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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-017",
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   "text": "The SEC would be better advised to interpret the rulemaking authority it received from Congress than to increase requirements on hedge funds in order to address concerns over potential systemic risk.",
   "abstract": "Perhaps the SEC would be well advised to interpret the authority it received from Congress rather than to increase the requirements on hedge funds to address concerns over potential systemic risk.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252",
   "datePublished": "2011",
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   "text": "Dynamic regulation is an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional Economics framework, describing intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic regulation describes intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and thereby improve institutional design.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process may increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and may improve institutional design.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560",
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   "text": "The institutional infrastructure for rulemaking was designed for a relatively stable society and stable economic and market environments, and it therefore fails to keep pace with rapidly evolving and increasingly complex modern markets.",
   "abstract": "The growing number of rule enactments, revisions, and revocations suggests that existing rules and institutional structures for rulemaking are becoming less capable of addressing the rapid pace of change.",
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   "text": "Trial-and-error rulemaking is suboptimal because participating actors acquire the necessary information ex-post, only after rules have turned out to be suboptimal, rather than increasing the availability of relevant information ex-ante.",
   "abstract": "is suboptimal for rulemaking because, rather than increasing the availability of relevant information ex-ante (through a dynamic process as proposed in this paper), participating actors acquire the necessary information ex-post after rules turn out to be suboptimal.",
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   "text": "Rules should be promulgated only after the particularized need for the rule has been identified and possible effects on society at large have been evaluated.",
   "abstract": "Rules are promulgated only after the particularized need for rules has been identified and possible effects on the society at large have been evaluated.",
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   "text": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.",
   "abstract": "A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).",
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   "text": "The combination of multiple feedback processes results in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information-enhancing events that minimizes ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable rules after those rules have already emerged as failures.",
   "abstract": "The combination of these feedback processes can result in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information- enhancing events. This process can help minimize ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable and presumptively optimal rules after previous stable rules have emerged as failures.",
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   "text": "Under dynamic regulation, ex-ante experimentation before the enactment of rules becomes the focal point of rulemaking, and anticipation of and adaptability to future contingencies become part of the rulemaking process.",
   "abstract": "Ex-ante experimentation (before the enactment of rules) becomes the focal point of rulemaking. The feedback effect improves the availability and quality of information for rulemaking ex-ante, helping to preempt suboptimal rules.",
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   "text": "Congress, financial regulators, and the financial regulation literature rely almost exclusively on rules presumed to be stable and optimal, which is the common denominator of regulatory responses to crises.",
   "abstract": "Congress, financial regulators, and the literature on financial regulation rely almost exclusively on \"stable\" and presumptively \"optimal\" rules.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "Rulemakers discount or willingly accept unknown future contingencies and the inevitable need for later revision, amendment, and retraction, because they are pursuing certainty and predictability in the rules they enact.",
   "abstract": "To attain certainty and increase predictability, rulemakers discount or often willingly accept unknown future contingencies and the inevitable need for rule revision, amendments, and retractions.",
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   "text": "Financial rulemaking is most needed ex-ante before financial crises, not ex-post after crises have already imposed steep costs on the economy, markets, and financial institutions and have distorted the rulemaking process itself.",
   "abstract": "Financial rulemaking is most needed ex-ante before financial crises, not ex-post after crises created steep costs on the economy, impacted markets and financial institutions, and affected the rulemaking process.",
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   "text": "Post-crisis rulemaking occurs in an economic, political, and legal environment whose sense of urgency prevents a full evaluation of the consequences of new rules for all affected constituencies.",
   "abstract": "Rulemaking takes place in an economic, political, and legal environment that creates a sense of urgency for rulemaking and may not permit a full evaluation of the possible consequences for all constituencies.",
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   "text": "The shock conditions that trigger calls for rulemaking have typically not been analyzed or absorbed systematically, so rulemaking under those conditions is associated with high levels of incomplete information.",
   "abstract": "Shock conditions that call for rulemaking often have not been appropriately analyzed and absorbed in a systematic fashion and are, thus, often associated with high levels of incomplete information.",
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   "text": "The bounded rationality of public rulemakers aggravates shock conditions during rulemaking, because rulemakers satisfy their own constituencies rather than all affected parties and are therefore more willing to act on incomplete information.",
   "abstract": "The bounded rationality of public rulemakers—who are satisfying their respective constituencies rather than all affected parties and, therefore, may be more willing to act in an environment of incomplete information—can aggravate shock conditions during the rulemaking process.",
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   "text": "Increasing the availability of relevant information for rulemaking through a countercyclical and dynamic process is a starting point for improved rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Increasing the availability of relevant information for rulemaking in a countercyclical and dynamic process could be a starting point for improved rulemaking.",
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   "text": "Dynamic financial regulation is the study of financial regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, by analogy to economic dynamics.",
   "abstract": "the concept of dynamic financial regulation describes the study of financial regulatory phenomena in relation to preceding and succeeding events",
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   "text": "In a dynamic framework rulemaking ceases to be a merely reactive process driven by the collective action problem, and instead increasingly uses institution specific and decentralized information that both reflects preceding events and anticipates future contingencies.",
   "abstract": "rulemaking in a dynamic framework increasingly utilizes institution specific and decentralized information reflecting preceding events and attempting to anticipate succeeding future contingencies.",
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   "text": "Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information, including information on how financial institutions and their decision makers actually act and are expected to react to unforeseen contingencies.",
   "abstract": "Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the adaptive capabilities of financial regulation through the increasing use of institution specific information.",
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   "text": "Financial rulemaking often relies on centralized rather than decentralized information, which is a further defect of the existing framework.",
   "abstract": "Financial rulemaking also often utilizes centralized rather than decentralized information.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
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   "text": "The growing number of conflicting decisions under old Rule 2019, and the confusion and uncertainty they produced, is what precipitated the concerted effort by bankruptcy practitioners and the federal bankruptcy bench to revise the rule.",
   "abstract": "The growing number of conflicting cases and the resulting confusion and uncertainty precipitated a concerted effort by bankruptcy practitioners and the federal bankruptcy bench to revise old Rule 2019.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2389423-011",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2389423-011",
   "text": "Based on these findings, adviser size may not matter as much for policy adjustments and SEC rule making as the hedge fund industry and its representatives have claimed.",
   "abstract": "Based on these findings, adviser size may not matter as much for policy adjustments and SEC rule making as the hedge fund industry and its representatives claimed.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost on the Hedge Fund Industry (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389423",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "normative",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2470008-016",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2470008-016",
   "text": "The quantitative measures used in systemic risk assessment are not codified in statute, so the FSOC can alter its thresholds and its analysis through rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "the quantitative systemic risk assessment measures are not specifically codified and the FSOC can change thresholds and analysis via the rule making process",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-029",
   "text": "Department of Justice investigations of particular corporate wrongdoers generate highly relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information that is usable for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "the information generated by the DOJ's investigations of particular corpo- rate wrongdoers generates highly relevant, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
   "datePublished": "2014",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2486570-032",
   "text": "Regulation by prosecution denies corporations the channels of influence available under legislative and administrative rulemaking, since it offers no comment process and no opportunity to lobby regulations in their favor.",
   "abstract": "Regulation by prosecu- tion also does not allow corporations to influence regulations in their favor through the comment process and lobbying.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570",
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   "is_failure_mode": false,
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001",
   "text": "Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects.",
   "abstract": "The concept of dynamic regulation in this article describes a supplemental regulatory tool that increases the availability of relevant, institution-specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-006",
   "text": "Under incomplete contract theory the rulemaking process is itself a learning process, and incomplete contracts are the instrument that carries that learning.",
   "abstract": "According to incomplete con- tract theory, the rulemaking process is a learning process facilitated by in- complete contracts17.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-010",
   "text": "In the current model of stable rulemaking, path dependencies lead rulemakers to act on a boundedly rational assumption that they already control sufficient information for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "In the current model of stable rulemaking, path dependencies may lead rulemakers to act based on a bound- edly rational assumption of control over sufficient information for rulemak- ing.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "stable rulemaking without feedback processes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-015",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-015",
   "text": "The trial and error approach to rulemaking structurally prevents rulemakers from obtaining relevant information ex ante, before rules are enacted.",
   "abstract": "The trial-and-error approach53 to rulemaking does not allow rulemakers to attain relevant information for rule- making ex-ante, before rules are enacted.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)",
   "datePublished": "2014",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2714974-006",
   "text": "The SEC's 2004 hedge fund adviser registration rule failed in court because the agency lacked authority to define the term client, which the Investment Advisers Act had not otherwise defined, and the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein vacated the rule as arbitrary rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Because the term \"client\" had not otherwise been defined in the Investment Advisers Act, the SEC had no authority to determine the meaning of the term.",
   "citation": "Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "applies to rulemaking under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "7764601d3ed5bb056b58949e8411eff9dfb9855f143719062030c980c5fa801b",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-017",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2740477-017",
   "text": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.",
   "abstract": "The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, regulatory agencies, self- regulatory bodies, and the literature on regulation, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.84",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-003",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2808132-003",
   "text": "In an environment of exponential disruptive innovation, the information rulemakers need is less likely to materialize soon enough for traditional rulemaking to be effective, regulatory issues become more complex, and unknown future contingencies increase substantially.",
   "abstract": "environment of exponential disruptive innovation, relevant information for rulemaking is less likely to materialize soon enough for traditional rulemaking to be effective, regulatory issues become increasingly complex, and unknown future contingencies",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "exponential rather than incremental innovation",
    "traditional information-dependent rulemaking processes"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "3515f2317ed9c1d33ae55d70467cdf1f6c4e350065ea6a887d5d7619599ad7d2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-002",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-002",
   "text": "Although the extent and causes of rulemaking ossification remain empirically uncertain, increased legal and evidentiary burdens on regulatory authorities are the consensus explanation for the slowdown in agency rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "some consensus exists that the legal and evidentiary burdens placed on regulatory authorities have increased substantially over time, precipitating the remarkable slowdown in rulemaking by regulatory agencies",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
   "confidence": "evidenced",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "United States federal and state agency rulemaking"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-006",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-006",
   "text": "The pacing problem is partly a byproduct of the goal of legal certainty: because regulation is designed to be a durable source of predictability, rulemaking driven by legal certainty cannot keep pace as innovation accelerates.",
   "abstract": "regulation is commonly perceived as a source of predictability and is meant to last; as innovation accelerates, rulemaking driven by legal certainty cannot keep pace",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "accelerating innovation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-008",
   "text": "Rulemakers rely almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules meant to be permanent solutions, and that reliance ignores the ever changing rule environment driven by exponential growth in technology and innovation.",
   "abstract": "created to attain permanent solutions for perceived regulatory issues (Kaal 2014b) ignores the ever-changing environment for rules driven by the exponential growth of technology and the associated exponential growth of innovation",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-039",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2831040-039",
   "text": "Rulemaking in the dynamic framework is an integral part of innovation that both supports innovation and curtails it, for innovation's own sake and for the maximization of societal welfare.",
   "abstract": "Rulemaking in the dynamic framework is seen as an integral part of innovation that supports the innovation but also curtails it for its own sake and maximization of societal welfare.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040",
   "datePublished": "2016",
   "claim_type": "normative",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "de5156f14f44a5753cab55b6c4b03049eda58a143b99e08ef427aee1d261e1bf",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-005",
   "text": "The time frame for rulemaking in the existing regulatory infrastructure is largely inadequate to address the regulatory challenges created by disruptive innovation.",
   "abstract": "The time frame for rulemaking in the existing regulatory infrastructure is largely inadequate to address regulatory challenges associated with disruptive innovation.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "notice and comment rulemaking in the existing regulatory infrastructure",
    "technologies developing at exponential rates"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-007",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-007",
   "text": "New regulations addressed to an innovative product can be obsolete before they are even finalized.",
   "abstract": "New regulations pertaining to an innovative product could be obsolete before they are finalized.",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "rules aimed at products subject to rapid innovation cycles"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2834531-009",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2834531-009",
   "text": "Because technological transition is becoming a permanent state rather than an episode, rulemakers' inability to address the regulatory issues created by disruptive innovation will generate high levels of legal uncertainty and inconsistency.",
   "abstract": "technological transition is going to be a permanent state in the age of disruptive innovation, rulemakers' inability to address regulatory issues associated with disruptive innovation will likely generate high levels of legal uncertainty and inconsistency",
   "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "age of continuous disruptive innovation",
    "existing rulemaking framework"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "9cd875ebdb0266febbdcdabfca5b9b9f0de1b7ad9e3d5a8a5971bdbe469323b7",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-005",
   "text": "Because the pace of innovation continues to accelerate, future contingencies in rulemaking are likely to grow substantially, which makes the dynamic anticipation of those contingencies increasingly important for rulemaking.",
   "abstract": "Given the pace of innovation,9 future contingencies in rulemaking are likely to grow substantially, making the dynamic anticipation of future contingencies increasingly important for rulemaking.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "continued exponential growth of technology and innovation"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-008",
   "text": "Supplementing the existing regulatory infrastructure with dynamic elements can reduce suboptimal regulatory outcomes, because dynamic regulation as a supplement addresses the shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework and curtails increased demands on the institutional infrastructure.",
   "abstract": "supplementing the regulatory infrastructure with dynamic elements can reduce suboptimal regulatory outcomes.17 Dynamic regulation as a regulatory supplement can help address the shortcomings of the existing rulemaking framework and curtail increased demands on the institutional infrastructure.",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "mechanism",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dynamic elements are used as a supplement rather than a replacement for existing rulemaking"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-010",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2957645-010",
   "text": "Feedback effects, defined as informational exchange processes between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, between rules and rulemaking processes, and across jurisdictions, are a central tenet of the theory of dynamic regulation.",
   "abstract": "Feedback effects occur when an informational exchange process exists between public and private rulemakers, outcomes and institutions, rules and rulemaking processes, and jurisdictions.20",
   "citation": "Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "250b10782a5ea5dece9235a7f711aee408feaf36f2e78e310d589b5ee6304be2",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2998097-019",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2998097-019",
   "text": "Rules become adaptable when institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback between industry and regulators, that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information before rules are finalized.",
   "abstract": "Rules can become adaptable if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback effects between the industry and regulators, that produce timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking ex- ante before rulemakers finalize rules.137 By increasing the",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097",
   "datePublished": "2017",
   "claim_type": "condition",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "dynamic regulation of the private investment fund industry"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-029",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-029",
   "text": "Facts based, ex post, trial and error rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules is incompatible with the needs of decentralized systems, because knowledge filters in at the edges of such systems and cannot be encapsulated in a timely fashion.",
   "abstract": "Centralized governance via stable and presumptively optimal rules in an environment of decentralized smart contracting and DAOs further exacerbates the shortcomings of stable and presumptively optimal rules in centralized structures.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "decentralized smart contracting and DAO environments"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:3441904-030",
   "text": "The speed of smart contracting and associated DAO revisions will render regulations aimed at morphing decentralized systems obsolete before static centralized regulations are even finalized.",
   "abstract": "The speed of smart contracting and the associated DAO revisions will make regulations pertaining to morphing and evolving decentralized systems obsolete before static centralized regulations are finalized.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904",
   "datePublished": "2019",
   "claim_type": "predictive",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "formal centralized rulemaking processes",
    "rapidly morphing decentralized systems"
   ],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815",
   "status": "current"
  },
  {
   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-030",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:5886442-030",
   "text": "Dynamic regulation is defined as an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional Economics framework, operating through intra jurisdictional and inter jurisdictional feedback effects between public rulemakers and private actors.",
   "abstract": "Dynamic regulation is defined as \"an optimization process for the learning experience in the NIE framework,\" involving intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between public rulemakers (e.g., regulators) and private actors (e.g., markets, firms",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, The AI-to-AI Economy and the Collapse of Anthropocentric Economic Theory (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5886442",
   "datePublished": "2025",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
   "confidence": "asserted",
   "is_failure_mode": false,
   "scope_conditions": [],
   "source_pdf_sha256": "d2f6edebc562152f6ea706cc3ad944f7a1b81979931571e54cb782849839dfce",
   "status": "current"
  }
 ],
 "description": "46 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'rulemaking'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}