equity, contingent convertible bonds can incentivize executives to lower their risk-taking because contingent convertible bond prices are sensitive to downside risks of SIFIs, including the risk of default.226",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2097160-036",
   "text": "Against the critique that long-term debt in pay does not deter short-run risky bets because expected short-term gains exceed the discounted value of the debt, adding early-trigger contingent convertible bonds changes managers' incentives by forcing them to weigh the effects of triggering events rather than only the debt to equity mix of their portfolio.",
   "abstract": "portion of executives' compensation packages could change managers' incentives. Executives would no longer simply focus on the debt versus equity portion of their portfolio; they would also consider the effects of triggering events.237",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160",
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   "text": "An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increases executives' incentives to lower risk-taking.",
   "abstract": "Contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for executives to lower their risk-taking.282",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2337268-001",
   "text": "The Investment Advisers Act prohibits contingent fee arrangements between investment advisers and their clients because such arrangements could induce inappropriate risk taking by the adviser.",
   "abstract": "Because contingent fee arrangements could lead to inappropriate risk taking by investment advisers, contingent fee arrangements between investment advisers and their clients are prohibited.7",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Investment Adviser Regulation (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337268",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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    "advisory contracts governed by the IAA",
    "outside the post 1985 exemption for certain qualifying large advisory contracts"
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010",
   "text": "Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company itself.",
   "abstract": "Inadequately informed directors may underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in more risky behavior than is desirable for the company itself.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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    "directors depend on counsel for fiduciary duty guidance"
   ],
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-018",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-018",
   "text": "The different legal standards for allocating liability in Germany and the United States illustrate rather different legal and societal attitudes toward managers' risk-taking.",
   "abstract": "The different legal standards for liability allocation in Germany and the United States illustrate their rather different legal and societal attitudes towards managers' risk-taking.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
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   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-020",
   "text": "If the liability standard were lowered, directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.",
   "abstract": "Directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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    "a moderate liability standard for oversight breaches is adopted"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-009",
   "text": "The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry combined with the low interest rate environment created by post crisis quantitative easing drove private fund managers to reach for yield.",
   "abstract": "The unprecedented growth in the private fund industry in combination with the low interest rate environment following the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing after the financial crisis of 2008-09 resulted in private fund managers' increasingly \"reaching for yield\".",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "low interest rate environment following quantitative easing",
    "post 2009 private fund industry"
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-038",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2715083-038",
   "text": "Rising demand for alternative strategies creates incentives for mutual fund managers to find ways to simulate leverage, in an industry that historically used little leverage and presented little risk.",
   "abstract": "while mutual funds have historically used little leverage (or leverage-creating derivatives) and presented little risk, the increasing demand for alternative strategies (Kaal & Anderson 2016) creates incentives for mutual fund managers to seek ways to simulate leverage.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
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    "mutual fund industry facing sustained retail demand for alternative strategies"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2748096-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2748096-017",
   "text": "The performance pressure on hedge fund managers incentivizes them to take disproportionately high risks in order to deliver sufficient client returns, and those disproportionate risks translate into proportional systemic risks.",
   "abstract": "Arguably, in order to obtain sufficient returns for their clients, hedge fund managers are incentivized to take disproportionately high risks in their management strategies, which can translate into proportional systemic risks.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "holds where managers must generate returns sufficient to retain clients"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "8f30260f2c1db728b45c4f3b9b7c64358cf9d3217277bc3c63a910c32f87b508",
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  },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2816408-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2816408-007",
   "text": "A second channel by which Title IV could lower performance is risk reduction: private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk and therefore earn lower returns.",
   "abstract": "Second, some private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk (Kaal 2013a), therefore lowering performance.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, Sandra Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance  – Evidence from 2010 – 2015 (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816408",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "advisers subject to registration and disclosure"
   ],
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   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-022",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-022",
   "text": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss upon conversion, could help reduce the pressure shareholders place on management of systemically important financial institutions to take increasing risks.",
   "abstract": "The threat of dilution of stock holdings, in combination with a threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder pressure on SIFI management to take increasing risks.48",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "conversion dilutes existing common shareholders",
    "shareholders anticipate the dilution ex ante"
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
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  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3995709-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3995709-032",
   "text": "Lower cost early feedback from the CRDAO enables risk taking by development teams that wish to move quickly through governance and upgrade processes, which in turn enables accelerated growth and scaling of experimentation.",
   "abstract": "The feedback provided by the CRDAO for the developer community enables risk-taking for dev teams who wish to move quickly through their governance and upgrade process, which in turn enables accelerated growth and scaling of experimentation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, How DAOs Optimize Open-Source Code Reviews and Create Open-Source Standards (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995709",
   "datePublished": "2021",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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    "dev teams operating with fast governance and upgrade cycles"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "6d77dbfb15ee86080bfde0b98089180cabafeb6defdf0f05eaaeb3cb99871e89",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4734750-028",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:4734750-028",
   "text": "Fast community feedback enables development teams to take risks and move quickly through their governance and upgrade processes, which in turn accelerates growth and the scaling of experimentation.",
   "abstract": "enables risk-taking for dev teams who wish to move quickly through their governance and upgrade process, which in turn enables accelerated growth and scaling of experimentation.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750",
   "datePublished": "2024",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "60eadf91c0913468505afc664c8d8d1e1673d6c5326d031ca7060addb8ab2eda",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "24 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'risk-taking'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}