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 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/entities/sarbanes-oxley",
 "identifier": "kaal:entity:sarbanes-oxley",
 "name": "Sarbanes oxley",
 "termCode": "sarbanes-oxley",
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 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X"
 },
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-020",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1558614-020",
   "text": "Director independence does not produce effective risk monitoring: as the failure of independent director oversight at Lehman Brothers and other large U.S. financial firms shows, independent directors cannot monitor risk when managers, accountants and lawyers keep them in the dark.",
   "abstract": "independent directors cannot effectively monitor for risk if they are kept in the dark by the firm's managers, accountants, lawyers, and other persons familiar with its business",
   "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614",
   "datePublished": "2010",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "U.S. style independence defined by lack of financial ties to the company",
    "information flow to the board controlled by insiders"
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1664809-021",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:1664809-021",
   "text": "A European company retains some ability to avoid the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by declining to list its securities in the United States, an escape route that expansive extraterritorial securities litigation would close.",
   "abstract": "A European company, however, has some ability to avoid the Sarbanes-Oxley Act if it avoids listing its securities in the",
   "citation": "Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Extraterritorial Application of US Securities Law – Will the US Become the Default Jurisdiction for (2010). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809",
   "datePublished": "2010",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-005",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-005",
   "text": "Since 2002 United States corporate governance has been substantially upgraded twice in response to crises, following more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity, a concentration of regulatory activity in a short timespan that is itself striking.",
   "abstract": "Since 2002, corporate governance in the United States has been, not just once but twice, substantially upgraded in response to crises, after more than seventy years of comparative regulatory inactivity.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-032",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-032",
   "text": "Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised, and some of their most controversial provisions were never enforced.",
   "abstract": "Both SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act were amended and revised. Some of their most controversial provisions were not enforced.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-033",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-033",
   "text": "Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the attorney up-the-ladder reporting mandate, has gone effectively unenforced: there is no evidence that the SEC ever charged an attorney with a violation of that section, even though lawyers were inevitably aware of executive misconduct in numerous instances.",
   "abstract": "there is no evidence that the SEC ever charged an attorney with a violation of Section 307.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-034",
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   "text": "The SEC never actually interpreted Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley and instead merely acquiesced in a law firm memorandum interpreting the provision, so private entities in effect fulfilled the SEC's statutory mandate.",
   "abstract": "The SEC, however, never actually interpreted section 402 and merely acquiesced with a law firm memorandum interpreting section 402.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "is_failure_mode": true,
   "scope_conditions": [
    "Section 402 of SOX, the prohibition on issuer credit to directors and officers"
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-036",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2273857-036",
   "text": "The partial repeal of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley through the Dodd-Frank Act illustrates that broad rules enacted during times of political expediency are often later retracted.",
   "abstract": "The partial repeal of section 404 of SOX70 via the Dodd-Frank Act is another example that illustrates how broad rules enacted during times of political expediency are often later retracted.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "empirical",
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   "@type": "Claim",
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-008",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:2317580-008",
   "text": "Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Act have influenced and shaped fiduciary duties, but they have not necessarily improved or clarified them.",
   "abstract": "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act20 and the Dodd-Frank Act have influenced and shaped fiduciary duties but have not necessarily improved and clarified them.",
   "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "failure",
   "confidence": "argued",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025",
   "identifier": "kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-025",
   "text": "The common denominator between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and other reform proposals is a top down regulatory approach of direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.",
   "abstract": "a noteworthy common denominator between SOX and Dodd-Frank and other reform proposals is the use of a top down regulatory approach, i.e. direct regulatory intervention with stable and supposedly optimal rules.",
   "citation": "Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)",
   "datePublished": "2013",
   "claim_type": "definitional",
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   "scope_conditions": [
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   "source_pdf_sha256": "ac5c955fe01209c54c78c4575c0b8bf570e5f1259c3f855510697cf51a32e59a",
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 "description": "9 claims in the published works of Wulf A. Kaal carry the concept tag 'sarbanes-oxley'. Derived node: a roster, not an adjudicated definition."
}