{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "DefinedTerm",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/rule-subversion",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:rule-subversion",
 "name": "Rule subversion",
 "termCode": "rule-subversion",
 "inDefinedTermSet": {
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 },
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
 "dateModified": "2026-07-29",
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 "subjectOf": [
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782192-017",
   "text": "The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategies always exist that follow the rules and still allow a minority player to profit at the expense of the majority.",
   "abstract": "The Folk Theorems of Game Theory (explained in Chapter ^) prove the point that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted. Strategies al- ways exist which follow the rules and yet allow a minority player to profit at the ex- pense of the majority.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Introduction to Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782192",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "any formally specified rule set analyzed as a repeated game"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e7eafd56cb8a8bd15b64cf58216bb655f939bdcc296387e362fd9191976d67ae",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3782203-017",
   "text": "However rules are formalized in a realistic setting, there exist strategies that follow the rules yet subvert the intentions of the framers, so legal strategies will always be available that profit an individual adversary at the expense of the group.",
   "abstract": "This leads to the intuition that however rules are formalized in a realistic situation, there are strategies which follow the rules, but still subvert the intentions of the fram- ers. There are legal strategies that profit the individual adversary at the expense of the group.",
   "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
   "datePublished": "2021",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "realistic repeated games",
    "players able to precommit to strategies"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "2 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'rule-subversion'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}